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ABSTRACT 
 
STEPHANIE ADAIR RISPOLI: Anatomy, Vitality, and the Romantic Body: Blake, 
Coleridge, and the Hunter Circle, 1750-1840 
(Under the direction of Reid Barbour and Paul Youngquist) 
 
 The Romantic Body brings together the works of Dr. William Hunter (1718-1783), his 
brother John Hunter, and his wife Anne Home Hunter (1742-1821) to provide a more 
sophisticated and socially situated understanding of the impact of the Hunters and their 
‘circle’ both within and outside of the field of medicine. By attending to the emphasis in the 
Hunters’ corpus on the phases of life (including embryology and developmental biology), 
sickness and decay, and death, I identify just how influential William was in his role as an 
anatomy professor in the fine arts. I also explore the ramifications of John’s sustained interest 
in producing a universal theory to explain the interplay of organs, consciousness, and bodily 
development. Anne, a linchpin between science and poetry within the Hunter Circle, whose 
own poetry was not a private, domestic practice but rather a series of reflections both 
responding to and differing from John’s questions about the boundaries between life and 
death.  
 John’s theories not only shaped and provoked William Blake’s (1757-1827) 
conception of the human body and his principles of life and cognition, but also influenced 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s (1772-1834) philosophy of life and death. In framing the human 
body as the center of a concentric schema, Coleridge’s Theory of Life informs my analysis of 
his earlier poetical works. Coleridge’s poems were experimental inquiries that might provide 
answers to some of the questions about our psychosomatic selves.  
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 This dissertation explores how a diverse cast of major figures in the long eighteenth 
century and in early nineteenth-century England participated in a series of conversations 
revolving around a coherent yet varied interest in the physiological and psychological aspects 
of bodies. At times these authors struggle with uncertainty and anxiety as they advocate 
different theories of life and death as a means to explain the human body in a way that might 
accommodate the exponential growth of anatomical knowledge during the period. They 
provoke and respond to one another in active, inventive, and also disputatious ways. The 
Romantic Body places metaphysics, fine arts, and science in dialogue with one another to 
produce a revisionary interpretation of the poetry and art of the pre-Romantic and Romantic 
periods. From this vantage, contemporary medical thought vigorously interacts with the 
social, gendered, metaphysical, visual, and rhetorical constituents of London in the age of 
Blake and Coleridge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In recent criticism, there have been encouraging signs of life in the scholarly 
endeavor to dissolve the two cultures model separating the scientific from the artistic 
dimensions of Romantic culture. One can see these signs in a wide range of recent 
monographs, including Tristanne Connolly’s William Blake and the Body (2002), Noel 
Jackson’s Science and Sensation in Romantic Poetry (2008), Maureen McLane’s 
Romanticism and the Human Sciences (2000), and Martin Wallen’s City of Health, Fields of 
Disease (2004). Nonetheless, medical and literary historians alike still struggle to take 
seriously the Romantic interest in the body as something other than an allegory or a 
metaphor. For instance, in his Flesh in the Age of Reason (2003), Roy Porter described 
William Blake’s (1757-1827) treatment of the body as “the body mystical”. And he is partly 
right, especially in reminding us that Blake “hated the preachings of Churches which spied 
only evil in the flesh, were obsessed with discipline, and made ‘thou shalt not’ their credo” 
(438). However, Porter suggests that Blake is in battle only with orthodox Christianity. Any 
progressive interpretation of Blake, for Porter, becomes reduced to a Blakean cliché insofar 
as Locke, Bacon and Newton are Blake’s enemy. Again, Blake is conceived as a “wayward, 
willful genius, entering into an ambiguous dance with the power or poison of the irrational” 
(445). The Four Zoas (c. 1796) is briefly mentioned but Porter relies heavily on Blake’s 
visions of his predecessors such as Voltaire and Paracelsus as evidence of Blake’s tendency 
towards the antinomian tradition. He also attempts to make the mysticism of Blake an 
argument for suggesting that Blake’s ultimate project in relation to the human body was to 
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“combat all such reductionist tendencies and espouse a primitive faith which gave pride of 
place to imagination as the emanation of the divine” (445). I believe this version of Blake 
captures only part of the poet’s thought, and even forces him back into obscurity. I do not 
want to downplay Blake’s religious philosophies but rather to figure out how his anatomical 
knowledge might enhance our understanding of those philosophies without defaulting to a 
purely allegorical perspective of him.  
 In a broader context, there is some recent criticism suggesting that, perhaps, late 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature and anatomy are not so different but that their 
mutual interest in the human body was fueled by a dark fantasy for omnipotent knowledge of 
ourselves. Various versions of this theme have been repeated in an abundant amount of 
secondary material, such as The Body in Parts (1997):  “It could be argued that what lay[s] at 
the heart of both poetic and anatomical practices of dissection was the poet’s or scientist’s 
virtuoso display of a fundamentally scandalous art: it is in the masterful publishing of secrets 
of the body by means of a masterful wielding of an instrument that the medical dissector’s art 
meets that of the poet-rhetorician” (Vickers 7). The image of anatomy conjured by Vickers is 
one of dark, taboo shame. While eighteenth-century dissections would hardly qualify as a 
walk in St. James Park during full-bloom, even so, anatomy was rarely a covert operation.1 
Descriptions used by Vickers and others have neglected to discuss the mutual fascination 
between anatomists and artists and fail to realize that neither understood themselves as 
practicing a “scandalous art”; rather they conceived their work as a part of a collaborative 
project aiming to contribute to and rectify knowledge pertaining to what Samuel Taylor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 How certain bodies ended up on their dissection table would be a more accurate discussion for dark secrecies 
of anatomical studies. It is interesting to note that during the Hunters’ tenure in the medical community no 
doctors have criminal records for being arrested for practicing dissection.  
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Coleridge (1772-1834) would call our psychosomatic condition. Over the course of this 
dissertation I will recreate a conversation that leads from the Hunter Circle through Blake to 
Coleridge.  
 Dr. William Hunter (1718-1783) told his anatomy students during a lecture that 
anatomy can only be thoroughly explored when Judgment Day occurs (Two Lectures). That 
did not prevent, however, or slow down the explosion of anatomical treatises in the 
eighteenth century. But William is a figure within the history of science and fine arts whose 
current standing in scholarship still undermines the value and depth of his work within 
London’s eighteenth-century intellectual culture. We have seen recent scholarship focused on 
William’s art collection, most recently Peter Black’s My Highest Pleasures (2007) 
cataloguing his paintings and coin collection; however, his library collection remains barely 
noticed at University of Glasgow’s special collections. In the history of anatomy, William’s 
legacy remains limited in scope and fixated on the bitter fallout between him and younger 
brother, John Hunter (1728-1783), or overshadowed by a tendency to showcase the 
anatomical illustrations from William’s The Human Gravid Uterus (1794), those depicting 
the nine-month gestation period of the human fetus. In regards to William scholarship, Roy 
Porter and W. F. Bynum’s collection of essays, William Hunter and the eighteenth-century 
Medical World (1985), remains the most recent criticism devoted to William’s works. After 
that twenty-seven year silence, my project rehabilitates the full scope of William’s interests 
by placing him as pivotal center between anatomy and fine arts. And I seek to understand 
more accurately William’s commitment to the historical, moral, and social dimensions of 
medicine and anatomy. By not treating William’s scientific and cultural interests as mutually 
exclusive, then we will see his work as well as himself participating in a broader 
	   4	  
conversation pertaining to the human body, most obviously in dialogue with John Hunter, but 
ultimately, a key voice for later Romantic writers such as Blake and Coleridge.  
 Undoubtedly, John Hunter owed his start in anatomy to brother William, and yes, 
there was a falling out between the brothers, but these two thinkers overlapped in subjects 
that are not exclusively confined to anatomy or to the fine arts. Given that William taught 
John the arts of anatomy by taking him on as his assistant at his Great Windmill anatomy 
school, John’s introduction to anatomy was atypical for a young man in London, home of 
several universities and teaching hospitals. However, John demonstrated a natural affinity for 
anatomy, and began his own inquiries into the uncertainties of the human body. Nonetheless 
those bloody brothers linked anatomy to larger cultural and philosophical concerns, in John’s 
case, especially metaphysics. Whereas William tended to invest his energies in the ethical 
and historical framework of his anatomy and art students, John advanced his metaphysical 
musings in questions posed during his anatomy lectures and treatises that sought to account 
for the conditions of the human body that we all must confront.2 He freely speculated and 
theorized on the stages of living and dying as reflections of the blood’s capabilities in 
sustaining the original spark of life. It is my focus on this key concept in John that separates 
my project from the prolific production of scholarship examining the conceptions of life in 
terms of embryology and gestation.3 My work looks beyond the initial uterus conception to 
demonstrate that the Hunters’ concepts of life and death were not limited by the subject of a 
pregnant woman, but only began with the mother, and that both were interested in accounting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 His nineteenth-century editors downplayed his metaphysical musings by eradicating his questions from his 
publications.  
 
3 See Denise Gigante’s Life (2009), Tristanne J. Connolly’s William Blake and the Body (2002), and Robert J. 
Richards’ The Romantic Conception of Life (2002) for particularly well-known examples of studies focused on 
the gestational start of life.  
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for how life and death were negotiated within a human body throughout its life to answer 
how it arrived at its death.  
 While the studies of the Hunter brothers’ work regarding gestation is important, they 
portray an incomplete picture of the Hunter brothers and their social network in eighteenth-
century London. Prior to this dissertation, the stigma following William was one of cruel 
indifference to the welfare of humanity, partly driven by the anatomical illustrations of his 
(in)famous treatise, Human Gravid Uterus, along with his lifelong bachelorhood as somehow 
suggesting he had a misogynistic tendency. But if one reexamines his Two Introductory 
Lectures (1784) in light of his underappreciated archive in Glasgow then a different, albeit 
complicated picture of William emerges. He appears as a Scottish man that conceptualized 
the education of anatomy as both a British national project as well as a moral imperative that 
could cultivate succeeding generations of English anatomists. And he understood anatomy as 
intimately responsive to the fine arts. For him, there was a clearly defined symbiotic 
relationship between anatomy and the fine arts. Understanding how William conceptualized 
the dynamics of this relationship has been overshadowed by contemporary scholars’ 
specialties, which intentionally and unintentionally treat William’s archival materials as 
disparate parts rather than as fractions contributing to a single project that he nurtured 
throughout his life.  
 I have begun to forge into William’s history and recovered some archival evidence 
that proves two major facets of William’s identity: a complex Scottish man who attempts to 
appropriate a British identity and a prolific anatomist who did not confine himself to 
physiology, but devoted himself also to morality, history and the arts. He took seriously his 
role as an educator that ensured every anatomy student access to a cadaver as a reflection of 
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his role to promote the right type of anatomist. What did the “right type” look like? 
William’s ideal anatomists was a human being that strove to progress the knowledge of our 
anatomical bodies but never lost sight of the ethical realization of their humanity within a 
long historical tradition. Within his Lectures, William outlines a particular framework that 
expects honor and a profound sense of history to pervade his students’ careers. Those traits, 
for William, will cultivate a generation of anatomists that brings forth progress answering 
anatomical riddles that will, in turn, benefit these young anatomists’ future patients. 
Collaboration was also a key element in William’s lectures, but only if anatomists possessed 
a specific type of moral drive. In that manner, William functioned as a contributor to the 
convening moment between science and human values.  
 William was hardly alone in conceptualizing anatomy and the larger understanding of 
humanity as a joint project. His younger brother, John Hunter shared similar intellectual 
aims; however, he approached the metaphysical side of human identity aggressively and 
sought to locate the precise balance between life and death as a means of defining what living 
is for humans, animals, and vegetation. For William, such a universal spectrum was not 
essential to his anatomical projects, but John’s project necessarily required a universal 
answer to ensure its authenticity as prevailing truth for all expressions of what he termed “the 
living principle”. While for both William and John anatomy functioned as a site of great 
intrigue and change, for John, anatomy was restricted neither to the empirical nor to the 
philosophical. His approach to anatomical exploration as well as his treatment of patients 
took on a methodology that blended empirical knowledge with metaphysics. In approaching 
the human being through his double perspective, we can then understand how John’s 
complicated legacy belongs within a larger cultural conversation, rather than as that of a lone 
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historical figure that has been repeatedly dubbed as “the father of modern surgery”. By 
returning John in proximity to his contemporaries that were focused on the concept of the 
human being—in the most broadly construed framework—my dissertation then recovers a 
conversation between leading anatomists and their social network that overlaps with and 
inspires two prominent Romantic poets, William Blake and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Within 
this redrawing of London’s social circles, an important figure emerges, one that has not been 
placed on equal footing with the Hunter brothers: Anne Home Hunter (1742-1821), John 
Hunter’s wife. 
 A poet in her own right, and a member of a prominent literary salon, Anne engaged in 
similar questions that her husband explored throughout his work such as the life and death of 
any body. Caroline Grigson’s recent anthology of Anne’s poetry, The Life and Poems of 
Anne Hunter (2009), has shed some light on Anne’s tenacity as a literary author; however, 
this anthology not only distorts the poems, but also offers no context in which to understand 
them. My discovery of Anne’s engagement with the interests of her husband began with a 
mulberry tree. What I realized was that her poem “The Mulberry Tree an elegy” (c. 1767) 
coincides with John’s experiment on a mulberry tree as he was trying to identify the moment 
at which life departs from the plant. Was this departure gradual? Instant? Her work provides 
not only an additional perspective to John’s life, but also another voice to the conversation 
regarding the question of life and death in a human body.  
 For William, life and death served as a framework in which to develop a historical 
sense of anatomy. But also, life and death were concepts that contributed to William’s 
prevailing sense of morality and ethics. By focusing on cultivating specific qualities in a 
young anatomist, William’s sense of human history is enduring, but the individual’s 
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opportunity to incite progress in the fields of anatomical studies and fine arts is brief. Hence, 
William insist on indoctrinating both his anatomy and fine arts students with history deeply 
influenced by human values: historicity, invention, and so on. On the other hand, John 
utilized life and death as a way to articulate his idiosyncratic philosophies of “the living 
principle,” and to locate the precise moments of living and dying within a particular living 
body (humans, animals, and vegetation). In doing so, we see John less as a strictly empirical 
anatomist, and more as a thinker who speculated on the metaphysical more than scholars 
have previously considered. Metaphysical queries such as why the living body succumbs to 
death, or what keeps death at bay have haunted the history of anatomy. John’s responses to 
these types of questions along with his questions pertaining to life and death reveal not only a 
lifelong project of his that weaved itself throughout his lectures and works (throughout his 
manuscripts and published works), but also a mind that was vested in purging the body of 
what he considered to be its weakness—dying. Anne, while engaged in John’s metaphysics, 
took a different approach that saw understanding death as a necessary action if we wish to 
appreciate the finality of human life as we forge relationships within families, friendships, 
and professional circles.  
 Anne’s interest in fine arts made her a frequent attendee at exhibitions at the Royal 
Academy of Arts, whose president Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792) famously painted a 
portrait of John, but her friendships did not end there. Anne developed a caring friendship 
with James Barry (1741-1806), a painter whom William Blake admired, too. Both Anne and 
Blake saw Barry as the quintessentially misunderstood artist-genius; however, each came to 
the same conclusion for very different reasons. Anne saw Barry’s fall from grace as a 
manifestation of the Royal Academy’s inability to tolerate eccentric behaviors, despite the 
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obvious merit of his paintings. But Blake saw Barry’s mental and physical decline as 
physiological proof of precisely how wrong were Sir Joshua Reynolds’ discourses on art for 
the new generation of artists, with Blake conceptualizing Barry’s erosion as Reynolds’ 
undoing of “proper” art. The link between Anne Hunter and Blake through Barry, at the very 
least, encourages a more flexible redrawing of the Hunter Circle.  
 Scholars have known for a long time that Blake responded passionately to the works 
and career of John Hunter (see below). For Blake, there is more to the imagination of the 
human being that expands beyond its status of living and dying, more than traditional 
anatomists have allowed. Ultimately this requires Blake to drastically modify current 
anatomical understanding of the body. The human body, to Blake, is in dire need of 
liberation. Once the body is properly liberated without any future threat of domination, then 
connotations of shamefulness and uncertainty will cease to exist in discussions of the human 
being. It is this lack of shame associated with the newly liberated human body that helps 
prove just how loosely allegorical Blake is in his conception of the human being. The shadow 
Northrop Frye has cast over Blake scholarship has led to an overly reductive treatment of 
Blake as purely allegorical, one that has only in recent scholarship abated as there has been 
progress in rereading Blake’s illustrations and works regarding the human being as more 
physiological than allegorical. In my reconstruction of Blake, we see how Blake’s life 
overlapped with the Hunter Circle, but also how several key themes in his works converse 
with William’s and John’s anatomical works. For there, we see how Blake is not merely 
responding to anatomical discourse, but evolving his own concepts of the human body—
anatomically and philosophically—by rectifying false notions through metaphysical 
	   10	  
explanation that Blake believes to prove how incomplete the knowledge of the anatomical 
body is, and that for him, validates the necessity and capacity for self-reinvention.  
 In his Vision of The Last Judgment (1810), Blake writes that “Fable or Allegory are a 
totally distinct & inferior kind of Poetry. Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what 
Eternally Exists. Really & Unchangeably” (Erdman 554). This passage highlights his 
emphatic understanding that whereas allegory has a place within the repertoire of literary 
artists, it does not testify to the truth of a subject. The truth of a subject, for Blake, is not 
disseminated through allegory. The value of allegory is one of affirmation, but it is unable to 
convey original truths. By maintaining Blake’s own distinctions between “allegory” and 
“vision,” we will see the emphasis Blake places upon his recontextualizing of the human 
being as both a personal conviction and a lifelong intellectual endeavor, especially in Four 
Zoas.   
 The body, for Blake, was a dynamic subject-object in conservations with the Hunter 
brothers pertaining to the human being. The corporeal body necessarily exists to navigate 
diverse perspectives relating to creativity in the areas of invention, exploration, and social 
constructions. Without the physical body, the metaphysical creations of humanity could not 
exist or persist through historical changes. All the while, Blake believed the human body was 
hardly permitted to fully develop its potential capacity for creativity for one major reason. 
Namely, he believed that the hegemonic forces of cultural warfare restrained creativity in all 
of its manifestations of knowledge in fine arts and science. In Island in the Moon (c.1784-
85), where he initially names John Hunter before redacting his name and renaming John as 
“Jack Tearguts,” Blake credits Tearguts with having “… found the dropsy out & soon / Shall 
do the world more good / He took up fever by the neck / And cut out all its spots / And thro 
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the holes which he had made / He first discovered guts” (455). Thus Blake recognizes the 
productive value of anatomy, but does not lose sight of the gruesome activities anatomy must 
participate in to yield progress: “And formd a crooked knife / And ran about with bloody 
hands / To seek his mothers life” (454-5). Nevertheless, corporeality had its rightful place in 
a proper understanding of the human body. One example of his understanding of how 
corporeality is intimately bound up in “proper and true” wisdom is found in one of the rare, 
quirky, yet humorous biographical instances we have of the Blakes: when a patron visited 
Blake only to find him in his London garden naked along with his naked wife, Catherine 
Blake, reading Milton’s Paradise Lost (Records xxvi-xxviii).4 From this episode we can see 
clearly how important the state of his body was for his understanding of this influential 
literary work, a poem that frames the importance Blake places on the body as the nexus of all 
understanding and productivity. In my project’s approach to Blake’s conceptions of the body, 
beginning with the historical overlap with the Hunter Circle, and then ending with his 
revision of his contemporary anatomical theories, we see how Blake is similar to John Hunter 
in their attempts to explore the human body through a multi-conceptual framework. From 
Blake’s earliest introductions to anatomy from the Royal Academy of Arts to his 
modifications of prevailing theories in The Four Zoas, he becomes a Romantic author that is 
hardly an allegorical artist, but rather an intelligibly conversational thinker that uses both 
illustrations and texts to convey his answers to the profound question of what it means to be 
human in eighteenth-century London.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 When Alexander Gilchrist wrote Blake’s first biography in 1863 this story has been casted as truth, revised as 
apocryphal, and labeled as false throughout succeeding generations of Blake scholars (until there is additional 
evidence to determine the story’s legitimacy, then it is important that we treat it as secondary information).  
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 With his own later, but also powerful response to John Hunter, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge represents an extraordinary culmination of this dissertation’s accounts of London’s 
epicenter for the study of the human body. While Coleridge’s foray into science has begun to 
receive scholarly attention, there has not been much work dealing exclusively with his Hints 
Towards the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life (1848). James Allard’s 
Romanticism, Medicine, and the Poet’s Body (2007) discusses Theory of Life in relation to 
the Hunters’ influence upon the succeeding generations of anatomists in Europe (Allard 31). 
Coleridge’s scientific works build upon his early years as a young boy, when he had plans to 
become a surgeon following his brother Luke’s career path at the London hospital. Later on, 
in preparation for achieving his goals, he attended Dr. Thomas Beddoes’ lectures, the author 
responsible for translating Dr. John Brown’s Elements of Medicine from Latin to English—a 
text whose frontispiece was illustrated by William Blake in 1795. It has been noted that 
Coleridge witnessed several of Humphrey Davy’s experiments with nitrous oxide, and soon 
thereafter wished to build his own chemistry lab. But that was not all he wished to build for 
himself, as Eric G. Wilson explains: “By attending to Davy’s lectures on the history and 
nature of chemistry, Coleridge wished to add to his collection of metaphors” (643). Science 
as both subject and object shaped Coleridge throughout his life, thereby offering a corpus 
that is deeply occupied with the functions and expressions of life discernible from the 
relationship between the body and mind. The engagement between the physical and the 
psychological states within a single human being intrigued Coleridge and prompted his 
intellectual desires to account for and explain that minute relationship that he so readily 
recognized as a singularly human characteristic.       
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 Science and philosophy were not separate fields of inquiries in Coleridge’s mind, but 
rather they served as hinges for his greatest pursuit to answer how the bridge between body 
and mind develops and sustains itself throughout life. The depth of Coleridge’s interest in 
science and psychology makes his contribution to the Oxford English Dictionary seem rather 
appropriate. The word “psychosomatic” originated from Coleridge when he wrote that “Hope 
and Fear…have slipt out their collars, and no longer run in couples…from the Kennel of my 
Psycho-somatic,” which is defined as an adjective that “involv[es] or depend[s] on both the 
mind and the body” (OED; emphasis added). In his project to unite science and philosophy, 
Coleridge’s later writings relied heavily on contemporary anatomical treaties to produce one 
of his most complete scientific works other than Essay on Scrofula (1816), which is Theory 
of Life.  
 In Richard Holmes’s The Age of Wonder (2010), we see Coleridge less as a poet and 
more as a comprehensive thinker deeply engaged with a multifaceted conversation focusing 
on the human being. However, Holmes and I differ in our work on Coleridge in the way in 
which we position his responses to his contemporaries. Whereas Holmes positions 
Coleridge’s responses as secondary to Sir Thomas Browne, Davy, and other scientific 
thinkers, I place Coleridge in direct conversation with John Hunter and the two of them on 
equal footing. Thus Coleridge reemerges as a thinker who challenges our prevailing 
framework for an understanding of John’s position in the Romantic era. And therefore what 
is especially poignant in Coleridge’s Theory of Life is our acknowledgement of how 
profound his idolization of John Hunter was. Coleridge’s naming of John has prompted my 
reconstruction of Coleridge as a dynamic conversationalist that engaged with John directly, 
but also felt so impassioned by John’s works that he sought to build from John’s unfinished 
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questions to provide a more coherent answer for the origin of life and all of its mutable 
expressions in the natural world. My intention is to help fill the scholarly gap surrounding 
Coleridge’s work on life and death as anatomical questions that grew out of his lifelong 
desire to answer what is exactly meant when he states “I am”. By shifting his thoughts from 
Lyrical Ballads (1798) to Theory of Life and ultimately to Aids to Reflection (1825), 
Coleridge reveals a growing awareness of the unknowability of life and death within both a 
human body and the history of humanity that had grown out of the conversation on what 
being human might mean in London’s future. 
 When Coleridge names John Hunter and describes his imagined sensation of standing 
on his shoulders in the opening paragraph of Theory of Life, we see how science and human 
values are joined together to produce what will ultimately become Coleridge’s groundwork 
for understanding life and death within a living body as a series of polarities. John’s anatomy 
museum is Coleridge’s textbook for morphing John’s living principle philosophies into his 
own conception of the world as a single concentric framework that ascends to the central 
circle containing the human brain as the finest expression of living powers. In this manner, 
Coleridge exemplifies J. Bronowski’s claim that “the progress of science is the discovery at 
each steep of a new order which gives unity to what had long seemed unlike” (15). Coleridge 
visualizes John as a quasi-divine leader in the realm of anatomy and even as proof of God, 
but later on recognizes that John fails to provide the absolute proof of the definition of life 
that Coleridge so desperately needs, and therefore Coleridge assumes control of John’s 
project to locate the definition of life, ultimately backing away from his intention to complete 
John’s project.   
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 Scholars have speculated on why Coleridge does not adhere to his own proclaimed 
goal in Theory of Life. As noted by Roberta Brinkley, “in the light of modern research [on 
scientific progress] it is especially interesting to find that Coleridge warned against 
attempting to solve the mystery of life itself and especially stressed the danger of encroach 
meant of science on alien territory” (394). That foreboding warning helps explain why 
Coleridge appears to have effortlessly, in part, abandoned his Theory of Life manuscript 
before turning exclusively into a Christian writer. In an alternative theory John Beer proposes 
that Coleridge’s long devotion to experimenting with life was undone by his inability to 
articulate an epic philosophy that would explain nothing short of the whole of existence. Beer 
suggests in his Coleridge’s Play of Mind (2010) that Coleridge’s writing is always a 
reflection of his “play of mind[s]” that strives to incorporate and examine a particular 
premise through all views available to him. In doing so, Coleridge burdens himself by trying 
to account for all perspectives, which quickly becomes impossible for Coleridge to manage: 
hence, increasingly frequency of abandoning projects in his later years. Both Brinkley and 
Beer are correct in accounting for Coleridge’s archive of fragments and manuscripts, but 
Theory of Life is finished in one aspect: for a brief moment around 1816 Coleridge embraced 
John Hunter’s literary works and anatomical collection. While Coleridge did not maintain his 
boyhood dreams to become a surgeon, he cultivated a mind that actively pursued the 
questions of life and death in a multifaceted approach through poetry, anatomy, and most 
importantly, psychosomatics.  
 This project has one goal, which is to recover a conversation that has not become so 
specialized in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London as it will become in the 
later nineteenth century. This conversation involves workers in the fine arts, poetry, 
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philosophy, and anatomy. My dissertation is not aiming to put potpourri where putrid flesh 
truly lies, but rather to dismantle stereotypes by showing a more complicated history in 
which there is no preference for the fine arts or medicine. By clearing away false conceptions 
of the chief anatomists and medical theorists of the Romantic period and rebuilding the lives 
of these major figures, I cultivate the idea that the Hunters, Blake, and Coleridge were 
aggressive and inventive in formulating their own theoretical origins of life and of how the 
human body functioned. They did so by generating a rhetoric that freely builds on and 
borrows from concepts in an era when the languages of medicine, metaphysics, and fine arts 
were interwoven in posing the question: by what means are we human? 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I: BLOODY BROTHERS: PURSUING THE DEFINITION OF LIFE 
 
 
 
 
There is no short cut, nor ‘royal road’ to the attainment of medical knowledge. The path 
which we have to pursue is long, difficult, and unsafe. In our progress, we must frequently 
take up our abode with death and corruption, we must adopt loathsome diseases for our 
familiar associates, or we shall never be acquainted with their nature and dispositions; we 
must risk, nay, even injure our own health, in order to be able to preserve, or restore that of 
others.  
   
   -John Abernethy, from his Hunterian Oration (1819) 
 
Dead, we become the lumber of the world; 
And to that mass of matter shall be swept; 
Where things destroyed, with things unborn are kept; 
Devouring Time swallows us whole, 
Impartial Death confounds Body and Soul. 
 
   -Rochester, translation of a chorus from Seneca’s Troas 
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I. Death: An Anatomical Origin  
 
 The brothers, Dr. William Hunter (1718-1783) and John Hunter (1728-1793), have 
been reductively treated in the histories of medicine and other fields of scholarship, but so 
too has their relationship with one another. Scholars tend to focus on specific anatomical 
practices pertaining to the biographies of each brother. For instance, we see a heavy emphasis 
on Dr. William Hunter’s Human Gravid Uterus (1784) and its anatomical illustrations, and 
for John Hunter the focus is upon his anatomy museum and its diverse collection containing 
some prolific specimens amassed under contentious circumstances. However, their medical 
thinking and how it interacts with the larger intellectual culture of eighteenth-century London 
has remained distorted by maintaining the focus on the brothers’ anatomical activities as 
outliers and thereby ignoring the philosophies surrounding their work. Medical empiricism 
has contributed to the permutation of the Hunters as scientists divorced from the metaphysics 
of the human body. In this dissertation, the ramifications of contextualizing the brothers 
solely through a medical empirical lens will be revisited to reconstruct a fuller picture of the 
Hunter Circle as both reflective of the eighteenth century and yet progressive in their 
speculations.5  
 By the end of this section, we will have three frameworks: a broader picture of 
William and John as thinkers, their relationship to one another, and finally their effect on 
their contemporary culture as well as posterity. My revision is based not only on their printed 
writings, but also on archival research such as student notebooks and lecture notes. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 To avoid confusion, the first names of Dr. William Hunter and John will be used from this point onwards.  
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reason these archival manuscripts have not been reconciled with the brothers’ printed works 
is because medical historians and literary scholars tend to look through a narrowed scope, so 
that the Hunters’ anatomical collections overshadow the complicated theories that underpin 
the various specimens. As I cover the neglected dimensions of William’s and John’s 
writings, one of the most revealing, but profoundly neglected aspects, has to do with their 
understanding of the relationship of death to life, one that preoccupies the theorist as well as 
the anatomist.  
 In a few key letters from the West Indies, John’s reflections on his case studies during 
his post abroad mark the growing difference between John’s previous work under William 
and his anatomical studies during ravishing warfare. Despite the fact that John left London 
with plenty of experience in dissecting dead bodies, the development of his skill in trying to 
preserve life was a new territory for John. His letters reveal his perplexity regarding his 
insufficient skills to save lives, and this may have fueled John’s tendency to ask metaphysical 
questions such as: What is life? Where is the boundary between life and death? And is it ever 
possible for us to know that boundary? Clearly on these issues John is no simple empiricist. 
Student notebooks reflect these neat fascinations.  
 It is not until the publication of John’s The Natural History of the Human Teeth 
(1771), that we see in print the germinations of his metaphysical musings—albeit much more 
restrained than those contained within his students’ notebooks—along with his struggles to 
develop a universal spectrum of Nature encompassing plants, animals, and humans. 
Interestingly, very few scholars have noted the profundity of John’s attempt to negotiate 
these three categories as interrelated. If we recognize his approach as metaphysical as well as 
empirical, then we can read his philosophies and anatomical observations as both pursuits to 
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define life. In defining life, John aims to develop a series of dynamic relationships between 
life and living actions, and decay and death. In his studies of a body’s stages of life, John is 
all too aware of the dangerous susceptibility of those thinkers that wish to conceive humans 
as superior animals, partly because such hierarchical thinking tends to perpetuate 
observations that heavily rely on the notion of mankind’s infallibility. In turn, such thinkers 
forget that the natural world circumscribes mankind. He explains further in Teeth: 
Natural Historians have been at great pains to prove from the Teeth, that man is 
not a carnivorous animal; but in this, as in many other things, they have not 
been accurate in their definitions; nor have they determined what a carnivorous 
animal is. If they mean an animal that catches and kills his prey with his Teeth, 
and eats the flesh of the prey just as it is killed, they are in the right; man is not 
in this sense a carnivorous animal…But if their meaning were that the Human 
Teeth are not fitted for eating meat that has been catched [sic], killed, and 
dressed by art, in all the various ways that the superiority of the human mind 
can invent, they are in the wrong. (41) 
 
What we glean from the quoted passage are the rudimentary beginnings of John’s 
methodology of conceptualizing human and comparative anatomy as a shared enterprise 
rather than as a hierarchical stratum. He believes there is a fundamental principle connecting 
the two anatomies of humans and animals, but how and why this is so remains elusive to 
him. John’s drive to qualify his theoretical suspicions is consistently found throughout his 
lifetime. Over a decade later after Teeth, a student named Mr. Twigge copied John’s 
philosophical thoughts on how his study of mankind, both anatomically and psychologically, 
entailed his desire to know what qualifies life: “The facility with which a Man thinks give 
him preference (advantage) over another. Few have observed Nature with more attention 
than myself, yet even now I think myself almost unequal to the Task. A Man will be ignorant 
of the knowledge he possesses till he arranges his Ideas” (Twigge). As stated in Teeth and in 
Twigge’s notebook, John distrusts a prevailing assumption that man’s mind was always 
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superior to the natural world. If the mind is fallible about its relationship to its corporeal 
embodiment as well as its relationship with external reality, then where do we start in trying 
to navigate these complexities? In short, John is concerned about the possibility that for all of 
his anatomical expertise, he does not truly understand life and its relationship to death.   
 Medical historians have underestimated the extent to which death continued to haunt 
late eighteenth-century physicians. Clinical advances did not shut off conceptual concerns 
regarding death. It is precisely because of decisive advances in medicine that physicians 
suddenly were in the position to understand life and death. Death was not an end to their 
meditations. In fact, we see a cultural shift wherein they realized that in order to think about 
life one begins at the concept of death. For instance, John would not have thought of the idea 
to invent the bellows to bring life to drowning victims if he did not approach their demises in 
reverse. Furthermore John and William did not understand the human body as a fixed entity, 
nor did they understand death as the end of a case. The competing philosophies circulating 
around the body and its functions in London’s intellectual culture testify to the convictions 
that the somatic body is dynamic.  
 The human body, for John and William, constantly acts and reacts to its environment, 
but they ask how an organism negotiates the two states of its life and death. Both William 
and John carefully avoid reducing life and death simply to two opposing forces. John does 
not conceive death as a radically antithetical power to nature’s will. Instead he believes that 
the susceptibility to death does not have to be universal. Moreover, by discovering the nature 
of death, we might be able to overcome death. And in doing so, we might find the universal 
principle that unites all living forms. In their pursuit to find answers, however, the brothers 
grapple with questions pertaining to life and death albeit through different lenses. Nor did the 
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brothers restrict their enquiries within the confines of anatomy. For William, the 
philosophical mediations on these subjects bring about such ambivalence in his writings that 
at times he leaves these questions to the divine. Instead he gravitates towards an emphasis 
that he can control namely the morality and sensibilities of anatomists. In contrast, John roots 
questions of life and death within a larger question of what makes a body alive that asks what 
and where is the network of actions and reactions in which a body is so deeply enmeshed that 
it desperately requires to sustain its life. The brothers’ diverse approaches to the questions of 
life and death show a common, united interest, but also their mutual differences in their 
theoretical applications.  
Theories of Dissection and its Relation to Deadness  
 In 1777, William Hunter wrote that “…for anything we know, the passive submission 
of dead bodies, their common objects, may render them less able to bear contradiction” 
(Commentaries iii-iv). Dead corporeal matter and its legacies as a battleground of mistakes is 
are recurrent themes in William’s works. In his second introductory lectures, he warns his 
audience again, “an error which has been very generally introduced into the writings of the 
best modern authors, is the drawing conclusions with regards to the living body, from 
experiments made up the dead body. This, in many cases, will be found to be fallacious” 
(Lectures 96). He reminds us that such causal and sloppy inference produces the “similar 
absurdity, that of explaining the functions of our body, upon mechanical principles; arguing 
still from dead to living matter” (96). Dead cadavers and their undeniable deadness pose a 
problem for William, especially the problem of pervasive inaccuracies and a consistent 
source of perpetuated mistakes that hamper the progress of anatomical arts. Hence, he aims 
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to cultivate the proper mindset for his students so that they never lose sight of fact that the 
dissected body will always be missing the essence of life.  
 Far more carefully than John’s lectures tend to be, William’s opening comments lay 
out a basic dilemma: dissection is necessary but its capacity to account for how the living 
body functions can only ever be approximate: “Anatomy is the art of examining animal 
bodies by dissection. It teaches the structure and functions of those bodies, and shews nearly 
on what life and health depend” (Lectures 62; emphasis added). His word choice “nearly” 
reveals his agreement about the great educational value of dead bodies to teach us, but also it 
demonstrates his equivocation and intellectual discord about the dead body’s ability to 
explain the actions of life. It is not that William believes it is impossible to account for the 
living actions of bodies, for “nature, in thus varying and multiplying her productions, has 
hung out a train of lights that guide us through her labyrinth,” but the act of dissecting is only 
a fraction of a proper understanding of the body (4). William’s perception of anatomy as an 
inexhaustible source of education is synonymous with the longevity of its object of interest, 
the fleshy body, for “we see that the subject is still so far from being exhausted, that is to this 
day, and must be to the end of time, new, entertaining, useful, and inexhaustible” (62). By 
tying the end anatomy to the Apocalypse William associates the completion of anatomical 
knowledge with a final divine judgment.  
 Contrary to the standard view that William is completely optimistic about anatomy, 
he is ambivalent of just how much progress an anatomist can make in his lifetime. How then 
does dissection aid in William’s theories of death and deadness? If we consider a repeated 
phrase throughout William’s lecture—“the effects of death upon the body”—we see him 
hinting at death as an unnecessary demise of a body. If only anatomists and physicians had 
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the requisite knowledge, or at the very least, could reconceptualize death by treating it as a 
disease of the corporeal body, then death would be a bodily flaw that might be potentially 
overcome. If we understand the properties leading to death in bodies where there is no overt 
explanation of a particular cause of death, then we might just be able to answer why bodies 
must succumb to their corporeal demise in permitting the ravishes of decay. In turn we might 
account for what defines life. What we cannot yet anticipate is the fact that for William a 
definition of life will end up taking a moral turn.  
 Anatomy for William is “knowledge of our body, through all the variety of its 
structure and operations in a sound state, it is by Anatomy only that we can arrive at the 
knowledge of the true nature of most of the diseases which afflict humanity” (72). But 
dissection often acts as a corrector in identifying diseases whose “symptoms are often 
equivocal…frequently mistaken, even by the most sensible, experienced, and attentive 
physicians” as well (72). The pain of revealing physicians’ mistakes in the dissected cadaver 
affects those working on the case. Their “fatal mistakes” according to William “are shocking 
to humanity but it would be invidious, and even cruel, to expose such as I myself have 
known; because it would involve he innocent with the guilty; as in our profession, the best 
are liable to error” (72). Thus in dissection it behooves the anatomists to “be humble, to 
confess our ignorance, and to encourage every study that is likely to improve us” (72). While 
striving for accurate empirical knowledge, William’s ideal anatomist must maintain a strong 
moral character.  
 Ultimately, for William the primary value of dissection is that it educates the novice 
in a highly practical means for healing the injured body.  
That Anatomy is the very basis of surgery every body allows. It is dissection 
alone that can teach us, where we may cut the living body, with freedom and 
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dispatch; and where we may venture, with great circumspection and delicacy; 
and where must not, upon any account, attempt it. This informs the head, 
gives dexterity to the hand, and familiarizes the heart with a sort of necessary 
inhumanity, the use of cutting-instruments upon our fellow-creatures. (67)  
 
This statement about the value of anatomy does not demonstrate that William is callous; 
rather it confirms his beliefs that an honest anatomist will recognize the real limits of 
anatomy, namely that it teaches about physiological structure of the body, but does not 
account for the living operations of the body. Within his confines of dissection as an 
educational tool, both advancements and mistakes must be endured, which prompted his 
infamous description of dissection as “necessary inhumanity.” By putting the phrase back in 
its original context, we no longer see William as a hazardous explorer wielding a scalpel. He 
is justifying a Baconian-driven anatomy that teaches “the true nature, and therefore the most 
proper cure of the greatest number of local diseases,” rather than perpetuating ancient cures 
that kill patients far more consistently than salvaging their precarious health (67).6 William’s 
trinity of parts—head, hand, and heart—also indicates a descriptive order that physicians 
must conscientiously undergo each time they prepare to perform surgery, for “Every young 
Surgeon is to study[,] to cut firmly & boldly, so as to never be disappointed of his intention” 
(“Advice to Surgeons” 38). The process of learning anatomy therein requires a mental shift 
that demands that the students learn to acknowledge, yet suspend their sympathy with their 
patients. In other words, he tells his students that they must not imagine the patient’s pain, or 
they will falter and prolong the pain of the scalpel. Dissection taught physiology, but also 
served to teach his students humility towards death. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 He names two popular ancient curatives in specific: “It were just as reasonable to assert, that the bark, and 
mercury are useless, in the cure of disease, because the bark does not cure a pox; nor mercury, an intermittent; 
or, because neither of them cures all disorders” (67).  
	   26	  
 In all contemporary dissections, William agrees, there has been progress but he 
argues there is still much more to uncover. As we will see, William’s emphasis on the 
humility of the modern anatomist will lead him to show considerable respect for the history 
of anatomy. History, for William, takes on a narrative of consistent progression. He readily 
acknowledges a sense of incompleteness, but views contemporaneous advancements as a gift 
to prosperity. But nothing shows William sense of anatomy’s limits thus far as his 
appreciation of Nature’s complexities, both as a historical construct and yet as a site of 
undiscovered works of Nature: “as Nature’s Intentions are various, her Workmanship is 
varied accordingly. These are obvious Reflections, and, perhaps, as old as the Inspection of 
dead Bodies. But modern Anatomists have gone further: They have brought the 
Articulations, as well as the other Parts of the Body, under a narrow Inquiry, and entered into 
the minutest Parts of their Composition” (“Cartilages” 514-5). As the state of anatomical 
knowledge delves into the minutest structures of the body, William obviously believes that a 
good anatomist has proper book training and extensive direct experience (Lectures 87).7 
Despite the importance William places on the value of each anatomy student dissecting his 
own cadaver, he insists that they come to the dissection table only after completing a course 
of lectures: but what is surprising about his instruction to his students is his emphasis that 
they need more than strict anatomical training experiences. What we learn in fact is that they 
need a proper awareness of the history of anatomy and its rhetoric; a strong commitment to 
the moral fiber of the anatomist; and even an active imagination. Crucially all of these facets 
depended on the students’ ability to imaginatively dissect as well.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This might explain why William felt it was necessary that John’s first test on the dead arm without his 
assistance was the most accurate manner in determining John’s proclivity in assisting him.  
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Let us then, in our imagination, make a man: in other words, let us suppose 
that the mind, or immaterial part, is to be place in a corporeal fabric, to hold a 
correspondence with other material beings by the intervention of the body; 
and then consider, a priori, what will be wanted for her accommodation. In 
this enquiry, we shall plainly see the necessity, or advantage, and therefore, 
the final cause of most of the parts, which we actually find in the human body. 
And if we consider that, in order to answer some of the requisites, human wit 
and invention would be very insufficient; we need not be surprized [sic], if we 
meet with some parts of the body, whose use we cannot yet make out, and 
with some operations or functions which we cannot explain. We can see, and 
comprehend, that the whole bears the strongest characters of excelling 
wisdom and ingenuity: but the imperfect sense and capacity of man, cannot 
pretend to reach every part of a machine, which nothing less than the 
intelligence and power of the Supreme Being, could contrive and execute. 
(Lectures 73) 
  
The striking part of William’s lectures is that death shapes our relateability to one another as 
we struggle to define life. The tension between life and death also lends a conceptual 
relationship to William Blake’s (1757-1827) theories pertaining to the human body. All three 
authors are vested in discerning how the body interacts with itself, interiorly. Blake creates 
myths that advance his particular anatomical theories. On the other hand, William and John 
join in this anatomical conversation with Blake in that all three desire to know how the body 
communicates with itself and simultaneously negotiates its external reality. 
 While the theories of death and dissection for John share similar cornerstones with 
William’s theories, John’s metaphysical mind carried these questions of life and death to 
radically different ends and with far greater elaborations. Death for John is at the very nexus 
of his pursuit to define life. It is not how we are conceived or formed in utero that 
preoccupies John, but rather, why our body takes the shapes it does. Why and how do our 
bodies know to form two legs or arms, and not five? Even more fascinating for John is the 
question of what composed that “living spark” that we all so readily recognize in 
distinguishing between the living and the dead. Yet he admits the distinction is somehow 
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hard to make, for “dead animals [or] as much organized as the living,” and therefore “life is 
not necessary to the organization of Life—Life does not arise out of, or depend on 
organization” (Twigge).  
 Life, undeniably to John, is a characteristic that is “superadded to matter” (Twigge). 
Death, too, is added to matter and is not a state but “… apparently a process peculiar to the 
dead animal or vegetable” (Twigge).8 For John, the distinctions separating animal and 
vegetable exist; however, both clearly can—and do—demonstrate the differences between 
life and death. John examines humans, animals, and plants as an attempt to achieve a 
universal answer to what defines life. Vegetable matter poses an interesting twist insofar as 
we distinguish its life capacity by contrasting it to decomposition. And fossils pose yet 
another philosophical problem. In order to accurately define life, all three facets—humans, 
animals, and plants—must be accounted for within the spectrum of living. Death, for John, is 
not nearly as congruent with dissection as in William’s perspective, but it occupies a serious 
place in his metaphysics as it pertains to flesh.  
 Dissections, for John, usually operate as a site providing validity during anatomical 
inquiries. For example, he explains how his past dissections provide him with evidence to 
oppose what anatomists had previously supposed as accurate. John refers to his numerous 
dissections as proof of fallacious anatomical knowledge: “Many other kinds of obstruction 
are described by authors, none of which I have ever seen, and as probably have opened more 
urethras after death, where there was an obstruction of the passage, than all the authors who 
have written on this subject, I am inclined to believe that they wrote from imagination only” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “This mode of turning Hens into Cocks is much such an improvement for its utility as that of Dean Swift’s, 
where he proposes to obtain a breed of sheep without wool.” (Twigge) 
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(Venereal 111). John’s attention towards dissection operates on a more meditative level, 
rather than as the part of a larger education that it is for William. In 1789, Benjamin Bell 
validates John’s self-reflection of his veracious dissection experiences: “[referring to 
corrosive metals upon flesh] a curious fact, first taken notice of by that very ingenious 
practitioner Mr. John Hunter of London” (Surgery 370). As a Scottish man without a formal 
medical degree, John relied on his expertise in dissections as a premier avenue towards 
accruing anatomical knowledge and gaining professional recognition from his 
contemporaries. John built theories upon private dissections and vivisections, which in turn 
stimulated the meditative content for his public lectures: “Mr. Hunter, after telling us 
[students], the substance of these Lectures were founded upon his own experience” (Anon., 
1779). Understanding dissection as a process that serves to (in)validate anatomical inquiries 
is a view uniting these two brothers. But more emphatically and unequivocally, John tells us 
“…Death points out to us what Life is” (Anon., 1771).  
 Some scholars have argued that it is precisely John’s atypical introduction into 
anatomy that cultivated his avant-gardism. Regardless of the source, John’s theories of death 
were preoccupied with discovering what causes putrefaction in order to conclude what 
prevents its manifestations in the living body. When John mentions dissections in both his 
lectures or published works, they tend to serve as an illustrative point in confirming his 
suspicions on incorrect anatomical assumptions, to demonstrate his findings, or alternatively 
to further explore his speculations of the corporeal embodiments as well as psychological 
aspects of our humanity. Often, as we will see, John intertwines his metaphysical postulation 
with his endeavors to locate its corporeal manifestation.  
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 From his work on decay, the concept of a “living principle” evolves as John’s mantra. 
In his essay “On the Digestion of the Stomach after Death,” published in the Philosophical 
Transactions in 1772, a year after Teeth’s publication, John appears for the first time to name 
his “living principle”: 
But as an animal body undergoes changes after death, or when dead, it has 
never been sufficiently considered what those changes are; and till this be 
done, it is impossible we should judge accurately of the appearances in dead 
bodies. The diseases which the living body undergoes (mortification excepted) 
are always connected with the living principle, and are not in the least similar 
to what may be called diseases or changes in the dead body: without this 
knowledge, our judgement of the appearances in dead bodies must often be 
very imperfect, or very erroneous; we may see appearances which are natural, 
and may suppose them to have arisen from disease; we may see diseased 
parts, and suppose them in a natural state; and we may suppose a circumstance 
to have existed before death, which was really a consequence of it; or we may 
imagine it to be a natural change after death, when it was truly a disease of the 
living body. It is easy to see therefore, how a man in this state of ignorance 
must blunder, when he comes to connect the appearances in a dead body with 
the symptoms observed in life; and indeed all the usefulness of opening dead 
bodies depends upon the judgement and sagacity with which this sort of 
comparison is made. (447-8; emphasis added) 
 
 
To know what defines life, John must—accurately—define death. This living principle is 
“always acting and preserving the substance, which it inhabits, from dissolution, and from 
being changed according to the natural changes, which other substances, applied to it, 
undergo” (448). John conceives of this “living principle” as a dynamic force that is not 
statically superadded to corporeality. He makes it clear that anatomical knowledge is largely 
dependent on the tenacity and veracity of the dissector. Within the same passage we see 
John’s adoption of William’s understanding of dissection not as an instant revelation, but as a 
process of discovering information in solving anatomical riddles. Even in his conversations 
at the Rainbow Coffee-house, William vocalized this conceptual shift, one that is especially 
highlighted in John’s industrious application of dissection-as-experiment. The concept of 
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revealing the body’s organs presupposes that an opened body would, theoretically, display to 
the observer a complete and rational system of knowledge pertaining to the material body. 
But the Hunter brothers understand dissecting a body as a process of discovery, thereby 
shifting the anatomist from a position of translator to scientific explorer.  
 Even still, death was not an abrupt end for John, since he conceived death as a 
gradual dynamic process that a body undergoes: “After the suspension of action, there is a 
small interval between it and death, the length of which depends on various circumstances—
A certain degree of action only is necessary for the continuance of life; and in some instances 
a very small degree—” (Anon. Student Notebook, 1777). Not only is death incremental and 
reacts in a symbiotic relationship with the living actions of the body, it is also 
idiosyncratically expressed in each distinctive body’s dying moments. In another student 
notebook in 1779, John still maintains his notion of gradual death as natural: “…in common, 
or natural death the Body is alive, after it is dead, there is a gradual decay of Animal life” 
(Anon., 1779).  
 By articulating a conceptual framework of death that operates gradually, rather than 
immediately and definitively, John articulated what will prove to be theories of sympathy and 
its subepidermal operations that explain its actions and its role in the decomposition process. 
John explains: 
I have asserted that life simply is the principle of preservation in the animal 
preserving it from putrefaction; but there is a curious circumstance attending 
life which would appear to be contradictory to itself. Life is the preserver of 
the body from putrefaction, and when life is gone putrefaction would appear 
soon to begin. But this is not uniform; it is sooner in some cases than in 
others; therefore there must be some other cause than the simple deprivation 
of life to account fro this difference in time. In the most striking instances of 
rapid putrefaction after death, it does not appear to arise from the process of 
putrefaction having gong to some length before total death took place…But 
there is a process or an action in life which predisposes the body for many 
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diseases, and which becomes the remote cause of them; and there is an action 
in life which disposes the body for a species of putrefaction (or 
decomposition) when dead, and very probably death is the effect of this action 
in these cases.  (Palmer 225; emphasis mine) 
 
In John’s view, death and life are neither allegorical nor moral issues. Rather John wonders if 
death is just an unfortunate end or in fact a complex process. What permits the life in a body 
to cease? Like William he asks just how natural death is. He does adamantly declare that 
putrefaction relates to death, but it also pertains to the living body. Indeed he asks how 
putrefaction should be categorized and remains uncertain: “What diseases is this to be 
classed with I do not know” (226). As he expresses his concerns about his inability to 
precisely locate or distinguish the minute shades of differences in rotting, death, and life’s 
dwindling actions, he explains that “death itself produces an action in all the muscular parts 
when there is nothing to prevent it. If a man’s head be cut off, he becomes stiff; he is not stiff 
while there is real life: for there is a difference between visible life and real life…. The action 
of real death is that which takes place in the stiffening of the body, and till then it is not dead 
(expect when killed in a peculiar manner—killed universally before the stimulus of death can 
be given,—and then it remains lax” (227). Real death, for John, comes when the dead object 
no longer shares characteristics that it displayed when alive. Within that rigid definition of 
“real death,” he gives putrid flesh an indeterminate status.  
Somatic Sympathy and the Indeterminacies between Death and Life 
 How does John relate sympathy to death? Sympathy is defined by John as “a 
principle in Animal Bodies so connected with every possible expression of actions, that we 
can have no proper conception of the latter without taking in the former every part acts 
accoding [sic] to its own nature. Therefore Sympathy becomes one of the most extensive 
parts in the whole Animal Œconomy” (Anon., 1779). He further lays out his identifying rules 
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of corporeal sympathy: “it’s either similar or dissimilar and it may be divided into three parts 
[belonging to the body], it belongs to the first principle of Life, to the sensative [sic], and to 
the mind”; and most importantly he tells his students that sympathy “takes place where there 
is no natural communication …the uses of sympathy answer very important purposes” 
(Anon., 1779). By “natural communication,” John refers to ocular proof of a process in 
which one can reasonably see the contact of one bodily substance with another so that this 
contact incites action. For instance, the lung expands with air and touches the diaphragm that 
separates the abdominal cavity from the chest cavity, thus taking on the shape of surrounding 
organs. Even in the disappearance of a natural communication system in death, we can still 
discern its effects; thus his concept of sympathy allows John to speculate on other parts of the 
body when he argues that the evidence of its corporeal effects is visible, despite the original 
cause remaining unproven in dissections or living bodies. In a later lecture, he revisits this 
concept and succinctly says that “By sympathy we mean sensation or action induced in one 
part in consequence of some impression made on some distinct part: the latter call’d the 
impressed, the former the sympathizing” (Anon., 1779). He informs his students that 
“Universal sympathy may be either immediate or secondary either sympathizing from the 
Disease itself or from sympathy of the Diseases” (Anon., 1779). To answer the haunting 
question of why living things die, John offers an answer to help explain how, rather than why 
by introducing the idea of decay as a disease that governs under universal sympathy. In other 
words, he sees the effect of putrid flesh and even goes so far as to determine its progress, but 
he cannot locate or identify why decay suddenly originates in a body. Thus by subsuming the 
transmission of decay as a extension of the body’s sympathy operations, John is able to 
uphold the body as a permeable, dynamic network of action, attraction, and repulsion. By 
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placing decay as the intermediary between life and death, John maintains an intriguing 
notion: the rotting flesh from limbs and wounds reflects the capacity of death and life to exist 
simultaneously in a body. For instance, a gangrene-infested limb does prohibit us from 
pronouncing the individual as totally dead, even despite the demonstrably dying limb. The 
intervention of an amputation—usually—increases the individual’s life over death, all of 
which is why John answers with a resounding ‘no’ when asked by his students if a “body 
become putrid when life ceases” (Anon., 1778).  
II. Monsters: The Liminality between Death and Life  
 In outlining the study of the human body, William separates anatomy and 
physiology.9 Anatomy, he says, “relates to the matter and structure of its parts” and the latter 
“relates to the principles and laws of its internal operations and functions” (Lectures 84). 
Matter, for William, is a general term to describe physical substances of the body. He does 
separate matter into solids and fluids, but it is the laws of the body’s mechanisms that 
produce evidence of life. Crucially, matter is neither impenetrable nor unyielding to 
circumstances of the body: “And, as it is the nature of matter to be altered, and worked upon 
by matter; so, in a very little time, such a living creature must be destroyed, if there is no 
provision for repairing the injuries which she must commit upon herself, and the injuries 
which she must be exposed to from without” (77). Matter can influence other matter, for the 
“animal man must necessarily be complex in his corporeal systems, and in its operations” 
(79). By contrast John treats matter as “only an abstract Idea”:  
… all Matter, Originally, is of but every few kinds, therefore we are only 
Acquinted [sic] with some of its properties. We are led to suppose it has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Interestingly, William considers animal oeconomy as an extension of physiology. See page 84 in his Lectures 
for further details.  
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existence by Matter in general, we meant the World, which is composed of 
several substances all which, we (learn? term?) under different properties 
peculiar to Matter (viz.) The Properties, of Simple Attraction10, Attraction of 
Cohesion, & Elective Attraction, which least is with its various effects 
constituted Chemistry and is a property which makes our species of Matter 
fonder of uniting with other substances in another. Also Magnitude, Figure, 
Solidity, & which with their various Applications to one another constitute 
Mechanism, Repulsion is rather suspected not to be an Universal Principle, 
but is peculiar to some matter only. Fermentation is peculiar to animal and 
vegetable matter only. These then are the general properties of rude Matter for 
the purpose of forming the World & it will be necessary to have clear Ideas of 
all Animal Bodies, the Human, I shall chiefly treat of; Matter has undergone 
such Changes, as to form, as it were, a new Creation, between which, and the 
last, no traces have been even supposed to be. (Anon., 1778) 
 
 
Matter for the brothers is limited to physical form, but John distinguishes the properties of 
matter beyond William’s designation of their physical states: fluids and solids. John informs 
us that “it is not Matter itself, which makes the Impression on our Senses, but only the 
different effects which it produces, for instance: we do not really see any thing but only the 
different shades of light that are reflected from it—nor when do we hear a drumbeat, hear the 
drum itself, but solely the action of which it is formed in the air…it is only Motion which is 
given to the surrounding air that makes the impression on our ears” (9). For a brother who is 
typically depicted as one without refinement, or classical education, John tends to indulge far 
more thought than William on the topic of what constitutes and distinguishes matter. And 
John elaborates to his students that “matter is endowed with life, which is something 
superadded to its modification;” however, he does not attribute free will to matter for he 
cautions us that while “matter may be alive,” it does not necessarily “admit of action” 
(Anon., 1779). From there, John explains another crucial aspect of his definition of life:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 He explains further: “Simple Attraction, or a disposition in the particule of each particular species of Matter 
to approach each other, without adhering together, as Sand &c. In some Matter this disposition is described, so 
as to form a fluid only; but in this case, attraction will no always take place, unless there is some degree of 
affinity, between the two applications, thus oil & water will not readily unite. In others the desire to approach 
each others particles is so great as to form the 2nd species, Attraction of Cohesion.”  
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Life is every part of an Animal, each part, is as much alive, on the whole, 
Life, is in every part, independent of any other & is Essential to it, & the 
preservative, of preservation, which consists without Action; before, which 
can take place the parts must be disposed, into form, which disposition of 
living particles, is Organization, and the parts, are found, proper to support 
their intended Actions, & it is the power of Actions which distinguishes, the 
living, from the Dead; …therefore, Life, is not Action, but is supported, & 
continued by it, there are instances of some living several weeks without 
Action; Action, is only necessary for the various purposes, the Animals is 
intended for. (Anon., 1779)  
 
John situates matter as the foundation from which he can build his metaphysical philosophy 
of the “living principle.” By contrast for William the concept of matter seems to play a 
minuscule part in the education of young anatomists, thus explaining his drive to insist that 
the content of anatomical education shares an importance with the cultivation of anatomists’ 
morality.  
 Prior to the seventeenth-century, “proponents of an Aristotelian and Galenic tradition 
that emphasized the fit of anatomical form to physiological function, … regarded monsters as 
organisms that had failed to achieve their telos, their perfect final form…they also asserted 
the ugliness of monsters from the standpoint of Aristotelian final causes:” by the time the 
bloody brothers developed their own understanding of monsters within their anatomical 
education, monsters—anatomically speaking—were no longer secondary studies, but rather 
took on importance alongside typical bodies in our understanding of nature (Datson 202). 
Ascribing “failure” as the rationale for monsters would have diminished them as an 
acceptable source for further study for the Hunters and their students. How could anatomists 
dismiss these bodies as failures if anatomy was the study of dissecting all bodies to discover 
knowledge of their structure? John’s diligence in studying anatomy through the broadest lens 
possible results from his attempts to set forth an outline of universal structure that 
circumscribed all facets of the corporeal flesh, monsters included. As Datson notes, “by the 
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early eighteenth century, however, the anatomical study of monsters increasingly drew its 
justification from the knowledge it could provide, by contrast, about the functions of the 
normal organism, rather than from the wonder to be gleaned by examining singular cases in 
great detail” (204). As deviations from the typical body, monstrous constructions drew more 
scrutiny as a legitimate source of scholarship, for “anatomists no longer exclaimed over the 
rarity of a malformation, but rather over its perverse functionalism” (205). Instead, 
malformations and unexpected differences were yielding more profitable results in accruing 
anatomical knowledge than the repetitious study of typical bodies.  
 Despite their agreement on the significance of monsters William and John did not 
entirely agree on the value of its medical history. William felt an obligation to teach his 
students that history; for John it was simply much more important to make a clean break. For 
William a good physician honored the past with due allegiance. For John what matters was a 
visionary dialogue between speculation and dissection. Monsters were proving that anatomy 
was no longer relegated exclusively to defining the typical spectrum of bodies. In order to 
understand structures and forms, now anatomists had to root their answers in the organisms’ 
waking life, too. Despite the myriad bodies and lives, “monsters did not—could not— violate 
nature’s laws, but in infringing upon society’s customs, they cast doubt on the stability of 
both orders” (214). Precisely so, the eighteenth-century intellectual culture of London could 
not  “converge in an single theoretical explanation for monsters,” so they used the 
“anatomies of monsters” as “the general framework of inquiry” (204). Through careful 
observations of monsters’ living actions John developed some of his most illuminating 
speculations on the philosophy of mind and embodiment. Monsters provided William with 
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demonstrable evidence of Nature’s persistence to strive for life above all corporeal 
circumstances.  
 Living, breathing monsters present a dilemma to John’s curious theoretical definitions 
of life and death. Monsters had nurtured John’s philosophies as more than aberrations of 
nature. His compiler and editor, James F. Palmer attributes John’s large collection of 
monstrosities to “the studying of abnormal productions” as a directive to “not only … to 
acknowledge … the fact that nature is subjected to certain laws, even in her most striking 
deviations from the usual order of things, but also … to throw much light on the laws of 
normal or natural formation” (Palmer 148). The term “laws of abnormal formations” 
becomes Palmer’s categorical rationale for John’s extensive, both large and minute, 
anatomical specimens of such abnormality (from humans to animals). John left a manuscript 
that classifies monsters according to their physicality, “1. Monsters from preternatural 
situations of parts, 2.—addition of parts., 3.—deficiency of parts., 4.—combined addition 
and deficiency of parts, as in hermaphroditical malformation” (Owen 90). By contrast 
William tended to organize his monster specimens separately from the “diseased” and 
according to their location at time of death. For example, one will find under William’s 
“Foetal Monsters” examples of spina bifida, hydrocephalus skulls, and conjoined and 
parasitic twins. That is not to say William did not make exceptions to his own classification 
system.  
 Owen, one of John’s most important nineteenth-century editors, explains that John’s 
work with monsters in his “Account of an extraordinary Pheasant” enabled him to conclude 
that “every species of animal, and every part of an animal body is subject to congenital 
malformation; but he knew such appearances were not attributable to a freak of Nature, or a 
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matter of mere chance; for he observes that species has a disposition to deviate from Nature 
in a manner peculiar to itself” (25). Owen further observes that John articulates one of his 
“most remarkable laws of aberrant formations” in which John writes that “I should imagine 
that monsters were formed monsters from their very first formation, for this reason, that all 
supernumerary parts are joined to their similar parts, as a head to a head, &c., &c.” (25). It 
was not just anatomical specimens displaying monstrous qualities that John collected. In his 
notebooks and lectures, he recounts stories of monsters passed on to him. For instance, Gould 
and Pyle cite evidence of John’s notes on cases of cynecomastia or gynecomazia, in which 
men develop mammary glands sufficient to produce milk. In John’s records, he writes of a 
sailor who managed to nourish his infant son after losing his wife three days before his 
mammary glands were able to produce sufficient milk. And in another case, a Chippewa man 
who lost his wife to childbirth prayed for milk to nourish his child, and was apparently able 
to do so (see 395-7).11 Whether John grants such stories authority of fact, his records of such 
cases explain Youngquist’s assessment of monstrosities in “British culture during the 
Romantic period” as having “presented less a psychological than a somatic challenge” (9).  
 The narratives John collects fall under the same classification and contribute to the 
difficulty he has in placing monsters within his definitions of life and death. For instance, 
why do hydrocephalus infants seem unable to live past a few months? Why does their living 
principle seem to dissipate despite having all corporeal qualities of an infant in a less 
“imperfect stage”? For he states in his treatise “On Monsters” that “every animal is formed 
from a portion of animal matter endowed with life and actions, being either so arranged in 
itself as only to require new matter for it to expand itself according to the principle inherent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 I have reservations because I have not been able to locate another instance of John’s interest in cynecomastia 
other than in Gould and Pyle’s work.  
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in itself” (Owen 239). All animals are formed for the same initiative of what John refers to as 
the living principle. In his “thick prose” as Youngquist righty terms John’s rhetoric, he states 
that all animals prior to their birth are formed with a predisposition towards life because of 
the vitality in their blood. John identifies blood as the corporeal substance that provides the 
source of the living principle, which in turn induces life in the body. But when do monstrous 
forms take place? John searchingly asks “whether the principle of monstrosity be coeval with 
the first arrangement, or arise in the progress of expansion, is not easily determined in many 
[instances of monstrosity]; but it is certainly not the case in all; for many take place at a late 
period, and would seem to be owing to accident, or to some immediate impression; but still 
there must be a susceptibility for such, which susceptibility must be original” (Owen 240; his 
editorial brackets). His question asks whether the principle of monstrosity is contained in the 
blood that carries the living principle or whether it is introduced to the body externally. Both 
theories have massive implications for the physiological philosophies of corporeal creation. 
John realizes as much and restricts the occurrence of monstrosity as likely a “preternatural 
formation” and maintains that it “might be reduced to the same principle as that of accidental 
injury, from which parts cannot recover perfectly, but recover defectively or with deformity” 
(240).  
 Monstrosity, for John, occupies a refracting place; for instance, a perfectly functional 
and shaped bull replicates its particular animal species, from which the monstrous bull veers 
away. John generalizes this point when he notes that “if we were capable of following the 
progress of increase of the number of the parts of the most perfect animal, as they first 
formed in succession from the very first, to its state of full perfection, we should probably be 
able to compare it with some one of the incomplete animals themselves, of every order of 
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animals in creation, being at no stage different from some of those inferior orders; or in other 
words, if we were able to take a series of animals from the more imperfect to the perfect, we 
should probably find an imperfect animal corresponding with some stage of the most perfect” 
(Owen 26).  
 In monstrous vegetables, John attributes an entirely separate cause for their 
malformations, defining them as “a deviation from the common principles in some of its 
productions, either in form, flower, seed, or colour”. Quickly moving to describe these 
deviations as producing “variety in every species” (Memoranda 22-3), he attributes 
monstrous tendencies in plants to human “cultivation [more] than any other immediate 
cause” because “when left to the natural mode of continuance, they [plants] will go back to 
the original again, or at least it is not certain what will be the produce; a new monster many 
arise” (Memoranda 23). In what for John is an unusual interpretation, human intervention—
or cultivation, if you will—is the source of vegetable monsters. John shrewdly points out that 
we do not consider the alternation of colors and shapes in plants as monstrous because we 
ascribe cultural reward to its significant changes.  
 What if humans view the monstrous plants as innocuous because we distance 
ourselves from them by maintaining our superior status? Neither brother explicitly states that 
the process of humans cultivating monsters in plants could potentially be extended to their 
responsibility for those monstrous births in humans and animals. John comes closer to 
assigning the source of monstrous humans to humans themselves. By focusing on a specific 
genealogy, John claims that “monsters, or the deviations from the common course, or what 
may be called the original principles, in nature, have in them an hereditary principle. We may 
first observe that animals, not monsters in themselves, shall have the principle of producing 
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monsters” (Owen 246). John believes that monsters follow a principal code akin to typical 
bodies.  
 John asks himself if “particular Species [are] subject to peculiar Monstrosities” and 
answers that “it is more probable that monsters are common to every animal; at least it 
appears so by all those we are acquainted with. From the rarity of any peculiarity in the 
production of malformations of any particular kind of animals, one would be so inclined to 
believe that there is but one principle governing these formations” (Owen 248). A universal 
definition for anatomical function and structure must also encompass the psychological 
dimension of bodies. Monsters, for John, present a complex, and yet a beautiful mystery of 
the monster’s body coupled with its natural behaviors:  
…it is not necessary that the constitution of the brain should perfectly agree 
with the constitution of the body; the brain being calculated for a more 
compound body than what it has; because a new part, having the powers of 
action, must produce an action in some common part of the brain, in order to 
put it into motion. / Do not monsters show that the mind and the formation of 
the body do not necessarily correspond?—that is to say, that the formation of 
the mind dos not arise out of the formation of the parts; for although the body 
may be strangely formed, yet the mind, if properly formed, shall have all the 
natural dispositions for the natural actions of the body; just as if the body had 
been perfectly formed in correspondence with the brain; but as the parts are 
not formed for such action, they cannot be complicated. My monstrous horse, 
although the penis stood out behind, when erected, and did not come along the 
belly, yet leaped upon the mare to cover her, which he certainly would not 
have done if the instinctive principle of action had arisen out of the 
construction of parts. (Owen 247-8)  
 
John questions the brain’s cognizance of its own deviated anatomical structure. Monsters do 
not understand or recognize their own limitations when driven by instincts, which John 
defines as “whatever impulse of action we have which does not arise from the knowledge of 
the event, or from a motive, is ‘instinct;’ and whatever action arises from an intention, is 
‘reason’” (276). Instincts become the pivotal characteristic bridging monsters and typical 
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bodies to one another. Is it possible for a comprehensive study of instinctive properties to 
reveal a universal rubric that will define the action of life contained in all corporeal bodies? 
While it is clear that John observes instincts overriding any alternations of a body’s structure, 
he does not offer an account to explain why it was so, perhaps in part because he himself 
simply did not know. John was far more willing to acknowledge uncertainty, whereas 
William tends to shift these uncertainties to the realm of divine knowledge. If we are perfect, 
William believes, it is because God has made us. By contrast John devotes more attention to 
monsters precisely because he is more interested in defining what is universally true by way 
of anatomical speculation.  
 In regards to deformities in infants, William traces one source of damage back to the 
unrestrained use of forceps in difficult deliveries. But thanks to an encounter with William 
Hogarth (1697-1764), William has come to view the fetus’ compaction as a marvel (or 
sublime awe).12 We learn about this from the anatomical specimen of a stillborn that William 
shows to his students: 
Now we can not say to a Woman let me cut a piece out of you & besides don’t 
stir that I may see how it lies: we can not do that, but we must guess by 
feeling different Women, where there is a little water. I find frequently that 
the Part either projecting downwards the right or left side which must either 
be its shoulder, Head, or Knees. It cannot be the Back, because that is a large 
round Mass, however, I will not take upon me to say what it is. You cannot 
conceive an thing snugger than the Foetus in Utero. This puts me in mind of 
Hogarth, he came to me when I had a Graved Uterus to open I was amazingly 
pleased, Good God, he cries, how snug & compleat the Child lies, I defy all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 To capture the uneasy position of a man-midwife, I have in mind the following passage of William’s lectures: 
“I have already mention’d yet it ought never to be a rule with Gentleman to gain reputation by doing your 
business quick, always take time, particularly in applying your forceps & when if pain is [illegible] them. Yet 
you may not squeeze the child’s head & when the head is deliver’d I often take away the forceps that I may 
have my hand more at liberty to support the woman. In a few cases I think of forceps as useful instrument. To a 
poor woman who is quite exhausted they may be of considerable service, but I wish to God, they had never 
been contriv’d. I am convinced they have kill’d & I may say 10 women to one that they have sav’d & therefore 
we should never use them on any occasion, but where they are absolutely necessary.—” (Chirurgical, 1775)  
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our Painters in St. Martins Lane to put a Child into such a Situation. We had a 
good Eye, look it off & in drawing afterwards uniform oblong Body. As the 
Child lies in this sung position, there is a strong expression of a pleasant 
Sleep, a seclusion or retirement from the world it is very expressing. Here is a 
poor thing who died in the Act of Reaching. The Men who steel our dead 
Bodies generally place them with their Head down to their Thighs & each Leg 
bent back to their Thighs—. (Chirurgical 1775)  
 
In this particular passage William is acutely aware of the pain involving childbirth, and also 
blurs the line between the perfectly formed versus the monstrous baby. By referencing 
Hogarth’s intrigue as well as his initial shock, William undermines the cultural assumption of 
what is perceived as normal versus what nature is capable of inducing to ensure man’s 
survival. And the same sight that jolted Hogarth is evidenced nearly twenty years later in 
William’s Human Gravid Uterus. Dr. Matthew Baille (William’s and John’s nephew) 
explains how the very situation that prompted Hogarth’s remark is always a latent possibility 
for linking the creation of a monster as a cause-and-effect of its structure within its womb: 
“From want of room in the uterus, and some accidental awkward situation of the parts, 
children are sometimes born with such apparent deformity in their hands or feet, that nurses, 
and people of a higher rank in other respects, but upon a perfect quality with them in natural 
knowledge, are frightened, and believe it to be a monstrous, or incurable deformity” (Uterus 
64). If William claims that the study of the human body is akin to studying the works of God, 
then the material existence of in utero monsters represents an uneasy acknowledgement of 
God’s mistakes. However, John does not permit divinity to suffice as an answer for his 
questions about the cause of monsters, and thus frees his thinking to explore the law that 
binds monstrous creations within nature’s paradigm of bodies. 
III. Life: Before Death of an Organism  
Theories defining Life 
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 In recent scholarship there has been a tendency to conceptually link the theme of life 
to a history of gestation by framing a historical conflict between preformation and epigenesis, 
and while this is necessary for the history of science, the eighteenth-century discussion 
concerning life after one manages to survive the perils of birth has been somewhat 
understudied. William’s career as a male midwife tends to examine what we look like but he 
also stresses other human factors such as national identity, morality, theories of histories, as 
well as the significance of fine arts. By contrast John focuses on two distinctive approaches 
to understanding life. On the one hand, he sees life as tending to reside in the minute 
structures of the anatomical body. For he tells us “Every individual particle of animal matter, 
then, is possessed of life, and the least imaginable part which we can separate is as much 
alive as the whole” (Twigge) On the other hand, he is also invested in asking metaphysical 
questions about the source of life.  
  It is not only in John’s or William’s lectures that we find encompassing theories of 
life. As F. Wood Jones rightly points out, “John Hunter’s great unwritten book” is that of his 
anatomy museum, for he explains: “It is the medium by which he sought to express those 
great principles of life, which he so profoundly understood, but which neither speech nor by 
writing could he make clear to his contemporaries” (778). One of John’s editors, Palmer 
describes how “the original design of Hunter, in the formation of his museum, was to furnish 
an ample illustration of the phenomena of life exhibited through the vast change of organized 
beings, by a display of the various structures in which the functions of life are carried on” 
(Palmer 148). And within John’s museum, as well as his works, we see the sagacity of his 
drive not only to define his “living principle” or “vital principle,” but also to locate the origin 
of these principles in each living body. By keeping Wood’s evocative description of John’s 
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museum and its anatomical specimens in our minds, we will discern his occasional 
frustrations with his inability to precisely articulate the originating cause of life in the body. 
Towards the end of his life, he was increasingly aware that his bouts of angina signaled his 
impending total death, and he began to worry about the amount of unfinished theories he was 
leaving behind for his heirs in anatomy. He had the foresight to clarify his struggles by 
explaining some of his peculiar rhetorical choices: 
I have used the word consciousness, because we have no language existing 
answerable to all my views of the animal oeconomy, and to coin words would 
not answer the purpose, beach then I must have a dictionary accompany my 
own. I have not a word for expressing the cause of those actions which take 
place in the body, as if it was conscious that such and such things were going 
to take place. There are actions in the body which come nearest to 
consciousness of the mind of anything that I can conceive and therefore I 
make use of this word; but it is commonly applied by philosophers only to the 
mind. (Palmer 236) 
 
It was that “consciousness” of a body’s action that John viewed as crucial for explaining life 
not as merely the recording of movement, or observation of action, but rather, as something 
more intangible.13  
 John lodges a complaint against the common analogy of explaining the life of a body 
akin to a watchmaker setting a watch: “Some have compared it to the spring of a Watch, for 
they say, altho’ ev’ry part of the watch should be perfect, yet if it wants the Vital Principle, 
or the spring, it cannot go” (Keats). A watch cannot mandate its own movements without 
external propulsion; the flaw John finds in this particular analogy is that we can reasonably 
expect our hand to move before us if we want to grab an object. Furthermore, a watch cannot 
will itself to show eight o’clock rather than ten o’clock. The purely mechanical model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 As John explains further: “When an animal moves, we doubt not the existence of life in it, but it does not 
follow that when the motion ceases life ceases also: if so, when action ceases as it does during suspension of 
respiration by hanging or drowning, it would put it out of human power to restore life as that requires the power 
of Creation” (Anon., 1779). 
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ignores the will of the human mind. And yet, John is careful not to reduce his definition of 
the vital principle to mere psychology. If that were true, he explains, we could will ourselves 
to live forever, but we must die, as all living things must—so far.  
 Thus, John’s studies of anatomy are not restricted to the somatic. He theorizes upon 
the psychosomatic relations and how they manifest themselves within individuals. In a 
posthumous essay, John spends some time deliberating on his observations on human 
psychology. The interiority of the mind fascinates John because it might help explain first 
how the body communicates within itself and second how it simultaneously interacts with its 
external environment. In both cases John seeks to understand “consciousness,” which he 
defines as: “…an impression of the mind of our own existence at the time, or rather of the 
existence of the mind and of its actions: for, I say ‘I am conscious that I exist;’ which can be 
only in thought; for, that I exist in body, can only influence the mind by its being sensible of 
the presence [of the body], as it may be of any other body; for, although it feels its own body, 
and is conscious of it, it can also be made sensible of another body and is conscious of that 
also; therefore both [acts of consciousness] refer to the mind” (Owen 252). Consciousness, 
for John, is the mind’s process of acknowledgements and the state of awareness of the body’s 
existence separate from external reality. Our consciousness, for John, interrelates with the 
mind’s decisions, for he visualizes the brain as the physiological organ that produces these 
actions. On the opposite side, the brain “can be so employed respecting the mind as neither to 
feel the body, nor be capable of thinking, and vice versa” (261). Crucially, the consciousness 
is the primal and necessary site for a body’s capacity to verify its existence separate from its 
perception of others; as he clarifies, “consciousness has always a relation to ourselves” (253).  
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 And yet, death and the act of dying shape the way our consciousness understands life: 
“this self-consciousness not only regulates many of our natural actions when in health, but 
the actions of the machine while under disease, both in the whole and in a part. We have an 
internal monitor of our powers, and we use them accordingly. This is often so strong that 
many know they are dying—a thing that cannot know from experience” (254). In simpler 
terms, John tells us that our “consciousness is a conviction of the existence of one’s self, or it 
is a feeling of itself, but is not a sensation; it is the reflection of one’s own existence, both as 
to personal existence and the existence of the mind” (252). John furthers his thoughts by 
developing a tripartite structure of how the consciousness, mind, and the brain work as a 
process to aid in the body’s perception in conferring evidence for the mind to acknowledge. 
The first interception is “sensation and demonstration [which] are absolute and the same,” 
then John haltingly wonders if “perhaps, conviction is the next or second,” and then confirms 
that “belief [is] the third” (253).14 These thought-processes are not confined to the wakeful 
body, for John explains: “what we think of when awake, we only see in the mind’s eye; but 
what we think of when asleep appears to be an object immediately of the senses…. and if we 
connect a few of those ideas together so as to make a little train of thinking, it is almost liking 
connecting real objects together” (257). These objects that our mind connects along with our 
ideas relating to them “are sensible as much [as] the objects of sensation as [external causes 
of sensation] itself; we can reason about them” (259; second editorial bracket is Owen’s). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 John defines conviction as “an impression on the mind which is equal in that mind to sensation or 
demonstration; therefore it is not necessary first to produce sensation or demonstration. To produce actions will 
be according to the circumstances that become the cause of conviction, whereby our causes of actions, and our 
actions, are increased beyond what they otherwise would be” (253).  
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Reason alone is not enough, for John, to determine life.15 As John explains, the problem with 
rationalism is that “we often want to reduce [mind] to reason, or to that principle which arises 
entirely from sensation, viz. reasoning about real things. This becomes the basis of religion” 
(259). The problem lies in the fact that reason itself is too narrowly individualistic. 
 Even still, processes of the body’s realization of its separation from external reality 
underpin John’s definition of life, which is why he attributes the mind’s formation to two 
causes—“the state of the body and sensation” (259). He further explains that “the actions 
arising from the state of mind are ‘instinct’” and that the “state of mind may arise from state 
of body only, as hunger; or from the senses only, as love; or from both, as love and lust 
combined; for these are two different feelings. A man may be in love, while he has no power 
of lust; a man may be lustful, and not in love” (260). If the mind were not subject to the 
body’s sensorial input, where it is supposed to provide the groundwork reason to understand 
its received information, then the state of mind would become an anarchy of its will: “when a 
state of mind takes place without the natural leading cases, where reason is [not] called in as 
a direction, it is madness” (260, editorial brackets are Owen’s; emphasis mine).   
 The mind continually sustains our collective intrigue because, as John argues, 
“perhaps there is nothing in Nature more pleasing than the study of the human mind, even in 
its imperfections or depravities: for, although it may be more pleasing to a good mind to 
contemplate and investigate the applications of its powers to good purposes, yet as depravity 
is an operation of the same mind, it becomes at least equally philosophical and equally 
necessary to investigate, that we may be able to prevent it” (268). Our minds are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Reason as defined by John: “Reasoning may be called either immediate or habitual: the immediate is when 
we are obliged to go through the whole process before we can drew the conclusions: the habitual is when we are 
so well acquainted with subject as to draw the conclusions at once, as it were jumping over the investigation; 
but this often leas us into errors by taking premises for granted” (262).    
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reducible to dual contraries, John explains, for “when we consider the mind of man as 
possessing a thousand qualities which are distinct attributes in themselves…we must be 
sensible how complicated the mind is; but as they are often mixed in the same person, they 
produce contraries in character which form the basis of all the oddities or inconstancies we 
meet with” (268). John names the mind, not consciousness, as the more interesting study of 
the two precisely because the mind directs the brain to enact its will power. The action of the 
person relates back to the decision on the level of the mind. Studying the mind is not merely 
an amateur sport. Far from it, John advises his contemporaries to delegate some of their 
anatomical studies towards the psychological because of patients’ tendencies to misrepresent 
their diseases: “If medical gentlemen would apply this to their practical knowledge of 
mankind, they would see that their opinions of such minds and practice perfectly coincided; 
and, to strengthen this idea, let us see who they are that are most subject to practice this kind 
of deceit” (269). He expands this point by telling us that “whoever has paid attention to this 
subject will agree with me in thinking that those minds [deceitful minds] are far from what 
they really wish us to think them to be; and that they are little minds” (269).   
 If John tells us that we cannot confine the definition of the vital principle to the 
visible action of the body, then what foundation does he rest his theory upon? He wants to 
know how the body contains the capacity—or knowledge—to function. In other words, how 
do the lungs know to expand to hold oxygen and compress to expel carbon dioxide? Nothing 
specifically teaches us to do so. And yet our bodies carry out these actions without our ever 
knowing or explicitly compelling our bodies to carry out the necessities of bodily 
perseverance. He poses the same question with regards to plants, and asks how certain types 
know to root underground and how others know to sprout leaves. He answers these questions 
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by locating the impetus for action in stimulation. The stimulus that provokes action, whether 
it is internal or external to the body, along with the body’s reaction is how we can define life. 
Action is demanded by all living beings: 
When we speak of action we do not mean any peculiarity of action, as of 
muscle or nerve, but action in general; we may here also distinguish Action, 
from Motion, for inanimate powers may be made to possess motion. With 
respect to Stimulus, no particular kind is mean, for what may be a stimulus to 
one, may not be to another, but whatever has the power of exciting Animal 
and Vegetable Matter to Action, is what I mean by Stimulus. Thus then we 
offer as the definition of Life, the deposition to Action on the application of 
Stimuli. Its true that this approaches near to irrisability [sic] but we don’t 
confine ourselves to Muscular Action. We extend our definition to all 
organized bodies. (Twigge) 
 
In 1764, John locates the residence of the living principle within the blood of a body.16 It is 
not until his 1794 posthumous publication, Treatise on the Blood, Inflammation, and Gun-
Shot Wounds, that we realize the profundity of his theory. And he admits as much himself: “it 
is probably impossible to say where the living principle first begins in the blood” (Blood 91). 
He suggests that it makes a certain sense that blood would be “endowed with the principle of 
life” because it seems “to be the most simple body we know of” (77). John recognizes his 
theory that “blood has life…is perhaps carrying the imagination as far as it well can go; but 
the real difficulty arises merely form its being fluid, the mind not being accustomed to the 
idea of a living fluid” (77). Life, for John, is defined by the stimulation arising from blood’s 
fluidity within the body, but more importantly, it is the only corporeal substance that could 
physically carry the living principle throughout the body by circulating throughout the entire 
body.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 François Duchesneau explains that “Hunter draws a significant distinction between the organization of animal 
matter and the self-supporting conditions for the living principle in very rudimentary forms of material 
structures” (291).  
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 Blood in William’s Lectures is treated as an anatomical substance that is important to 
the life of a body, but he does not state an overt opinion on John’s living principle theory. 
Strangely, William maintains silence on his brother’s definition of life.17 There remains an 
omission of William’s rationale for his quietness on John’s peculiar theory, but perhaps it is 
explained by William’s own definition of life taking a less anatomical, and a more ‘sensible,’ 
that is to say, a more cultural direction than John’s. William’s discussion of life shares no 
resemblance to the metaphysical and psychosomatic depth of John’s anatomical focus. 
William discusses life mainly as a cultural phenomenon, which is in part due to his 
conception of anatomy as de facto the art unifying humanity because each of us is 
corporeally embodied. He viewed his great skill as an educator in anatomy as carrying 
responsibility and authority in molding the younger generation. From the perspective of an 
older gentleman he tells his students: 
This [teaching anatomy] affords me an heart-felt comfort, now, when years 
and reflexion have given me the clearest view of the uncertainty, the 
shortness, and the miseries of human life. I sincerely pray that a great number 
of you may enjoy such a comfort in the close of life; when, I am certain, the 
most diligent, the most conscientious, and the most humane, among you all, 
will most ardently wish, that you could have done still more service to the 
cause of your poor distressed fellow-creatures. (Lectures 62)  
 
If anatomy unites us, then how does William define life? The study of anatomy operates as a 
cultural nexus for London’s intellectuals and artists. With Baconian undertones, he identifies 
how the “successive labour and attention of many ages” along with universal collaboration 
aid in the growth of anatomical knowledge, thereby benefiting all of mankind. He identifies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Biographically speaking, it is noted that William and John stopped speaking to one another from a feud over 
who should properly receive credit for discoveries pertaining to the circulation in utero as seen in William’s 
Human Gravid Uterus illustrations. However John discussed his philosophies years prior to this argument and 
continued to do so until his death, and William still did not offer his views.   
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the greatest improvement made to anatomy since Galen took hegemonic control as truly 
beginning with Leonardo Da Vinci in the fifteenth century, and he explains how Leonardo 
“has been overlooked, because he was of another profession… I believe he was, by far, the 
best Anatomist and physiologist of his time…Leonardo was certainly the first man we know 
of who introduced the practice of making anatomical drawings” (37). There is no rhetoric of 
mutual exclusivity in William’s description of Da Vinci as both artist and anatomist. Da 
Vinci represents—historically—the ideal anatomist as envisioned by William because Da 
Vinci treats the human body as the epicenter of all types of knowledge. For William 
intertwining of morality alongside anatomical instruction reflects his synthesis of an 
anatomist’s integrity as an extension of personal intelligence and allegiance. For example, he 
defines honor and its value over achieving immortality in the history section of his Lectures, 
from which also we see how William’s classical learning shaped his philosophies: “Honour 
is acquired only by merit; immortality by any thing very striking or interesting to mankind, 
whether meritorious, or sagacious, or accidental and neutral” (40). The more metaphysically 
inclined John did not dwell on his role within a historical-cultural continuum of humanity to 
the degree William does in his Lectures. William understands that his role as an educator is 
not to merely impart knowledge, but also, to cultivate a generation of honest, innovative 
thinkers. In his first lecture, he concludes by reminding his students that “the history of 
Anatomy should stimulate us all to cultivate it with diligence” (62). Anatomy, for William, 
was not simply a career decision; it was the study of the living self within its cultural context, 
and as such it carried great responsibility towards posterity. Hence, the demise of anatomy 
was intrinsically linked to the duration of mankind.  
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 Just as John rejects the watchmaker-mechanistic model of the human body, William 
ridicules the historical concept depicting the body as a mirror of the expansive and intelligent 
universe: “The human body has been, commonly enough known, by the name of 
microcosmus [sic]; as if it did not differ so much from the university system of nature, in the 
symmetry and number of its parts, as in their size” (63; emphasis added). William separates 
anatomy from the traditional conception of our corporeality by defining human beings not as 
reflections but as original entities interacting with a world composed of other such entities. 
However, his rhetoric in advocating this idea still contains residual Galenic awe for our body, 
which also resonates with the Burkean notion of sublime: “Can we seriously reflect upon this 
awful subject [anatomy], without being almost lost in adoration?” (64). An anatomist who 
fails to understand the question he has just posed is one who “labour[s] under a dead palsey, 
in one part of his mind,” and William invokes the authority of Milton to exemplify how an 
author who could not see light was nonetheless able to write Paradise Lost (1667). In 
William’s thinking the intricate intertwining of anatomy and the fine arts serves to affirm the 
grandeur of humanity. It was no surprise that Sir Joshua Reynolds invited William to become 
the Royal Academy of Art’s first Professor of Anatomy.18   
Anatomical Studies at the Royal Academy of Arts  
 On 27th December 1769, a year after William accepted Reynolds’ invitation, the 
Royal Academy passed a resolution enabling him to have “free access to all General 
Assemblys” relating to the administration of the academy (Kemp 27). The result of this 
resolution was that William had more freedom to express his synthetic vision between 
anatomy and the fine arts than we typically see in the later anatomical lectures at Royal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Figure 1. 
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Academy. William treats the Royal Academy and anatomy theater as proof of his conviction 
in Britain’s rising greatness. Without hesitancy, William elevates the works of artists along 
with the novel discoveries in London’s intellectual culture:  
If we do our part, if the rising generation particularly, can be smitten with a 
laudable ambition, with a noble emulation’ the works of English Artists, in the 
course of a very few years, may rival, did I say? why [sic] not excel in the 
finest productions of Greece and Italy. When we have already gone so far 
beyond the ancients, in since, in every thing besides, are we never to excel, 
not even to equal them in works of imagination? Has Nature granted us with 
such compelling powers / powers in all other things and denied it in that? No: 
Shakespeare and Milton and Wren shew that Nature is not a partial step-
mother, that Genius is not confined to the lattitudes [sic] of Athens and Rome. 
We are actually at this time making rapid progress, and Why should not 
posterity be able to say that the later half of the 18th Century was not the most 
distinguished period in the annals of human Genius? (33-4)  
 
For William, each single contribution further advancing Britain’s growth, regardless of the 
field it advances, was proof of Britain’s riveting imagination and life. Imagination propels 
and incites animation, and animation becomes a necessary facet to his theory of life. He 
explains, “if there is not a great deal of Life, of soul, of animation in it, the sense will not be 
properly impressed, and the imagination will be fettered with the dull and staring reality of 
the Canvas” (40). Art shares with anatomy a common desire to depict and explain the human 
body. An anatomy of the body in motion—and a correctly formed one—is a sign of active 
life within art, and great art has the ability to convey living activity: “…there appears to me 
to be more composure, more inactivity in the figures than we see in real life…Representation 
in the imitative Arts is a Substitute for reality; and except in matters of curiosity, effects us 
only as such, that is by giving us the impression of the original reality” (40). An art’s failure 
to produce these desirable affects means that the artist failed at the rendition of life.  
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 As a major patron of Hogarth, William advises artists throughout his Royal Academy 
lectures not to forget to add “elegance, and beauty and grace and dignity,” but also to add 
“animation, Spirit, fire, force and violence, which make a considerable part of the most 
interesting scenes” (43).19 And thus William’s definition of life is intimately bound up with 
expressions of animation: color, psychosomatic tension, and production. His theory of art 
claims that it is the various expressions of animation, colors, the complexities and 
ambiguities of the mind/body dynamic forces that enable a discernable observation of life. 
Since William offers a flexible integrative framework for distinguishing life, not a concise, 
anatomically rigid outline defining life, his concept of life is hardly categorically driven but 
rather admits of a certain ambiguity.  
 As the first Professor of Anatomy at the Royal Academy, William honed his tastes as 
an avid art collector amongst other collections of artifacts (coins, zoology, etc.). However, 
Peter Black points out that the trustees of his will did not catalogue his art collection, despite 
their commitment to catalogue his coin, library, and anatomical collections. Black describes 
this omission as the trustees’ understanding of William’s art collection “as a function of 
Hunter’s wealth rather than as a part of his intellectual programme as a museum builder” 
(63). William intended his marriage between art and anatomy to reflect the study of the 
human body as an extension of the divine: for William says that anatomical art is the 
“contemplation of the highest work of God” (Black 63; Kemp 32). The human body becomes 
a site for William to renegotiate its existence and its functions in relation to its natural 
environment as divine works.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Black has noted that John and Anne’s parlour at their Leicester Fields house contained “framed sets of the 
Rake’s and Harlot’s Progresses and the Election” (Black 81). 
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 Arguably the first-year lectures at the Royal Academy amounted William’s attempt to 
justify his presence before a classroom of artists. But do his actions to justify his value as a 
professor for student-artists make sense? Archival records indicate that William’s first art 
purchase was in the early 1750s, which would mean that he had been seriously collecting art 
for almost two decades prior to his Royal Academy lectures. What exactly did he collect and 
how did it contribute to his lectures’ themes? His first art purchase was at the auction of Dr. 
Richard Mead’s collections of fine art, anatomical specimens, and books, including Dr. 
Mead’s painting of Newton as well as his Egyptian mummy (Black 67). In 1756, William 
purchased Rembrandt’s “Capital Landscape,” which modern art historians have proven to be 
a Philips Konick painting instead. It was not until 1771 that William secured his purchase of 
a legitimate Rembrandt canvas, The Entombment (1634). Black attributes several other 
misrecognitions of Rembrandt works within his collection to William’s naïve victimization 
and to his desire to transition from a Scottish background to London’s gentility. During the 
heyday of his major art purchases; William befriended not only Hogarth, but also Robert 
Strange, and George Stubbs who would become famous for his anatomical depiction of 
equines. As Black shows, William purchased twenty-four paintings from Strange and Stubbs, 
major expenses resulting from William’s desire to build his Great Windmill anatomy school 
as the site of his home and museum.  
 Given William’s well-known friendship with Reynolds as well as the latter’s dazzling 
painting of John, we ought to treat William’s professorship as a cultural reflection of the 
Royal Academy’s drive to combine art and intellectualism as characteristics of a proper 
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Londonite.20 William represented the product of the cultural pressures on an Enlightenment 
male-midwife but also taught his students a foundation in philosophical and moral integrity 
as a contribution to the strength of the British Empire. William told his student-artists that he 
“shall endeavor to improve, to share in the pleasure of learning,” and he emphatically claims 
“that what imitates Nature most is most striking; and that it will be likewise more pleasing if 
the subject be properly adapted to our passions.” In this way he positions himself and his 
students as observers of Nature (Kemp 37, 39).  
 For William an intentional purpose of art is to invoke the imagination of the viewer: 
“If there be but a single transgression, it strikes a correct eye, disturbs the imagination, and 
like an absurd Player in a moving scene, breaks the charm; thus the sweet delusion vanishes, 
and nothing is left but canvas, lines and colours” (41). Effects are absolutely crucial to 
distinguishing great art from plain art. To highlight the importance of achieving such artistic 
greatness, William explains how intellectuals, theoretically, have access to the same general 
knowledge of imaginative literature and art, but to translate those raw materials in order to 
produce novelty requires that individuals overcome any and all self-imposed boundaries. 
Alternatively William describes the same process as one’s natural inclination for attaining 
agency, and thereby freedom from boundaries and from what he calls  “human powers:”  
Shall we be discouraged and listen to indolence which is seducing our hearts, 
and whispering to us that every noble enterprise is beyond our abilities. No—
Human powers are capable of going much further in most things than we 
could easily believe. If men would set out with a good plan, with Spirit to 
undertake, and with preserving resolution to carry on the design, there is 
scarcely any thing that might not do. (42) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is noted that Sir Joshua Reynolds was a neighbor of John and Anne Home Hunter at their Jermyn-Street 
residence.  
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While William does acknowledge that access to education is predicated on both financial 
wealth as well as the proper introductions, he believes that personal initiative and steadfast 
commitment are the best moral aptitudes in determining an individual’s capacity for genius. 
He uses this method to validate his own credentials for teaching his student-artists. In 1777, 
William explains that if  “a man has not such a degree of enthusiasm, and love of the 
[anatomical] art, as will make him impatient of unreasonable opposition, and of 
encroachments upon his discoveries and his reputation, he will hardly become considerable 
in anatomy, or in any other branch of natural knowledge” (Commentaries iii). By professing 
his commitment to the fine arts along with a dissemination of correct anatomical knowledge, 
William exemplifies that open dialogue pertaining to the body is more about what people 
contribute, rather than their background.  
  Within the same Royal Academy lectures, William weaves a strand of human 
productivity into his theory of art that strives to delineate the human form, while 
incorporating the morality of human character. As he explains, “In Poetry, the description of 
forms is so vague, so much is always left to the imagination, that when the Idea is once fully 
conceived it is easy to express it in language. But in the other Arts, every part of form must 
being determined and made out. Thence, in every subject when a human figure is represented 
which is either new, or treated in a new manner, the Artist after having sketched out his Ideal 
Design must execute and finish all the parts from Nature” (45). Imagination needs help. 
Indeed, William conceives of imagination as a Lockean tabula rasa that derives its forms and 
content from the human experience.21 How can we express what our imagination conceives 
without language? William uses poetry to point out the flaw in language in that it yields an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 William’s library records show that he owned a 1690 edition of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Humane 
Understanding.  
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undefined picture of the poet’s intentions; he explains further that “what imitates Nature 
most, all things else being equal, will strike us most: and it will be more pleasing too, […] 
the artist requires much judgement both in the choice of subject, and in the management of it. 
This is the Station where a happy Genius distinguishes itself” (45). It is because nature has an 
infinite variety that our imagination is infinite, too. In short, nothing exists outside of nature, 
for as Richard Terdiman defines “actuality”,  “Nothing exhausts reality. Everything has a 
limit and an outside. This externality or otherness may be temporal, spatial, conceptual, or 
material, but it always exists” (169).  
 In a 1746 letter from William to Dr. William Cullen (1710-1790), Hunter expresses 
that his next aim is to open an anatomy school; this goal highlights William’s awe for nature 
and her untold secrets as well as her beguiling dangers. Even more significantly, Nature 
serves as an intellectual’s boundary from slipping into a nebulous chaos that prevents 
progress:   
Well, how does the animal economy appear to you, now that you have 
examined it, as one may say, with precision? I have good reason to put the 
question to you, because in my little attempts that way, since I begin to think 
for myself, Nature, where I am best disposed to mark her, beams so strong 
upon me, that I am lost in wonder, and count it sacrilege to measure her 
meanest feature by my largest conception. Ay, ay the time will come when 
our pert philosophers will blush to find that the have talked with as little real 
knowledge, and as peremptorily of the animal powers, as the country miller 
who balances the powers of Europe. But, if I follow out this train of thought, I 
shall become as per as those I blame; therefore I’ll drop the point.  
(Brock 122) 
 
Experience, too, guides the intellectuals’ endeavors, but it often paralyzes progress; in 1774 
Dr. William Rowley publicly chastised William for relying too much on his own experience 
and confidence as a male-midwife: “I hope, Sir, that these observations will not only be of 
some service to the public, but answer another purpose, and be an instruction to you: it may 
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teach you, for the future, that a successless [sic] effort in your practice, out to incite you to 
look farther than the limits of your own knowledge; and that every probability of relief 
should be embraced in cases of extreme danger. Let, then, some principle of benevolence, for 
the future, moderate your ambition: for be assured, that it is the approbation of one own’s 
conscience, which must give a value to the encomiums of mankind” (Rowely 34). The 
burden of uncertainty fuels William’s interest in risk and exploration as well as his vagueness 
about the necessity of imagination and experience, but he also believes the two share an 
uncomfortable alliance with one another. Somewhere between the relationship of 
imagination and experience, William finds that it is the intellectual’s mind that binds the two.  
 When he was a student in Dr. John Theophilus Desaguliers’ (1683-1744) course of 
experimental philosophy as a part of his medical curricula in London, William was exposed 
to Desaguliers’ explanation for our urge to seek knowledge. In his dedication to Frederick, 
Prince of Wales, Dr. Desaguliers writes that “To contemplate the Works of God, to discover 
Causes and their Effects, and make Art and Nature subservient to the Necessities of Life, by 
a Skill in joining proper Causes to produce the most useful Effects, is the Business of a 
Science” (1).22 William would carry such beliefs throughout his career as a male-midwife, 
physician, anatomist, lecturer, and as a fine arts collector. In his residence at Jermyn-Street in 
London, as a student W.B. Monkhouse recorded in his notebook (c.1755), William’s opening 
lectures clearly echo his early foundations with Desaguliers and Frank Nicholls insofar as 
they understood anatomy as a linchpin of the enterprise of discovery relating to the body: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 At Kew, Prince Frederick was known to have a room full of Desaguliers’ instruments. For a more indepth 
understanding of Desaguliers, see Patricia Fara’s ‘Desaguliers, John Theophilus (1683–1744)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/article/7539, accessed 12 June 2012] 
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From this time the Art got ground apace, and when to the knowledge already 
aquir’d the great Harvey added his discovery of the Circulation and that an 
animal body was an Hydrulic Machine, it was tho’t to have arriv’d at 
perfection: All disease were not suppos’d to be eas’ly found out and as eas’ly 
cur’d, but time and experience teach us far otherwise, and Convince Man that 
there is still ample filed for the Exercise of human wit and sagacity: May we 
not rather think that more still remains to be discover’d than what is already 
come to our knowledge? (Notes) 
 
William’s educational upbringing emphasized autonomy in one’s thoughts in which, 
Beekman explains, “[William] had been taught, principally, the importance of an 
independent mind when in search of knowledge; ‘the right of an individual to form his own 
opinions from the evidence on hand.’ Along with this freedom of thought, he had developed 
a healthy skepticism and an open mind which, together with a natural curiosity and an 
extraordinary determination, provided him with the most important of the necessary 
qualifications for a successful investigator” (“Education” 76). By harking back to his winter 
studies in 1740-41 with Desaguliers, in which he learned the relationship between 
experimentation and inductive reasoning, William strove to teach his student-artists and his 
anatomy students a moral rubric that is not necessarily knowledge-content specific, but rather 
aims to produce an intellectual profile that—he hopes—is predicated on the freedom of 
moral intelligence. This profile should be guided by a proper indoctrination in Britain’s ethos 
in what amounts to an imperial British transatlantic identity.  
Anne Home Hunter: The Missing Link  
 When in 1804 the church of St. Martin-in-the-Fields rejected Anne Home Hunter’s 
monumental inscription to John for her husband’s grave, she captured the contemporary 
sentiment of John as a genius who illuminated the dark labyrinth of nature’s mysterious 
marvels where he travelled as a lone explorer. Nevertheless, his Herculean persona in 
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anatomy was mitigated by his humanness. In her original manuscript, Anne describes her 
husband as having a “love of truth” that sustains his lifelong interest in the corporeality of 
living bodies, but more importantly, she attributes his lifetime dedication to his attempt to 
alleviate the universal failures of the human body:  
Hunter, if Years of toil, of watchful care 
If the vast Labours of a pow’rful mind 
To sooth the ills Humanity must share 
Deserve the grateful plaudits of Mankind, 
 
Then, be each human weakness buri’d here  
Envy would raise, to dime [sic] a Name so bright.—  
(“Epitah” Manuscript, c. 1804)  
 
To argue that Anne was only a domestic mother and a devoted wife is to misconstrue her 
own engagements with John’s questions surrounding life and death. For Anne, too, had her 
own developing theories of how to define life. Yet like William, she sought to situate life and 
especially death within the wider net of culture. In this way, Anne provides a missing link 
between the worlds of the Hunter brothers. As we will see, she also provides a link between 
the Hunter Circle and William Blake.  
 If we take Anne’s suggestion to conceptualize John as “those specks which on the 
Orb of Day appear / Take nothing from his Warm and Welcome light,” then we see how she 
situated herself within a larger, culturally important narrative attempting to answer what 
being human meant. In one of her earliest poems, “An eregular [sic] ode to—” (c. 1766), 
Anne describes the fragile symbiosis between life and death as a necessary metaphor for 
human connection that similarly reflects our corporeal fragility: “Till Life shall reach its 
latest Sand / Tho’ gay desires, and Chearful Youth / Fly far away / Let Friendship last as long 
as this frail gesture of decay” (Grigson 92). In a double gesture, she is mapping both the 
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limits and duration of flesh to the human connectivity of friendship. The interaction of 
friendship between two people shares a longevity similar to the human body. While 
friendship may end long before a person’s demise, Anne conceives of its span as being 
intimately linked to the vulnerability of life.23  
 Anne pens quite a few elegies to her dear friends as well as famous artists she 
admired and socially entertained. In several of her elegies to her friends, they are united by a 
common concept that Anne developed in order to deal with her grief over loss. She names 
her poetical theory “The Dear Idea,” which stems from her participation in the elegiac 
tradition honoring the dead. But Anne does not confine her elegies to particular individuals, 
nor does her “Dear Idea” necessarily wholly correlate to the popular pastoral elegies of her 
period.24 Her “Dear Idea” is a mental practice that helps her justify human connections 
through the fragility of life. Death constantly thwarts her desires to prolong her personal 
relationships, but in order to avoid cynicism, she believes each relationship is a contribution 
to her grand, metaphysical idea that a necessity for humanity is socialization. Whether that 
socialization takes the form of language, fine arts, literary salons, or dissection rooms, it 
creates the fabric producing solidarity.  
 In another poem, “The Mulberry Tree an elegy” (c. 1766), she responds to John’s 
“living principle,” pointing to her overwhelming frustration at elegies’ inability to alleviate 
turmoil and pain.25 Concluding that “Verse just points to Memory where they Lie,” she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 I suspect in the line “Till Life reach its latest Sand” that Anne is referring to Greek mythology’s underworld, 
River Acheron or Styx that is ferried by Charon.  
 
24 Her approach to the elegiac shares a remarkable, conceptual similarity to Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux’s (1636-
1711) second book of Art poétique.  
 
25 Even as late as February 1886, trees from the Hunters’ Earl Court home were put up for auctioned thus 
showing London’s interest in the Hunterian gardens “Hunter Family Album” (c.1900-50). 
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regrets that elegies perform only the agonizing act of remembrance, and cannot and do not 
answer the wish to feel the sensation of the departed subject’s or object’s return (100). In 
other words, elegies are soothing conversation pieces, but cannot resurrect the living action 
of the dead. We see Anne’s frustrations in her epitaph to John, but Anne’s poem “Mulberry” 
is a reflection of this practice and responds directly to John’s Of the heat, &c. of animals, and 
vegetables (1778).26 In Heat, John explains his experiments on trees’ longevity in regards to 
the temperatures: “is every tree dead that is frozen?” (Heat 36), a question John revisits in his 
Blood treatise in 1794. Anne’s poetical responses to John’s experiments show that she was 
not excluded from John’s experiments, nor was she unaware of the philosophical problems of 
life and death surrounding his speculations. For she, too, explores those themes: 
For bright ey’d Science mark’d the growing Shade 
That Shade which I—‘s friendly hand improv’d 
His care more fresh its early Verdure made 
Ye Muses mourn the Tree, your I—so lov’d27 
 
[…] 
 
The Red-breast now in vain shall hope to find 
They spreading Leaf to shade the Wanderers Woes 
No more tormenting Ills of Human-kind 
Thy Balm shall soften, for no more it flows.  
 
The time is past now never to return 
In vain for thee shall smile the vernal Spring 
Soft onye Wings of Night, ye Zephyrs mourn, 
Sigh thro’ the Willows, in whose shade I sing. 
 
For ah! it fell, no pitying Power to save 
The verdant Joys, the early Honors die. (100) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
26 Read at the Royal Soceity June 19 and November 13 in 1777. 
 
27 In Grigson’s transcription of “Mulberry,” she believes that “Anne’s ‘I’ and ‘J’ were the same, so that ‘I’— in 
this poem she strongly suggests that it refers to John Hunter” (100).  
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Anne’s response to John’s experimentation in trying to locate life in the plants of their garden 
induces her own introspections that capture the impact of John’s inquiries upon her poetry as 
well as her personal meditation on life and death. In using her elegy to contest the validity of 
its poetical practice to provide relief, she wonders if perhaps life manifests itself only to 
provide fodder for death: “Me thinks as we grow old, our only business here is, to adorn the 
graves of our Friends, as we dig our own.—” (Poems 69). Is life only meant to remember the 
dead? Anne is acutely sensitive to the vulnerability of humanity.    
 For Anne understands that each moment of life contains a fragment of death. John 
explains this action in plants’ capacity to suspend action of the living principle “although the 
living power is still existing; and probably this power can lay much longer inactive in the 
vegetable than in the animal”, which suggests the suspension invites ‘partial death’ 
(Memoranda 21). But it is the trees’ newest branches that demonstrate plants’ close 
resemblance to the human body’s dynamic stages of life and death: “…but as the last shoots 
of plants are the weakest, we find this effect mostly in those. In many hard winters the last 
shoots shall die, and we shall see the living part next to the dead, shoot out its leaves; …those 
leaves shall fade and wither away, and those lower on the vigorous stalk or branch below 
shall live” (22). Death and life are constantly present in every body as an interplay of 
principles of living power, and Anne applies John’s theories to her relationships.  
 Unlike William and John, Anne adds the concept of time to her philosophies of death. 
For her, time is the only consistent and predictable guarantee throughout mankind. Changes 
are measured by the notches of time. Seasons tell us when another year passes us by. She 
casts Time in a masculine role that may be implicitly referring to Chronos, the Keeper of 
Time, as she describes his duties: “And drag to light the sordid slave; / But from affection’s 
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temper’d chain / To free the heart he strives in vain” (200). She describes Time as her 
measuring ruler of life and death, and more importantly she configures her narrative by 
Time’s pain to endure onwards despite her inability to alleviate her discomfort: “In spite of 
time methinks I see / Eyes once so fondly fixed on me; / I hear that voice, whose magic 
sound / My soul in soft enchantment bound; / Again the shadowy image flies, / And every 
sense but sorrow dies” (200).28 John’s death marked the end of her marriage, but her 
hauntings of John’s voice continues to disrupt her reality. Let us recall that while John muses 
on the differences of total death, real death, and partial death, he omits emotional receptivity 
surrounding the death. By contrast Anne depicts a small death of herself as an annihilation of 
all senses except her emotional affections, though emotions are not considered a part of the 
five senses of the human body. And yet, emotional responses to art were imperative in 
separating great art from decent art in William’s lectures at the Royal Academy. By 
implicitly referring to John, she reminds her most eminent husband that he had forgotten to 
address emotions within his theories of death. As Oppenheimer observes “John’s 
biographers…have omitted to point out explicitly to what degree her traits supplement his 
own…. Her contribution cannot be measured along by the quantity and quality of her 
published lines, but must rather be evaluated in the light of what she gave to John, who has 
invested us with so strong a heritage” (444). While Anne may have contrasted with and at 
times complemented John, she was hardly aloof in her own speculations of what role death 
played in the eighteenth-century London’s intellectual culture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This poem’s subject was suggested by Dr. James Gregory (1753-1821), a Scottish physician who is the author 
of Theory of Moods of Verbs (1787). Also, he showed copies of Anne’s poems to Robert Burns, who lately 
copied them to excel in his poetical arts. For the latter, see Oppenheimer’s “Anne,” pg. 443.  
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 In another poem, Anne meditates on the death anniversary of their infant son, James 
(d. 1775), composing a poem that stresses a mother’s untimely loss of her infant child. In her 
elegy for James, the greatest flaw of life is that we must experience death and its traumatic 
losses. Death shades the experiences of life, a reality that seeps into and shapes Anne’s 
conception of life. And her conclusion is that life is a slave to death:   
Must memory too the present evils aid, 
And tinge with darker hues life’s deep’ning shade? 
Must woes on woes accumulated roll, 
And cloud with care the sunshine of the soul? 
Such is our wretched lot, ill fated kind! 
Our thread of life with misery entwin’d; 
Capricious fortune’s sport, or passion’s slave; 
Till peace takes root, and blossoms on the grave. 
Can I forget the days of anxious pain, 
When that dear angel form I watch’d in vain? 
Can I forget the agonizing hour 
When those lov’d eyes were clos’d, to wake no more? 
[…] 
    When lost in grief, my eyes refus’d a tear, 
Instinctive fondness south his silent bier, 
Hope whisper’d, ‘sure he sleep,’ I wildly press’d 
The lovely image to my aching breast, 
And felt the fearful chill of nature’s awful rest. 
Beyond the point to which the mind can bear, 
Reason is blunted by the heart’s despair  
In apathy the struggling passions cease, 
And time by slow degrees restores the soul to peace. (195) 
 
John expressed his own lamentations about James’ untimely demise and his inadequacies 
compared to Anne’s strength during their grief. Nevertheless, Anne’s loss is particularly 
compounded by the inability of John to save James’ life. After all, her husband was a man 
who had boasted that he dissected more bodies than his colleagues, and often had his hands 
working on a cadaver when someone stepped into his dissecting room. While her earlier 
poems reflect an emotional depth and reaction that provide us a glimpse into their private 
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lives, they also show her awareness of her husband’s experiments as they affected her own 
philosophies. Anne’s originality in responding to John’s metaphysics lies in her demand that 
any deliberation on death must acknowledge its profound isolation, in antithesis to her 
definition of life—interaction.  
  
 
PART II: BUILDING THE CORPOREAL HUMAN BODY WITH BLAKE’S 
SOMATIC IMGINATION  
 
 
 
Once the game is over, the King and the Pawn go back in the same box.  
 
   -Italian Proverb 
 
Consciousness is present only to the extent that consciousness is useful. It cannot be doubted 
that all sense perceptions are permeated with value judgments.  
 
   -Nietzsche, The Will to Power 
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I. A Neurohumanities Apparatus  
 
 It is well known that William Blake (1757-1827) ridicules John Hunter by name in an 
early manuscript that does not emphatically name others but types of personalities. But in 
later revision Blake changed the name to Jack Tearguts. I will argue that the naming of John 
Hunter and the subsequent change suggests Blake’s intense, but ultimately complex 
engagement with the works of John. In the previous section we have seen that neither 
William nor John is as simple as historians of science have claimed. For William’s part, the 
anatomist must be a person of moral caliber, culture, and even imagination. For John the 
anatomist doubled as a metaphysical thinker, while his wife Anne connects John to the world 
of London world that is so important to his brother William. In this section, I will present 
evidence not only that Blake knew the Hunters but also that in devising his own theories of 
the body and imagination he engaged, critiqued, and transformed some of the brothers’ 
theories. In particular, as with Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), so too with John Hunter, 
Blake moves from a simplistic attack to a more mature assessment of a worthy opponent. By 
rethinking Blake’s relationship to the Hunter Circle we can gain a better understanding of 
what he meant in his complex analogy: “Science remains thro Mercy: & by means of 
Science, the Three / Become apparent in Time & Space, in the Three Professions / Poetry in 
Religion: Music, Law: Painting, in Physic & Surgery” (Erdman 125).  
 Through the salvation of the mind, Blake hopes humans will undo the cruelties 
history has inflicted upon the understanding of the human body, and thereby both reorganize 
and free the trapped body. Emotions play a pivotal role in the Blakean question of whether 
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we will remain imprisoned in our bonds or free of them. Emotions abound and shift 
throughout Blake’s rhetoric, revealing particularly momentous changes in his life. His works 
contain a range of sorrow, elation, dreams, nightmares, repose, hostility, and death. These 
emotions are hardly stable and fixed, but are akin to the dynamism of our psychosomatic 
body. In Blake, there are no definite parameters of our bodies’ capacities or its limitations. 
However, one of the few things Blake is relatively consistent about throughout his works is 
his insistence that our individual perspective truly determines how we physically and 
mentally manifest our lives, how we conceive of reality, and how we allow those conceptions 
to alter the forces of individual and cultural creativity.  
 As he seeks our salvation, one of the schisms Blake tries to fuse is the separation 
between the psychological and the somatic body. When we examine Blake’s work All 
Religions are One and There is No Natural Religion, we see his attempts to diminish the 
conviction that any particular set of religious expressions is the ‘correct’ version. Instead, 
Blake points to the “Poetic Genius [as] the true Man” (1). The absolute value of the Poetic 
Genius as truth, Blake claims, proves itself whenever we attain cognition though living 
experiments that are sanctioned by experiences. Our corporeal body is a derivative of the 
Poetic Genius: “and that the forms of all things are derived from their Genius. Which by the 
Ancients was call’d an Angel & Spirit & Demon” (1). Our bodies contain each of the facets 
of the spiritual realm, which for Blake is not exclusively ethereal. In the original life of the 
Poetic Genius it was a single entity that—over the eons of history—became fragmented, and 
now pervades each human body existing as a residual substance. Because this residual Poetic 
Genius is in every body, Blake argues that when we produce knowledge, it comes from the 
part of our composite Poetic Genius as we strive for truth. If humanity unites, then the 
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fragmented slivers of the Poetic Genius embedded in each living body would come together 
and then the Poetic Genius awakens in a transformed wholeness.29 Because humanity 
continues to endure the incompleteness of the Poetic Genius too often our fragmented selves 
give away to the somatic demands of the individuated body, thereby creating a foggy 
confusion in intellectual exchanges. Hence Blake says that the “Poetic Genius adapted to the 
weaknesses of every individual” (3).   
 Blake disseminates the fragments of Poetic Genius as a residual and necessary part in 
each living body that helps us as we navigate the world and also contributes to the production 
of novelty; thus he considers the Poetic Genius “the Spirit of Prophecy” (1). In other words, 
all the novelty we produce has already happened prior to the fragmentation of the Poetic 
Genius. Prophecy in Blake’s conception of the world is not an act of discovery, but a massive 
recovery of the single mind belonging to the original Poetical Genius. Alternatively, we 
know what will happen, futuristically, because it already happened. The dilemma we face is 
that we remain in a perpetual state of sleepwalking. In Jerusalem (c. 1804-20), Blake writes, 
“I see the Four-fold Man. The Humanity in deadly sleep / And its fallen Emanation. The 
Spectre & its cruel Shadow / I see the Past, Present & Future, existing all at once / Before 
Me; O Divine Spirit sustain me on thy wings! / That I may awake Albion from his long & 
cold repose”  (159; emphasis added). This collapsing of time in Jerusalem is also a notion 
Blake describes to Thomas Butts on 6 July 1803: “only rememberd by my Understanding to 
be a Memento in time to come & to speak to future generations by a Sublime Allegory which 
is now perfectly completed into a Grand Poem that This World Contains. Allegory addressed 
to the Intellectual powers while it is altogether hidden from the Corporeal Understanding is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 We find out in later works that the complete Poetic Genius is named Albion.  
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My Definition of the Most Sublime Poetry…This Poem shall by Divine Assistance be 
progressively Printed & Ornamented with Prints & given to the Public” (730). The Poetic 
Genius living and expressing in Blake sees no distinctions in time, which enables Blake to 
remain confident in his prophesies regarding the future because the future is a simultaneous 
unfolding of history. While David Bindman considers Jerusalem to be “a final synthesis of 
his poetic vision and the medium he had invented for its expression”, I argue it is more than 
Blake’s philosophy of poetry (Bindman 297). It is his absolute and final rendition of the 
actuality of our world, and ultimately of our corporeal selves. Jerusalem shares with There is 
No Natural Religion a trajectory of thoughts that reflects the timeline of Blake’s elucidation 
of the Poetic Genius as he aims to define us—to the most complicated audiences—ourselves.   
 It is important to address Blake’s early interest in the human body and its intellectual 
systems in order to trace how his understandings of these facets of humanness underpin his 
account of the imagination and how it relates to anatomy. The question is whether Blake’s 
argument for rethinking our embodiment is metaphysical or somatic. Part of Blake’s 
criticism tends towards the former as a result of Northrop Frye’s Fearful Symmetry. 
However, Thomas Frosch understood that Blake’s lack of specificity suggests a more 
comprehensive approach in dealing with the psychosomatics of our cleansing. Frosch 
disagreed with Frye’s steadfast commitment to a mythopoetical treatment of Blake’s body, 
arguing that Frye’s insistence on maintaining a distinction between “sense” and 
“imagination” makes Blake “difficult to understand” by obscuring how “the imagination 
could be liberated by an expansion of our perceptual organ. The body drops out of Frye’s 
interpretation, and he become disturbingly figurative when he reads Blake on these matters, 
tending to make the poet tame and ‘sensible’ when he is most highly unusual” (Frosch 28-9). 
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In further elaboration, Frye “becomes excessively allegorical” and neglects a “quite literal 
sense of the risen body” (Frosch 29). Both scholars share a degree of validity in their 
assessment of Blake’s conception of the body, but neither discusses Blake’s originating point 
of interest in the human body. When Blake confronts the limitations of our perceptions, 
scholars tend to believe he refers to an act of “awareness” of something that was previously 
obscured. Take for example his claim that “Mans perception are not bounded by organs of 
perception. He perceives more than sense (tho’ ever so acute) can discover…. The bounded 
is loathed by its possessor. The same dull round even of a univer[s]e would soon become a 
mill with complicated wheels”. In such cases we often suspect that Blake refers to cleansing 
of sorts that will reveal a sixth sense (Erdman 2). That is part of the answer, but Blake is also 
advancing a project to expand our perceptions as a parallel means to engage with the 
prevailing anatomical theories in order to offer a more comprehensive theory. 
 In There is No Natural Religion, Blake sets up his argument that “Man has no notion 
of moral fitness but from Education. Naturally he is only a natural organ subject to Sense” to 
point to the obvious truism of his foes’ beliefs that “the desires & perceptions of man 
untaught by any thing but organs of sense, must be limited to objects of sense” (2). Blake 
himself argues that “Mans perceptions are not bounded by organs of perception” and raises a 
contrary note that “if it were not for the Poetic or Prophetic character. The Philosophic & 
Experimental would soon be the ration of all things & stand still, unable to do other than 
repeat the same dull round over again” (3). Imagination, for Blake, becomes not only the 
outlet for overcoming a restrictive rationality, but also a means to explain our bodies prior to 
the indoctrination of eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Hence, The [First] Book of Urizen 
serves to explain Urizen’s domination over our collective understanding of the human body. 
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Frosh writes, “Urizen is a limit of expansion, an arbitrary ne plus ultra that bounds thought 
and perception and seeks to bound desire and imagination” (Frosch 20). In order for Urizen 
to attempt to exert domination over our perception—humanity—he has to somatically exist. 
Eternals, for Blake, are kindred to us not by divinity, but rather by physicality. Crucially, 
Blake explains that Urizen, the demigod who controls us through his “net of religion,” must 
be someone we recognize in order to explain the longevity of his domination as well as 
humanity’s inability to acutely perceive Urizen’s labyrinth. Accordingly Blake depicts 
Urizen as intimately involved with our bodies, physical flaws, and most importantly, our 
fears. Increasingly, it becomes necessary for Blake to set up a framework to explain a 
perception of the self to describe the physicality of subconscious mind and its extraordinary 
capacity to both dominate the body and to undermine itself. To demonstrate the threat of that 
Urizenic control, Blake needs to engage with the prevailing anatomists in London to prove 
his familiarity with anatomy so that he might claim authority to introduce his own anatomical 
theories. Let us turn to Blake’s days as a student at the Royal Academy of Arts, when I 
believe his path crossed the Hunter Circle, and he found seminal material for his conception 
of the psychosomatic body. 
James Basire and James Barry: The Social Network at the Royal Academy of Arts  
 In the beginnings of the Royal Academy of Arts, scientific thinkers engaged with 
contemporary artists and they sought out artists for their anatomical engravings as well to 
enjoy the prestige that came with attending the Royal Academy’s exhibitions and lectures. As 
mentioned in the first section, Dr. William Hunter was the first Professor of Anatomy at the 
Royal Academy; and John and his wife, Anne Home Hunter were major supporters of the 
Royal Academy’s artists. The Hunter Circle’s relationships to the Royal Academy were not 
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merely as spectators, but rather, they were notable figures within the social network 
circumscribed by the Royal Academy. By focusing on two major art figures, James Basire 
(1730-1802) and James Barry (1741-1806), we will see how Blake’s awareness of the 
nuances of the Hunter Circle extends beyond the local celebrity of the brothers’ anatomical 
collections.  
 One artist particularly, James Barry, had an amiable relationship with the Hunter 
Circle as well as Blake. Here is a timeline of possibilities for their overlapping networks in 
London. James Barry’s time at the Royal Academy from 1771-c.1780s overlapped with 
William’s tenure as Professor of Anatomy from 1768 to 1783. As an avid art collector, 
William purchased several of Barry’s aquatints (Correspondences 450). He was also a major 
supporter of Barry’s painting The Distribution of Premiums in the Society of Arts (Oil on 
canvas, 11ft. 10in. x 15ft. 2 in.) to the extent that he received public gratitude from Barry.30 
William L. Pressly offers convincing evidence that Barry painted the head of William in the 
oil painting William Hunter, M.D. (c.1780). Barry’s relationship to William was hardly 
superficial, but rather they shared an enduring friendship because of their appointments at the 
Royal Academy.  
 We know that John accompanied his wife, Anne Home Hunter to the same annual 
art exhibitions attended by William. The Royal College of Surgeons in London holds 
Anne’s notebooks of unpublished poems that contained an ode to Barry, which is undated 
but probably dates to c.1806; but unique within Anne’s collection of poetry were her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 As C. Helen Brock notes, “James Barry, engaged on a great mural for the Society of Arts, hoped William 
could lend him coins with the heads of Pericles and Lycurgus. William, unfortunately, could not oblige … But 
he [Barry] gave public expression to his gratitude to ‘Dr. Hunter for the great assistance my pictures had 
received from the use of his most extensive and valuable Collections’” (Hunter, 45).   
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footnotes to her ode on Barry.31 In these footnotes, Anne reveals her friendship with Barry 
along with her commentary on Barry’s livelihood at the Royal Academy.32 In her 
notebooks, we trace the depth of her relations to the Royal Academy in her thoughts on her 
visits to the exhibitions as well as artists she befriended. And analogous to Blake, she 
contributes her own criticisms on the public’s reception of Barry and his intellect:  
To the Memory of James Barry Esq Professor of Painting in the Royal Academy. 
 
Eccentric Barry. resting now in peace 
Within the friendly shelter of the tomb 
Thy care worn form from suffering must cease, 
While thy freed Spirit from the murky gloom 
Of its dark prison house of mortality 
Thro’ realms of light Eternal, wings its way. 
 
Nature on thee bestow’d no common mind, 
At once capacious penetrating, bold; 
Imagination, with those gifts combin’d, 
And honest pride was mingled with thy mold: 
A thirst for knowledge, a desire for fame, 
1.And industry unequl’d, mask’d thy name.  
 
Yet, some strange lessen (?) working tho’ [i.e. thro] the whole 
2.Stole fro they art the happy pow’r to please 
3.Suspicion damp’d the ardour of thy soul 
And disappointment, foster’d the disease.  
4.Incompass’d by a World, to thee unknown 
Then liv’dst neglected, comfortless, alone.  
 
Unhappy, not unjust the Man I deem 
Whose fancy, like a Meteor thro’ the storm 
Shoots forth a Wild, uncertain, fistful (?) gleam 
Of lurid light; on each surrounding form 
Mocking with fearful shapes, his mental blew 
Shading his cheerless path, with mournful Yew. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I am aware of Caroline Grigson’s The Life and Poems of Anne Hunter (2009), but her editorial philosophies 
are incongruent with academic standards.  
 
32 I have included the entire poem as transcribed from the manuscript as well as her footnotes.  
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Ah! who? shall blame when tem’prement inclines, 
To aggravate the ills of human Life? 
5.Or when in high ambitious vast designs 
The haughty Spirit, with his fate at strife 
Must yield with sullen fortitude to bear 
The chill of blighted Hope; almost despair. 
 
6.Still tho’ repuls’d, the social feeling wove 
A web of comfort, for declining Age; 
Humanity & Friendship kindly strove  
The parting pang of Nature to assuage; 
The grateful Arts, the last sad duty pai’d 
And the Muse sings a requiem to thy shade.  
 
 See Notes.—    
 
1.  No one who has read or heard Mr. Barry’s Lectures on the theory of the art of 
Painting as given at the Royal Academy; or who has seen his series of Pictures at the 
Society of Arts and manufactures at the Adelphi, will deny him the praise of superior 
endorsements; or of patience and persevering application in the study and exercise of 
his art.  
 
2. Mr. Barry’s execution was not always equal to his conceptions, nor was his designs 
always in good taste. In the series of Pictures I have mentioned, the portrait of Doctor 
Burney swimming up the Thames with his hair full dripped (?) and surrounded by 
Water Nymphs, is a failure in taste and propriety too obvious not to strike every 
beholder in colouring his Eye was defective.  
 
3. An unfortunate persuasion that his Brother Artists were jealous of his talents, led 
him to suspect them of being disposed to injure him. The Author of their notes (?) 
once heard Mr Barry aucr (?) that the late Sir Joshua Reynolds had by underhand 
means, obtained possession of a Cask sent him from Rome containing casts from 
Antique Statues, besides rare drawings; and he was convinced that they were secreted 
in Sir Joshua’s cellar.  
 
4. His ignorance of the world made him apt to fancy himself slighted. An 
acquaintance happening to be engaged when Mr Barry wished to visit him, was 
sufficient to break off an intimacy of many months standing: and thus he was reduced 
to live in a Solitude of his own making. 
 
5. Mr Barry had the Soul of a great Historical painter. But he failed in the 
execution—his resent of Success soured his temper, and undid him negligent of the 
ordinary decencies of Life, and social intercourse.  
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6. From a combination of circumstances Mr Barry’s affairs became so much 
deranged, that his friends secure his future subsistence, subscribed & purchse him an 
annuity. The Society for the empeacement—33 
 
The first line of her poem conveys her awareness of Barry’s eccentric personality, one 
bordering on madness because of the public’s ridicule, but the immediate solace she 
conveys through her hopes that Barry has found everlasting peace demonstrates her special 
affections for his peculiarities. And Anne should know, after all, since John and she lived 
two blocks from his last residence. Her kindness to Barry was also the cause of John’s visit 
to Barry’s house to offer his medical expertise; however, Barry would not permit John to 
cross the threshold of his house because Barry suspected John was working for Sir Joshua 
Reynolds who had painted John in 1786.34 Not only did Anne try to console Barry, but also 
she tried—through her ode—to dispel rumors of Barry’s insanity, describing him as “a 
roman spirit with true attic taste” (Grigson 201). Because his artistic genius is a facet of his 
destiny, she argues, Barry had no control over the events of his life, or over the reception of 
his works. She describes him as one “born to achieve a glory of thy own, / To rise unaided, 
and to shine alone; / Thy genius takes its elevated stand / Above the level of thy native land, 
/ Grasping at once beyond the world’s controul, / The painter’s fancy, and the poet’s soul; 
/… / Commands whole ages in one fleeting hour” (201).  By explaining his peculiarities as 
effects of his destined role as an artistic genius, she depicts Barry as a misunderstood 
genius, but that did not exclude him from her critique (for example, see her first footnote).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Any words that were difficult to decipher are followed by a (?) to indicate uncertainty in my own 
transcriptions; Royal College of Surgeons London (H-BMS0014).  
 
34 I speculate that he would have let William treat him, but William had passed away in 1783.   
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 In Blake’s annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds’ lectures, he critiques Barry’s artistic 
skill in a similar method to Anne’s, except they differ in their comparison of Barry’s 
perceived relation to Sir Joshua Reynolds. Anne considers Reynolds as a family friend, and 
respects his skills as a portrait painter, whereas Blake holds Reynolds as both the voice and 
the cause of the commercialization of art at the cost of imaginative creativity.35 Blake sees 
the rise of Reynolds as symptomatic of the devolution of humanity and its artistic 
productivity: hence “The Arts & Sciences are the Destruction of Tyrannies or Bad 
Governments Why should a Good Government endeavour to Depress What is its Chief & 
only Support” along with his supposition that “The Foundation of Empire is Art & Science 
Remove them or Degrade them & the Empire is No More—Empire follows Art & Not Vice 
Versa as Englishmen suppose” (Erdman 636). Given Blake’s resentment towards Reynolds 
along with prominent figures supporting his work at the Royal Academy (both financially 
and publicly), Blake readily identifies with Barry’s conviction that the Reynolds camp 
intended to destroy Barry’s art and to silence his philosophies pertaining to the education 
and cultivation of art.  
 The following excerpt offers the best evidence that Blake personally met Barry and 
it describes the tension within the Royal Academy atmosphere: “Who will Dare to Stay that 
Polite Art is Encouraged, or Either Wished or Tolerated in a Nation where The Society for 
the Encouragement of Art. Sufferd Barry to Give them, his Labour for Nothing A Society 
Composed of the Flower of the English Nobility & Gentry—Suffering an Artist to Starve 
while he Supported Really what They under pretence of Encouraging were Endeavouring to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Hazard Adams’ Blake’s Margins: an interpretive study of the annotations (2009) for a thorough analysis 
of Blake’s attacks upon the philosophies of Reynolds and his successful artworks. Wisely, Adams explains 
Blake’s extended attacks on eighteenth-century culture.  
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Depress.—Barry told me that while he Did that Work—he Lived on Bread & Apples” (636). 
Blake, unlike Anne, sees no flaws in Barry’s artistic skill, but both Anne and Blake share 
the viewpoint that Barry was a deeply misunderstood genius. To Anne, Barry let paranoia 
destroy his reputation, but Blake attributed the destruction of Barry’s sanity to the Royal 
Academy’s founders and London’s shifting cultural ideologies.  
 Even before James Barry’s prominence and subsequent decline, the Hunter Circle had 
already overlapped with Blake’s life. During Blake’s apprenticeship under James Basire, we 
see another network that offers us a glimpse into the blurring of anatomist and Romantic 
literary figures. In the twentieth century, Jane Oppenheimer left us with an especially strong 
link between William Blake and John Hunter, one that has been neglected from a lack of 
historical evidence to corroborate their connection. Extrapolating from Blake’s “Public 
Address” where he writes that “I knew the Men [Woolett & Strange] intimately from their 
Intimacy with Basire my Master,” she emphasized John Hunter’s relation with James Basire 
as an engraver for his projects (573). Scholars have offered a vague acceptance of this 
working partnership between John Hunter and Basire, but until now, our understanding of the 
extent or timeline of this relationship has lacked firm evidence.  
 J.F. Palmer’s compilation, The Works of John Hunter (1837; 4 vols) included plates 
clearly showing that John had retained Basire’s engraving services for both his The Natural 
History of the Human Teeth (1771) and his “Philosophical Transactions” papers from the 
years 1787-1794.36 But a recently discovered manuscript in the Royal College of Surgeons of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Evidence is found in a subsequent volume of J.F. Palmer’s The Works of John Hunter (1837) containing plate 
from Palmer’s compilation of Hunter’s works. In Palmer’s volume of Hunter’s illustrations you can clearly see 
James Basire’s name along with several others such as: William Bell, William Sharp, James Roberts, William 
Skelton, George Scharf, J.V. Riemsdyk, James Stuart, and James Gilpin. These names, including Basire’s, are 
not always visible in our digital archives such as Eighteenth Century Collections Online (ECCO) and Journal 
Storage (JSTOR).  
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England demonstrates not only that Hunter employed Basire’s services, but that he did so 
precisely during the time in which Blake was his apprentice. William Clift (1775-1849), one 
of John’s last secretaries, and the initial curator of the Hunterian Museum after the 
government purchased his anatomical collection, corroborates John’s relationship with 
Basire. In his personal journals (RCSE; MS0007), Clift speaks of copying “a handful of 
[John] Hunter’s remaining papers” and remarks that they include accompanying illustrations 
by Basire. Clift gives them a date range of 1775-1780; these crucial years overlap with 
Blake’s apprenticeship with Basire.  
 Unfortunately, it is quite possible we may never see the papers mentioned by Clift 
since they were given to Sir Everard Home (1756-1832) who destroyed about two-thirds of 
John’s work to avoid charges of intellectual theft.37 Nonetheless, we can believe in the 
veracity of Clift’s meticulous transcriptions and his steadfast dedication to John’s works; 
among those contemporaries that admired Clift was Richard Owen, the succeeding Hunterian 
Museum curator, whose letters speak of Clift’s integrity as an individual and as a naturalist.38 
Clift’s note regarding John’s papers with Basire illustrations during Blake’s apprentice years, 
along with the knowledge of the working relationship that spanned over a quarter of a 
century between John and Basire, provides us with a robust circumstantial connection 
between these three men extending beyond Blake’s caricature of Hunter in Island in the 
Moon. Blake did originally write “Jack Hunter” in his Island manuscript but eventually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 According to Clift’s ‘Notes on the destruction of the Hunterian Manuscripts’ (c. 1824).  
 
38 Sir Humphry Davy is largely instrumental for Clift’s induction into the Royal Society in 8 May 1823. In a 
1945 letter from Arthur Keith to George Grey Turner, he described Clift as a ‘meticulous gatherer of small 
facts’. According to Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Clift was ‘praised by the surgeon John Flint 
South, Sir Benjamin Brodie the elder’ and Sir Joseph Banks. Accessed January 20, 2011 at: 
www.oxforddnb.com 
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struck through “Hunter”, leaving us our present “Jack Tearguts”. Yet even this action 
demonstrates that Blake still thought of John long after his days in Basire’s shop, and perhaps 
had come to regret the insult.39  
 Blake’s overlap with the Hunters Circle at the Royal Academy is hardly restricted to 
their mutual affinities for select artists. After Blake’s apprenticeship with Basire ended, he 
was admitted as a student at the Royal Academy in 1779 and consequently was required to 
attend William’s anatomy lectures.40 Scholars have typically assumed the dates of Martin 
Kemp’s transcripts of William’s lectures from 1768-1772 as the range William’s tenure at 
the Royal Academy. This is because Helen C. Brock stated in Correspondences that, “though 
William never published his Royal Academy lectures, rough notes for the lectures from 
1769-1772 have survived. From these, Martin Kemp has reconstructed much of the contents 
of the introductory lecture, together with the material for succeeding lectures”; we tend to too 
readily consider Kemp reconstruction as the authoritative version (293). Kemp’s work is 
extremely valuable for understanding the content of William’s lectures, but he has misled us 
on the chronology of William’s appointment. First of all, we know that in the spring of 1771 
“the King helped alleviate the overcrowding in the Academy’s Pall Mall building by 
providing rooms in the under-used Royal Apartments at old Somerset House in the Strand—
there is a Zoffany painting of Dr. William Hunter […] lecturing to students and academicians 
in these rooms” (Taylor 5). Furthermore, the Royal Academy’s mandate in Section III 
stipulates, “There shall be a Professor of Anatomy, who shall be elected from the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 There is a curious catalog record at the Hunterian Collection at University of Glasgow MS Gen 1652/19 that 
relates Dr. William Hunter to Basire as well as to Blake: “Papers relating to the research into two pen and 
watercolour paintings by James Basire; ‘The Garden of Gethsemane’ and ‘The Last Supper’ (1798), created to 
illuminate forgery by William Blake and to satirize some of his work. By Nicholas Valentine, Lower Largo, 
Fife, 1997. 27 Sheets. 2 photographic prints (colour) mounted.”     
 
40 Records of Blake’s exact attendance have proven difficult to narrow with certainty.  
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eminent men in that branch of Science. He shall read annually Six public Lectures in the 
Royal Academy, adapted to the Arts of Design; and shall continue in office during the 
Queen’s pleasure” (Sandby 426). Since John Sheldon, F.R.S. (1752-1808) did not succeed 
William as the Professor of Anatomy at the Royal Academy until 18 July 1783, then there is 
an elapse of eleven years in current scholarship regarding William’s tenure at the Royal 
Academy.41 I believe William held his professorship until Sheldon’s appointment, and 
repeated his six lectures in those eleven years.42 In summary, given the King’s mandate but 
also that there is no other anatomy lecturer between William and Sheldon we can conclude 
that William continued to give his lectures through the time during which Blake was required 
to take them.  
 In a two-volume work of The Lives of the Artists, the gossipy eighteenth-century 
biographer Whitey explicitly places Blake in William’s classroom at Old Somerset House:  
Dr. William Hunter’s lectures on anatomy were strong features of the 
instruction at Old Somerset House, and bodies of criminals who had been 
executed were from time to time allotted to the Royal Academy for purposes 
of demonstration. Some the actual dissection appears to have taken place at 
Surgeons’ Hall. [John] Deare, writing when he was only sixteen, to his father 
in the country, says he has been to see two men hanged and afterwards 
witnessed the partial dissection of one of them at Surgeons’ Hall. The 
muscular development of the second man was so remarkable that Hunter 
declined to dissect the body, saying that it was worth preserving. It was 
therefore carried to the Academy schools, where [Agostino] Carlini the 
sculptor undertook to make a cast from it. That body, which was that of a 
smuggler, was placed in the attitude of the Dying Gladiator, and Carlin’s cast, 
known always to the students as ‘Smugglerius,’ remained in the schools for 
many years afterwards.  
 The earlier students at Old Somerset House included … John 
Flaxman, … William Blake… (Whitey, 277, vol.1) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See “John Sheldon” entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography for further consultation. Accessed 
23 June 2012.  
 
42 Professorship in anatomy at the Royal had five year terms, but however, eligible for re-election (Sandby 361).  
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In Jerusalem Blake designates “Somerset” as one of the “Forty Counties of England […] 
divided in the Gates Of Rube” and therefore a geographical space created in the world from 
Jerusalem’s bosom, which Blake extends to describe the contemporary postlapsarian world 
(Erdman 160). Given Whitey’s identification of Blake as one of William’s students at the 
Old Somerset House, along with the fact that Blake’s first exhibition premiered at the newly 
reconstructed wing of Somerset house in May 1780, then Blake’s identification of Somerset 
in one of his longest illuminated works adds another explanation for his loathing for this 
London landmark.  
 Finally, by revisiting Blake’s homework assignment (anatomical sketches) for his 
Anatomy and Life lectures, we can argue that its production resulted from William’s lectures. 
Thus Blake’s initial introduction to the Hunter Circle began at the Royal Academy, and it 
was one of his earliest exposures to prevailing anatomical theories. By revising William’s 
timeline at the Royal Academy, we can begin to reconstruct a social network that connected 
the Hunter Circle and Blake. With that in mind we can examine how Blake’s Urizen, Milton, 
and Four Zoas operate in not only a political or allegorical framework but also within a 
somatic context. 
Anatomical Rhetoric in Blake’s Corpus  
 
 Blood. Guts. Creation. These are objects that Blake boldly touches upon in his 
hauntingly beautiful illuminated book, The [First] Book of Urizen (1794).43 Blake published 
this illuminated book roughly six years after he invented relief etching, which ushered in an 
intense history of producing his illuminated books in the 1790s. In these books, Blake’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In 1818 (copy G), Blake contracts the original title, The First Book of Urizen to The Book of Urizen, which 
has produced numerous claims by scholars investigating the implication of the contracted title in regards to The 
Book of Los and The Book of Ahania, and whether they form a relational context to one another or are 
individualistic. See Viscomi, The Idea of the Book, pp. 279-88 for a detailed history on Urizen’s production 
history in relation to other illuminated books.  
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illustrations, combined with his poetical texts, have been the subject of many scholarly 
debates. In the following three illuminated books Urizen, The Book of Los (1795), and The 
Book of Ahania (1795), Blake explores themes concerning origins. He especially focuses on 
the origins of man, religious authority, and social norms in these illuminated books. The 
forms of his works are creation myths attempting to explain how we arrived at the present 
day notion of ourselves. His answers to the complex question of who we are requires a close 
examination of how his poetic and illustrative processes incorporate contemporary medical 
ideas as he explains, in Urizen, the metaphysics and the materiality of our composition.  
Urizen focuses on the origins of man to explain how man has become enslaved by the 
religious systems that Blake believes restrain minds and bodies. In the literary structure of 
Urizen Blake parodies the Book of Genesis, both in his use of double columns and chapters, 
and in narrative sequence. Before Blake can show the relationship between a human body 
and the restrictive systems of society, he begins with a mythological “Eternity,” a preexisting 
place that is home to the “Eternals,” the demigods of Blake’s corpus. In Eternity, Urizen, one 
of the Eternals, begins to withdraw from the other Eternals, which announces the impending 
division of Eternity.44 In the process of his exodus from Eternity, Urizen, who becomes the 
central autocrat of the poem, undergoes various radical changes to his states of being 
(Worrall 10).45 In darkness, Urizen works on his “Book of Brass” and “His iron laws,” when 
Los—Blake’s alter ego—an important character in Blake’s myth representing imagination, is 
torn from Urizen’s side “in a way analogous to Eve’s division from Adam” (Erdman 72: 44, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Please note that my italicized “Urizen” refers to the poem, whereas the non-italicized “Urizen” refers to the 
figure Urizen. I follow these distinctions throughout the paper.  
 
45 All 8 copies are ordered differently and vary in the number of plates, from 25 to 28 plates. Out of theses 8 
copies of Urizen, it is interesting to note that Worrall believes Urizen, copy C (1794) is the authoritative 
ordering of Urizen because he believes Blake omits plates depicting Los to emphasizes the title, The Book of 
Urizen.  
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81: 26 and Worrall 10). When Urizen confronts the Eternals in his bid for a world where 
dynamics cease to exist and therefore, the world is “without fluctuation,” he causes the final 
schism in Eternity to occur (Erdman 71: 11). Then darkness consumes Urizen’s environment. 
Thereafter, Urizen is confined to a circular space where blood begins to pool and “a human 
heart” describes the newly Urizenic world (73: 36). As this abyss of darkness expands, 
Urizen’s formlessness of “unmeasurable death” undergoes a transmutation (74: 8).   
In reaction to the Eternal’s fury and Eternity’s strife, Los tries to prevent Urizen’s 
changes by condemning him to corporeality, which I will demonstrate later on in this section. 
After Urizen is rent from Los’s side, Los fears Urizen’s “fathomless void for his feet; / And 
intense fires for his dwellings” (74: 5-6). So, as Urizen lies “in a dreamless night,” Los uses 
his blacksmithing skills to “bound every change / With rivets of iron & brass” of the formless 
Urizen (74: 9-10). As a consequence of this, Urizen condenses into a human body because of 
Los’s relentless blacksmithing; Los also witnesses the creation of the first female form, 
Enitharmon, with whom Los will eventually beget Orc (a son of revolution). After his body 
is corporeal, Los endures a “stony sleep” as “ages roll’d” over him, after which he awakes to 
the newly created material world (74: 2, 5). He sets off to explore this world and finds that 
his children are unable to maintain his “iron law,” which makes his “soul sicken’d” (81: 26, 
23). In order to ensure his rule in this world, Urizen, freshly separated from Eternity, weaves 
an impenetrable web over the cities he visits. As the material world continues to grow, 
ironically, it becomes the world we know. This new world is without “eternal life” and ruled 
by false laws and systems that bind mankind (71: 39).  
 In the myriad creation narratives in Urizen, Blake’s use of blood precedes the 
creation of Urizen’s (and Enitharmon’s) human body. David Worrall further explains, “Life 
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takes on a human form Blake describes as a ‘globe of life blood trembling’, Blake’s two-way 
image of both a blood corpuscle and planetary universe” (22). In other words, Blake focuses 
on blood to introduce Urizen because of blood’s corporeality and its familiarity as a material 
substance common to all living objects. The use of blood to introduce Urizen’s bodily 
changes is Blake’s contribution to the debate surrounding the notion of blood as the origin of 
material bodies. His poetic diction and metaphors are not alone in signifying the complex 
relationship between blood and its capacity to aid in the production of a body. His 
illustrations that accompany the text, and also his full-page illustrations sharpen Blake’s 
focus on the link between blood and body formation.46   
The idea of relating a creation myth to a primal anatomical substance makes one 
wonder why Blake is unusually precise in anatomical rhetoric in his explication of Urizen’s 
body formation (as well as Enitharmon’s). As noted, Urizen parodies Genesis, but it seems 
unlikely that Genesis was Blake’s source for describing the formation of man’s body: “And 
the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, & breathed into his nostrils the breath 
of life; and man became a living soule [sic]” (KJV Chapter II).47 In Urizen, Blake dedicates 
three plates (Blake Books 10, 11, and 13) and forty-six lines to track Urizen’s body formation 
from a formless entity into a material human body. In The Illuminated Blake, David V. 
Erdman describes Urizen’s fetal positioned skeleton as a moment in the long process of 
fleshing Urizen’s body: “We see a cowl of flesh begin to form over the spine and behind the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Unless otherwise noted, I refer to Urizen, copy A (1794) from The William Blake Archive 
(www.blakearchive.org) throughout this paper for visual illustrations. I use copy A because it is the earliest 
printing of Urizen and is the only one of two copies to contain all 28 plates (copy B printed in 1795 is the other 
copy).   
 
47 I cite from a 1611 King James Version familiar to Blake.  
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head of his aged greenish bones, and a blue spinal nerve” (190).48 Blake’s elongated and 
highly concentrated elucidation of Urizen’s body suggests that he did not find inspiration for 
Urizen’s body in Genesis.  
 The detailed piecemeal presentation of Urizen’s body parts after a large quantity of 
blood suggests that Blake used a widely known anatomical treatise by John, A Treatise on 
The Blood, Inflammation, and Gun-Shot Wounds (1794). As I will argue, the anatomical 
knowledge displayed in Urizen derives from John’s treatise, which reflects Blake’s 
familiarity with this text as well as competing theories of anatomy in his day.49 The 
popularity of John’s posthumous treatise marks a shift in anatomy not only to explain how 
our bodies’ structure works, but also to delve into the origin of the body’s materiality. John’s 
obsession during the last years of his life was to locate the “original spark” of a human body, 
and this proved the impetus behind his research to write Blood, in which he states repeatedly 
that blood is the origin of a body. Blake’s use of Blood provides him with another 
opportunity to satirize, but also to modify John by using his theories of body formation to 
create the contemptible Urizen.50 I will demonstrate how Blake’s and John’s texts engage 
with one another, as they both attempt to answer the fundamental late eighteenth-century 
question of why our physical bodies manifest as they do.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Please visit www.blakearchive.org to see The [First] Book of Urizen, copy B, object 11 for a clear visual.  
 
49 From this point onwards, I will cite John’s treatise by its abbreviated form, “Blood.”  
 
50 The first instance of Blake’s satirizing of John Hunter is the character ‘Jack Tearguts’ from An Island in the 
Moon (1784): “Ah said Sipsop, I only wish Jack [Hunter] Tearguts had had the cutting of Plutarch he 
understands anatomy better than any of the Ancients hell plunge his knife up to the hilt in a single drive and 
thrust his fist in, and all in the space of a Quarter of an hour. He does not mind their crying—tho they ever so 
hell Swear at them & keep them down with his fist & tell them hell scrape their bones if they dont lay still & be 
quiet” (Erdman 454).  
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 My focus on Urizen’s body and the sequence of materials that Blake used to create 
his body aims to show that Blake is aware of the philosophical debates about the structure 
and development of the material components in bodies that preoccupied eighteenth-century 
anatomists. Blake’s application of John’s specific sequence of body parts as they form from 
blood suggests that we are able to trace how Urizen enlists but also critiques Blood’s 
theories. Blake’s construction of bodies seeks not to comment on the body-as-an-idea, but 
rather to link our bodies to Urizen’s body in order to free the original Poetic Genius. To fully 
understand the repercussions of Blake’s adaptation of John’s philosophical inquiries on the 
origins and structure of the human body, we must first direct our attention to Blake’s use of 
blood to understand why material substances appear as they do in Urizen. By doing so, we 
are able to read Urizen’s body construction scene as not only a creation myth, but also as an 
attempt by Blake to render Urizen’s body as a similitude for ours.  
History of Blakean Scholarship on Urizen’s Body 
 The eight extant copies of Urizen come with a puzzling printing record in that “the 
problem of arranging the plates is confusing, for each of the seven [eight] copies is bound 
quite differently from the others … [and] despite the extraordinary inconsistency of the 
orders in which copies are numbered and bound, the proper arrangement of the text is fairly 
plain” (Blake Books 171-2).51 The enigmatic history of Urizen’s technical production 
combined with the vivid full-page color illustrations has caused much speculation around 
Urizen and its textual meanings. Therefore, a brief survey of past scholarship on Blake’s 
Urizen will provide us with a historical spectrum of the body criticism focused on Urizen’s 
body.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Bentley did not know of copy J at the time he published Blake Books (1977).  
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 D. J. Sloss and J. P. R. Willis, coauthors of an early twentieth-century Blake edition, 
The Prophetic Writings of William Blake (1926), explain the phrase “globe of life blood” and 
its visual representation as a feminine symbol that is intended to invoke “the idea of 
corporeity,” while serving as a reminder of the “distracting influence of mundane 
environment upon the visionary, the appeal of the physical beauty, of social, moral, and 
artistic conventions” (96, fn. 39). In 1965, forty years after Sloss and Willis’s edition, S. 
Foster Damon published A Blake Dictionary that connects Urizen’s stages of materialization 
to the nine-month gestation period of a human’s embryology. He writes that Urizen is about 
“spiritual conflicts” which in turn “create[s] the physical body, tracing the development of 
the embryo to the foetus” (422). Damon’s parallel between the development of Urizen’s body 
and that of a human embryo remains the current interpretation amongst Blake scholars. 
Moreover, recent critical works strengthen Damon’s claim by reinforcing the parallel 
between Urizen’s body and human embryology using historical connections, such as to Dr. 
William Hunter’s Human Gravid Uterus (1774).52  
 Stefani Engelstein’s Anxious Anatomy (2008) psychoanalyzes the position of bodies 
displayed in Urizen’s illustrations under the pretense of an embryological framework 
established in Damon’s Blake Dictionary. She explains Urizen as Blake’s “most explicitly 
embryological text,” concluding from that premise that: 
Blake’s images in this work look like a bizarre distortion of an obstetrical 
atlas: a skeleton curls itself into a fetal position, an old man floats in dark 
amniotic-fluid, a young wound in the coils of a serpent that resembles the 
umbilical cord falls head downward in accordance with the late-term fetal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  This folio edition is known for its exquisite detailed depictions of a pregnant uterus in the last trimester and 
the manner it is presented. As the reader progresses, each plate reveals what is beneath the layer removed in the 
dissection. In recent criticism, this book has attracted attention because the mother’s body is displayed with her 
limbs (head, arms, and legs) hacked off and its incision points are just as detailed as the uterus.  
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position, a womb-like globe swollen with blood floats outside any body, 
attached by branchy forms to the exterior of a male figure. (79)53  
 
After her explication of Urizen’s body formation scene, Engelstein suggests, “Like [Dr. 
William] Hunter’s texts, Blake’s poem is simultaneously an embryological account and an 
atlas” (84). From this point, she departs into the anatomical history of obstetrics to highlight 
Blake’s use of words that she believes connote fetal imagery.54  
 As Engelstein relates Urizen to William’s Uterus, she informs us that her reading of 
Urizen differs from Tristanne Connolly’s earlier work, William Blake and the Body (2002), 
because she goes “a step further and demonstrate[s] how Blake’s celebration of the body 
coexists with his antagonism toward contemporary trends in the natural sciences” (71). For 
Engelstein, Connolly’s survey of the body in Blake’s work is more akin to Northrop Frye’s 
and Kathleen Raine’s “canonical readings” of Blake’s “antagonistic position toward nature 
and the natural history,” resulting in an understanding of Blake as “an antimaterialist 
Neoplatonist” (71). However, Connolly, too, sees Urizen in relation to William’s Uterus and 
other obstetrical treatises.  
 In the course of her readings, Connolly makes Urizen analogous to Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses because of the similarities the characters in both works share, which for her 
cannot be coincidental, despite other numerous works with themes of the history and creation 
of the world. The shift of Urizen’s body from non-corporeal to corporeal is termed 
“metamorphosis” by Connolly, which allows her to bring in Metamorphoses; however, one 
cannot tell whether Urizen or Metamorphoses is the focus of her chapter on embodiment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  She uses Urizen, copy G c. 1818, for what appears to be for her own aesthetic preference. I provide my 
examples of the illustrations she analyzes from copy A for the reasons I stated in fn. 46.  
 
54 Considering that she has a chapter titled “’Natural’ Reproduction and Reproducing Nature,” it is interesting to 
note the absence of Damon in her bibliography.  
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The symbol of metamorphosis that Connolly ascribes to Urizen’s body transformation 
affords her the opportunity to bring in human embryology via the Hunter brothers. 
 Connolly starts with this line of inquiry: “Images of foetal development are 
appropriate to Urizen’s story of beginnings, but why in reverse?” (80). Her answer is that 
“Blake could be hinting that creation is more of a regression than an advance. Creation is at 
odds with itself: supposed to come into being, for Blake it is a step closer to nonexistence” 
(80). This also applies to those who study embryos: “[I]n their concentration on the 
empirically perceptible material body, they do not really discuss life” (80). If she had read 
either of the Hunters’ works carefully, she would have found plenty of instances in which the 
Hunters cite their philosophical stance on the origins of life, even as they admit they have no 
empirical proof for their beliefs. She freely cites from William’s Uterus, failing to address 
the fact that William did not compose the text. William dissected the pregnant cadavers while 
Jan van Rymsdyk (fl. 1767-1790) engraved the stages of his dissection. In the 1794 edition, a 
decade after William’s death, his nephew, Matthew Baillie, composed the accompanying 
text, the content of which was deemed unsatisfactory to contemporary anatomists and was 
especially disagreeable to John, who had helped with the dissection.55 She concludes, in light 
of obstetrics, that prevailing theories of fetal development during Blake’s composition of 
Urizen “enable a link between metamorphosis and foetal development. The changes of 
Urizen play with both concepts, preformation and epigenesis,” and that Urizen’s formation 
ought to be understood as a mode of “embodiment [that] is not the same as the birth of a 
child: it is the binding of an eternal” (81, 94). From Connolly’s perspective, then, the changes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Connolly cites the 1774 edition of Uterus in her bibliography; however, there is no text in the 1774 edition 
that I have personally examined and I know of no other 1774 edition that does contain text. It seems to me that 
she cites text found in the 1794 edition thinking Dr. Hunter would have wrote those words in 1774 had he not 
been so hesitant to elucidate a theory on embryology at a time when it was rife with conflicts from a theological 
standpoint.   
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of Urizen’s body are a conceptual rather than a somatic rendition of prevailing anatomical 
theories of Blake’s day: “Blake’s description of it echoes the transformations of the foetus, 
and, through the alienation of metamorphosis, the ambivalence of human birth” (94).  
 In “William Blake and Eighteenth Century Medicine” (1979), F.B. Curtis, too, 
examines Urizen as a commentary on the creation of mankind through eighteenth-century 
theories of embryology. However, Curtis traces three prevalent terms in Blake’s works—
“spine,” “bones,” and “fibres”—to multiple obstetrical works.56 For Urizen, he understands 
these three words as aids in signifying “the frequent association of pains of gestation and 
childbirth, ironically inverted by Blake: Man’s entry into the world as a child promises 
freshness and youth” because it is in the womb that such body parts are formed (196). As we 
saw with Engelstein, Connolly reads the scene of Urizen’s shift from a dark abyss into a 
human body as representing the embryology (or gestational) process without addressing the 
minute details Blake incorporates into the scene. It is only at the end of the formation process 
that Urizen’s newly formed human body receives attention from the critics. The actual 
minute process of Urizen’s formation becomes just a facet of embryology in their readings. 
Whether intentional or not, each critic’s reading does confirm Damon’s original claim that 
Urizen’s body formation models the human embryological process. Curtis concludes that 
Blake’s choice to use an embryological narrative for Urizen’s body formation scene explains 
how “Blake gain[s] by using anatomical imagery” in order “to locate the creation of his 
figures firmly within the context of birth and therefore of pain” (197).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Curtis characterizes the following medical works as influences in Urizen: W. Osborn’s Essays on the Practice 
of Midwifery (1792), J. Bell’s The Anatomy of the Bones, Muscles, and Joints (1794), and J. Aitken’s Essays on 
several important subjects in surgery (1771). 
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 In “Evolution and William Blake” (1965), Carmen Kreiter argues that Urizen 
indicates the increased likelihood that Blake had direct contact with John, Kreiter writes, 
“Blake could also have drawn the embryological changes of Urizen from material seen in 
[John] Hunter’s museum, for Hunter had made many sketches of stages of development of 
various animals, in which he had illustrated how first the heart develops, then the brain, the 
spine, and so on” (113). From that premise, Kreiter believes Blake’s use of “conglobing” 
allows for the strong possibility that Blake witnessed open heart surgery: “‘Conglobing’ is 
not a term that describes the heart’s action as deduced from the appearance of the chest wall; 
such terms are the common ‘beating’ or ‘pounding’. Blake’s term, on the contrary, describes 
something only seen when the heart is viewed through a surgically opened chest” (114). In 
other words, Blake might have stood next to John as he dissected or performed surgery on a 
living patient.  
 While I do agree that Blake is familiar with the Hunter brothers, I am not willing to 
accept Kreiter’s speculation about an actual meeting between Blake and John Hunter (at this 
point in my archival research). Furthermore, Kreiter believes Blake’s use of embryological 
terms derives from two pioneering classic studies by William Harvey that John Hunter must 
have “undoubtedly owned” and discussed with Blake during their meeting (116).57 Hence, 
Kreiter believes that Urizen’s body creation is “not merely an arbitrary invention,” but rather 
“that it echoes with considerable accuracy the seven-staged description of embryogenesis 
made by John Hunter’s famous seventeenth-century predecessor, William Harvey” (116). 
Kreiter is right to highlight the uncanny parallels in Urizen’s formation to anatomical works. 
However, his assumption of a meeting between Blake and John is too circumstantial without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Kreiter specifically points to two of Harvey’s famous works: An Anatomical Disquisition of the Motion of the 
Heart and Blood in Animals (1638) and De Generatione (1651).  
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any support from viable archival evidence. In addition, Kreiter selection of medical texts that 
Kreiter believes are reflected in Urizen rests entirely upon the assumption that John shared 
them with Blake.  
 Despite the historical tendency in Blakean scholarship to conceptualize Urizen’s body 
scene as an embryological process without regard to Blake’s unusually specific anatomical 
language, John Mee in “Bloody Blake: Nation and Circulation” (2006), analyzes a specific 
anatomical object often repeated in Urizen. He traces Blake’s use of the word “blood” in 
Urizen to reveal Blake’s source in the works of John Brown. In doing so, Mee theorizes how 
Blake’s use of “blood” from a particular medical text reflects how Blake modifies “blood” to 
comment on the social ills of the eighteenth century. In the next section, I will provide a 
close reading of how Mee defines Blake’s rationale and source for his notion on blood. 
Subsequently, I will examine the historical source Mee believes to be the primer of Blake’s 
anatomical knowledge.  
 Mee is right to detect an underwhelming amount of scholarship devoted exclusively 
to Blake’s treatment of blood, specifically in Urizen. He argues that Blake’s use of blood 
suggests that we ought to read its role in Urizen as part of a larger metaphor, namely 
circulation. Mee does not focus on the corporeality of the substances Blake employs to create 
Urizen’s human body. Instead, he examines how blood helps, metaphorically speaking, 
circulate Urizen’s actions and desires before and after Eternity’s split. Mee argues that 
circulation and its opposing force, “blockage,” were “central to the ideas of the health of the 
nation both literally and metaphorically. The circulation of goods was regarded as the 
lifeblood of the nation,” which is why he believes Blake uses the same conceptual framework 
to aid his readers through contemporaneous literary themes (63). From this perspective, Mee 
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conceives Urizen’s body as a micro-example of England’s body politic. Mee’s examination 
of the metaphors of circulation in Urizen harks to a rich eighteenth-century trope that Mee 
believes is evident of Blake’s commercial work as an engraver on Dr. John Brown’s 
Elements of Medicine (1795).58  
 According to Mee, Blake’s circulation metaphors are inspired by Dr. Brown’s idea 
about the body’s operation as “a self-contained system of energy rather than its causes” (69). 
This theory, Mee suggests, is why Urizen is really about “the broader ideas about formatted 
space” and “the operations of sympathy in body politic” (74). Despite his disregarding the 
possibility that Blake uses blood as a corporeal substance, Mee discusses why blood is a 
metaphoric component of circulating spaces within Urizen: 
The ‘wheels of blood’ are not exactly regulated into any arterial system of 
exchange. Equally when the cardiovascular system emerges as the dominant 
trope in The Book of Urizen, it is not simply part of an opposition between 
blockage and circulation, but also between two different ideas of circulation. 
Urizen’s is ‘Self-closd, all-repelling.’ … Yet for all that he is identified with 
‘solid obstruction,’ Urizen does not exactly block circulation as such. Rather 
he wants to produce (he never exactly succeeds) a codified system of rigidly 
formatted space, ‘The net of Religion,’ through which constrained forms of 
sympathy may circulate. (76) 
 
What we see is that Mee’s analysis is mainly concerned with how circulation benefits 
Urizen’s newly reformatted world (the post-Eternity material world). He reads Urizen’s shift 
from a formless entity into a solid (corporeal) body as representing the forces of expansion 
and contraction, respectively. These spatial manifestations can then be read as indicating the 
“desire of Urizen to abstract a more orderly space from these bloody passions” in which 
“‘whirlwinds and cataracts of blood’ are eventually formatted into a more orderly space 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Blake engraved the front piece, which is a portrait of the author. This is a translated edition (from Latin to 
English) published by Joseph Johnson.  
 
	   98	  
organized around the universal laws of the moral sentiments” (78). By circulating moral 
sentiments, Mee means that the motions of circulation are precisely what enables Urizen to 
spread his ideologies for “One command, one joy, one desire, / One curse, one weight, one 
measure / One King, one God, one Law” around his new world (Erdman 72: 38-40).   
 In his quest to “circulate” his desires, Urizen also opposes Eternity’s delightful fires 
of frenetic energy by “cooling down like an antiphlogistic doctor, but his idea of stability 
only brings death” (Mee 79). Mee believes Blake’s association of coolness with Urizen’s 
body intends to slow the energy of Eternity, and, in response to Urizen’s coolness, the 
“Eternals think Urizen’s formatted universe brings death rather than life” (79). For Mee, the 
circulation metaphor and polar temperatures in Urizen are proof of “Blake’s ability to 
acknowledge the material conditions of the world-as-it-is and at the same time his insistence 
on the importance of another kind of circulation entirely as the proper basis of human 
relationships” (79). With this belief, Mee displaces the circulation metaphor into the realm of 
metaphysics, therefore, reading Blake’s use of blood as rooted in a larger project that 
comments upon abstract human relationships. The legitimacy of these relationships is 
directly tied to their (dys)functional paths of circulating desires, or their blockage in such 
paths. Mee thinks Blake’s greatest source of inspiration for using circulation as a metaphor to 
talk about human relationships comes from Dr. Brown’s excitability chart (see Figure 2) that 
attempts to classify levels of excitement in a person’s body as a diagnostic tool.59  
 Brown’s chart, Mee argues, serves as the basic guide for Blake’s use of the 
eighteenth-century’s popularization of  “the trope of circulation” that was “capable of being 
conceived in different ways” which Blake demonstrates in Urizen (79). The idea of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Figure 2.  
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systematically mapping a body’s range of responses is not original to Brown; however, he 
did popularize its reception among medical and laymen alike. In fact, Elements is more of an 
empirical account arising out of Renaissance’s humorism, which was becoming increasingly 
outmoded and unable to withstand the new advances in anatomical knowledge.60 Dr. Brown 
salvages the humoral theory by grounding it in empirically derived categories. For instance, 
he takes a common disease and records its effects on the body in terms of agitated or languid 
states. Figure 2 depicts the center of this scale as having a zone that represents a healthy 
body. The healthy body’s equilibrium consists of the two states of excitement: sthenic, when 
energy is excessive and asthenia, extreme weakness. The symptoms of a common disease are 
noted on the chart according to the degrees of excitability a body exhibits as it suffers. Thus 
their cures—according to Dr. Samuel Lynch, who created this chart for Dr. Brown—are 
based on “support[ing] the excitement” or “diminish[ing] the excitement” (Brown 163). Dr. 
Brown condenses the four humors into two states: excitement and death. According to the 
chart, perfect health is narrow in scope. There are five degrees in either direction, which 
become a “predisposition” towards an illness. The content and development of this chart span 
the two volumes of Elements as it discusses many other diseases and cures in light of this 
chart. But it is odd for Mee to rely on Dr. Brown’s chart for his primary understanding of 
Blake’s use of blood if Mee is also treating Blakean blood as a metaphor. In fact, Elements 
cannot offer us textual clues in indentifying Blake’s source of anatomical knowledge. The 
problem is that Dr. Brown hardly discusses blood, since his text is more concerned with how 
to stabilize the body’s states of excitement in order to prevent death.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Humorism: The doctrine of the four bodily ‘humours’ and their relation to ‘temperaments’ and to diseases 
(Oxford English Dictionary). The four bodily humors are: black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood. The four 
temperaments commonly associated were: melancholic, choleric, phlegmatic, and sanguine.  
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 Dr. Brown’s discussions of body parts are neither specific nor the central to his 
chapters. Body parts such as the brain, the eye, or blood are used as reference points to 
describe diseases and their location in the body. Dr. Brown never delves into a body part to 
explain its functionality in relation to the body or how it forms. It is doubtful that Blake’s 
knowledge of body parts in the order he presents them in Urizen or his use of blood derives 
from a thorough reading of Elements. The lengthy two-volume text has one goal: to explain 
the body’s excitement levels and its desire to maintain health within the five degrees on his 
chart. Everything else reads as a manual designed to help us restore our body’s equilibrium 
when ill.   
 Lastly, there is another oddity to Mee’s connection between Urizen and Elements: the 
chronology between the two texts. It is ahistorical because Blake put a date of 1794 on 
Urizen’s title plate, but his engraving of Dr. Brown’s portrait for Johnson was published May 
1, 1795.61 While one might argue that Blake might have spent the preceding year working on 
the portrait—he was, but along with other projects such as Songs of Experience (1794), 
Europe (1794), and Poems of Catullus (tr. J. Nott March 10, 1795)—this still implies that 
Blake had access to the newly translated pages from Elements. This is problematic. It is 
generally assumed in Blake scholarship that Blake did not know Latin. Since Dr. Thomas 
Beddoes translated the 1794 edition of Elements from eccentric Latin into English to be 
published in March or April 1795, it would have been necessary for Blake to have contact 
with Dr. Beddoes to have the translated pages. I have not been successful in locating proof 
that puts Blake in proximity to Dr. Beddoes in order to have access to the translation before it 
was published. Nonetheless, Joseph Johnson, the book’s publisher, would not have viewed it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Figure 3. 
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necessary for Blake to read Elements before completing the portrait. Therefore, it seems to 
me that the English edition could have only been available to Blake shortly before it was 
published or when it was actually available to the public in May 1795. These dates suggest it 
would have been much too late for Blake to incorporate Brown’s theories in Urizen. To avoid 
these chronological potholes, Mee believes that Blake’s work on Urizen and Dr. Brown’s 
portrait overlapped during 1794 and suggests that the 1794 date on Urizen’s title page was 
written before the illuminated book was completed. Furthermore, he concludes that “Blake 
did not necessarily have the Brown volume in his possession to engrave the portrait, but the 
sudden infusion of blood into his poetry suggests that he either read it or knew something of 
it” (Mee 74). If Blake did not know Latin or Dr. Beddoes, I am uncertain as to how Mee 
concludes that Blake had access to the translation to have read it. Even if he “knew 
something of it,” there still remains the other aforementioned issue, that Elements does not 
treat blood as an extensive topic.  
 Mee’s original intention to highlight the presence of blood in Urizen is a valid point 
of inquiry. However, by treating blood as a metaphorical component of yet another metaphor, 
circulation, Mee does not entertain the notion that Blake’s use of blood could very well be 
just what it is—blood, a corporeal substance. My treatment of Blake’s use of blood rests on 
the view that Blake regards each body part and substances as corporeally as possible. By 
treating Blake’s anatomical rhetoric as signifiers of anatomical references, I will examine 
how Urizen engages with John’s Blood and its attempts to explain the origin of a material 
body and its major organs via blood. Nonetheless, in other works, we will see, blood for 
Blake is not simply reducible to anatomy but takes on the larger meanings of life and 
prophecy. 
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Mixing Blood to form the Hunterian Body of Urizen  
 John identifies blood as the carrier of the “original spark” of life because it 
ubiquitously participates in every function of the body—from structural composition to the 
sustainment of bodily actions. To develop this concept further, he devotes chapter six in 
Blood to explaining the philosophical and empirical accounts of blood’s connection with 
“living solids” and ultimately how blood has the ability to create a body.62 Or alternatively, 
as Youngquist succinctly phrases it: “Thus the blood, which circulates throughout the body to 
enliven it and coagulates when necessary to rebuild it, is alive” (Youngquist 11). 
Interestingly, John explains the need for chapter six despite his long publishing history 
exploring blood-as-living because “without some such principle all we have been examining 
is like dissecting a dead body without having any reference to the living, or even knowing it 
had ever been alive” (Blood 76). I will now investigate the rhetorical presence of blood in 
Blake’s Urizen to elucidate the specificity of Blake’s use of blood for Urizen’s impending 
bodily construction. By approaching the first corporeal substance identified by Blake in 
Urizen we see how his initial association of blood with Urizen serves as a building block for 
Urizen’s body. This successive ordering follows the chapter outline of John’s treatise, Blood, 
in which he states in the introduction that his text is written to pursue his “ideas of life further 
than has commonly been done,” starting with a natural historical account of blood (3). Blake 
and John use blood as the first corporeal subject in their works, and as John argues, blood is 
the origin of a body; therefore, Blake’s use of blood to bring about the corporeal creation of 
Urizen suggests that John’s opening discussion of blood also influenced why Blake thinks of 
blood as the first bodily substance.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 John’s use of  “living solids” is a general term that refers to any body part that is not composed of blood. For 
example: muscles, nerves, organs, and bones.   
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 After Urizen’s preludium, Blake describes an entity that is “Dark revolving in silent 
activity: / Unseen in tormenting passions; / An activity unknown and horrible; / A self-
contemplating shadow” (Erdman 71: 18-21). We are told that “dark Urizen” is preparing for 
a battle by gathering his forces of  “ten thousands of thunders” (71: 28). As Urizen stores up 
his energies for an epic battle, Blake reminds us that we are reading a creation story by 
giving us a temporal perspective of Earth: “Earth was not” and “Death was not, but eternal 
life sprung” (71: 36, 39). A warning reverberates throughout Eternity: 
The sound of a trumpet the heavens 
Awoke & vast clouds of blood roll’d 
Round the dim rocks of Urizen, so nam’d 
That solitary one in Immensity[.]  
(71: 40-3)   
 
Making its first appearance in the poem, blood is directly associated with Urizen, since the 
blood’s motion rolls upon objects belonging to Urizen. While the blood swirls around 
Urizen, with trumpets blaring throughout Eternity, Urizen speaks from his “dark solitude” to 
reveal how he has “books formd of metals” in which he has “written the secrets of wisdom” 
(72: 24-5). As Urizen concludes his apocalyptic speech, his quasi-face is revealed to the rest 
of the Eternals: “The voice ended, they saw his pale visage” (72: 1). Shortly thereafter, Blake 
again invokes blood with Urizen: “Rage, fury, intense indignation / In cataracts of fire blood 
& gall” (72: 45-6). Blake will repeat “In whirlwinds & cataracts of blood” for a third time 
before making explicit that blood transforms Urizen’s formlessness into his corporeality and 
therefore removes Urizen from the realm of mere allegory (73: 13).  
 In his opening chapter of Blood, John states that he must begin with a natural history 
because blood is present in every living thing and very few comparative anatomical works 
have been exclusively devoted to studying blood. He hopes “this publication will, at least, 
	   104	  
have equal good with those I have before produced, not only enabling persons to write the 
same subject, who could not otherwise have done it, but even become critics in matters of 
which, till then, they were entirely ignorant” (Blood 2). John is attempting to produce a work 
that deals with blood exclusively in order to make his claim that blood is the origin of bodies. 
It was uncommon for blood to receive serious attention by anatomists, much less be a major 
part of a treatise. In past treatises, if blood received attention at all it was often as a byproduct 
of the anatomist’s explanation concerning vessels or the mechanics of circulation. Treating 
blood as an authentic source of inquiry in the dissection room and not as a mere byproduct of 
cutting bodies, John hopes to explain its pervasive presence in living bodies. 
 Blood’s states of solidity and fluidity are the first tactile category that John decides to 
tackle in the first part of Blood. Believing that solidity and fluidity are “General Principles of 
the Blood” (Blood’s Chapter One Title), John supposes that all solids must first exist in a 
fluid state: 
The whole material world has been very properly divided into solids and 
fluids; these being only essentially different states of matter as we are able to 
observe. From one of these states, to the other, matter appears to be 
continually passing, but with these restrictions, that no species of matter can 
assume a solid form, without having first been in a fluid state; nor can any 
change take place in a solid till it be first formed into, or suspended in a fluid. 
The living animal body is obedient to these general laws, for all solid and 
animal matter has first been fluid, and having passed into this solid form, 
becomes a recipient for other fluids, out of which the solids may themselves 
be renovated and increased. … the fluid part of an animal body, in its natural 
state, has but one appearance, which is that of blood. (12)  
 
 
Our perceptivity determines our ability to distinguish between solid and fluid, and indeed 
John explains the ubiquitous tendency to conceive the world in this dichotomy. We see the 
same dichotomy occurring in Urizen when we consider the two forms Urizen takes: 
formlessness and a human body. Urizen’s states share remarkable similarity with John’s 
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passage on fluidity and solidity. The trajectory of Urizen’s body from the opening plate to 
the preceding lines of Urizen’s entrapment, in which solidification occurs, parallels John’s 
claim that all solid animal matter must first exist as fluid. Blake’s repetition of “blood” with 
Urizen leads to a specific type of solidification.   
 The Eternals fight against Urizen’s demands for a world of inflexibility by corralling 
his dark entity through their affinity for fires:  
Fires pour thro’ the void on all sides 
On Urizens self-begotten armies.  
But no light from the fires. all was darkness 
In the flames of Eternal fury[.]  
(Erdman 73: 15-8)  
 
At first Urizen runs from their fires “To hide, but He could not” and retaliates by making 
“mountains & hills in vast strength, / He piled them in incessant labour” until “hoary, and 
age-broke, and aged, / In despair, and the shadows of death” (73: 21-3, 26-7). Once Urizen 
slows, solidification commences. The last two mentions of blood with Urizen describe it as 
a superfluid object much like Blake’s descriptions of fire. Blake’s relationship between 
blood and fire replicates John’s belief that “heat in the animal body, principally in those 
which are called warm animals, has been commonly considered as depending principally on 
blood” (Blood 15). Moreover, just as John understands blood’s ability to coagulate as an 
intermediary state between fluid and solid (20-5), Blake too, constructs a similar transition. 
When Urizen finally expends his energy fighting Eternal’s fury and submits, he, 
comparatively, coagulates. The following is the last scene in which Blake associates blood 
with Urizen’s formlessness before he turns corporeal: 
And a roof, vast petrific around, 
On all sides He fram’d: like a womb; 
Where thousands of rivers in veins 
Of blood pour down the mountains to cool 
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The eternal fires beating without  
From Eternals; & like a black globe 
View’d by sons of Eternity, standing 
On the shore of the infinite ocean 
Like a human heart struggling & beating 
The vast world of Urizen appear’d.  
(Erdman 73: 28-37)63 
 
As the blood pours in a womb-like enclosure—hence the valley where the blood is pouring 
down to cool—Urizen’s newly delimited world is like “a human heart struggling & 
beating”. Blood is no longer associated with heat, and, as it cools, it produces an 
environment for Urizen that is not only an organ pertinent to all life forms, but specifically a 
human heart. In John’s explication of blood’s natural history, he points to the necessity of 
blood’s ability to coagulate to form first the heart, then the vessels, and finally the rest of the 
body’s necessary structure for life (Blood 11). While John does not outright note what 
causes coagulation, he explains “that it [blood] coagulates from an impression: that is, its 
fluidity under such circumstances, being no longer proper or no longer necessary, it 
coagulates to answer now the necessary purpose of solidity” (25). The first solid form that 
blood takes, in John’s opinion, is a heart. This pattern, where blood first solidifies into a 
heart, strongly suggests that Blake is using John’s developmental theories, which in turn 
suggests that Blake’s sequence of corporeal parts is, also, indebted to John.  
 If we read Urizen’s two states not as “expansion” or “contraction” as Mee does, but 
rather as states of fluidity and solidity along with blood’s presence, we can begin to see how 
Urizen’s bodily descriptions match Blake’s incorporation of Blood. In the next section, I will 
analyze Urizen’s body formation. Blake uses a very specific pattern of body parts in exactly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 John remarks the prevailing use of conceiving circulation as water systems: “The distribution of water from 
the sea, is similar to the arterial system; and the rivers returning to it have an analogy of veins” (15). Compare 
with Blake’s: “Where thousands of rivers in veins / Of Blood” (Erdman 73: 30-1) . 
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the order discussed in Blood to create Urizen. Furthermore, Blake does not leave his Urizen 
project completed in 1794. In The Small Book of Designs (1796), he will revisit the plate of a 
“red globe” to enunciate the corporeal meaning more concretely and this time, to provide a 
textual caption that resonates more clearly with his anatomical knowledge.64 
II. Ordering Urizen’s Corporealization in a Hunterian Method 
 After Eternity’s schism, where “the stars are apart from the earth,” Los, Blake’s alter 
ego representing Imagination, experiences extreme pain because Urizen is “rent from his 
side” (Erdman 73-4: 42, 4). After Los’s torn side heals, he sees Urizen lying “cold, 
featureless, flesh or clay” and becomes frightened by Urizen’s “formless unmeasurable 
death” (74: 5, 8). To control Urizen’s “formless” entity, Los decides to “bound every change 
/ With rivets of iron & brass” that are “the changes of Urizen” by employing his 
blacksmithing skills (74: 10-2). Los continually binds Urizen in blacksmithing metals such 
as sordor, iron, and brass, until Urizen suddenly beings to corporealize regardless of the 
ensuing efforts of Los: 
Los beat on his fetters of iron; 
And heated his furnaces & pour’d 
Iron sordor and sodor of brass 
 
Restless turnd the immortal inchain’d 
Heaving dolorous! Anguish’d! unbearable[.] 
(75: 28-33)65 
 
Los’s work that spanned over “hours, days & years” abruptly brings about the 
corporealization of Urizen’s body (75: 18). The first body part named is the spine, then the 
ribs. After blood, the next anatomical object identified is Urizen’s skeleton. We know that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Please visit www.blakearchive.org to see The [First] Book of Urizen, copy A, object 11 for a clear visual.  
 
65 Please visit www.blakearchive.org to see The First Book of Urizen, copy B, object 11 for the text’s 
accompanying illustration.  
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John considers blood as “the moving material of life, and taking a part in every action of it,” 
and that he believes that blood is the “original spark” of life because it ubiquitously 
participates in every function of the body—from structure composition to the sustainment of 
bodily actions. He names this concept “the living principle” (Blood 71, 76). To develop this 
concept further, he devotes chapter six in Blood to explaining the philosophical and 
empirical accounts of blood’s connection with “living solids” and ultimately how blood has 
the ability to create a body.66 It is clear that Blake is not dissecting in Urizen: he is very 
much invested in creating Urizen with familiar materials. Before returning to the particulars 
of how blood transforms into “living solids,” it is necessary to consider the opening lines of 
Urizen’s body formation and see how these lines parallel with John’s notions.  
 The first part of Urizen’s skeleton that Blake identifies is the skull: “Till a roof 
shaggy wild inclos’d / In an orb, his fountain of thought” (Erdman 75: 33-4). Damon has 
demonstrated that “orb” often correlates to skull throughout Blake’s corpus (362). The rest 
of the skeleton is as follows: 
A vast Spine writh’d in torment 
Upon the winds; shooting pain’d 
Ribs, lie a bending cavern 
And bones of solidness, froze 
Over all his nerves of joy. (75: 37-41) 
Urizen’s form from Los’s blacksmithing has caused him to acquire a human body in a 
piecemeal process: his body does not simply appear as a whole (completed) body. Bones are 
first in Blake’s procession of parts to create Urizen, as it was with John’s highly respected 
The natural history of the human teeth (1771) wherein he proved bones were living. This 
line of thought is carried into Blood, where John writes that “It is within these fifty years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 John’s use of  “living solids” is a general term that refers to any body part that is not composed of blood. For 
example: muscles, nerves, organs, and bones.   
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only, that bones have been allowed to be alive” (76). He further explains that when blood 
“becomes a solid…its solidity becomes the ultimate end of the blood, as blood to produce 
living callus of bones” (78, 92). Blake has effectively condensed this process as described 
by John into one line—“And bones of solidness”—which suggests that Blake was following 
John’s assumption that blood as fluid must necessarily turn solid, which produces the solid 
parts required for a body to exist.  
 Blake returns to a minute component of blood—that is, its “globules”—to create the 
next major section of Urizen’s body: his vessels and organs. The leap from bones back to 
blood, then forward to organs reflects a disorganization of John’s chapter on blood’s living 
principle. Blake, too, commences with a stanza on Urizen’s skeletal framework, then revisits 
Urizen’s blood (“a red / Round globe”) in the following stanza and resumes with Urizen’s 
organs in the third stanza: “two little orbs / and fixed in two little caves” (Erdman 75-6: 35-
43, 1-9, 10-8). Similarly, as John is developing his philosophical grounding, he will step 
back to reintroduce data he collected from previous experiments with blood to arrive at the 
next step in a body’s formation: 
I shall endeavour to show that organization, and life, do not depend on the 
least on each other; that organization may arise out of living parts, and 
produce action, but it can never rise out of or depend on organization. An 
organ is a peculiar conformation of matter, (let that matter be what it may) to 
answer purpose, the operation of which is mechanical; but, mere organization 
can do nothing, even in mechanics, it must still having something 
corresponding to a living principle; namely, some power. (Blood 78) 
 
John goes on to explain that through his tracking of the growth of a chick embryo, he has 
observed how blood solidifies into bones. The production of vessels ensues because blood 
must be permitted to travel throughout the developing body: “[B]lood has the power of 
action within itself” to provide nourishment for the body since it is the only anatomical 
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object freely fluid throughout the body (26, 72). Blake, too, replicates John’s chronological 
theory of blood’s capacity for life: 
From the caverns of his jointed Spine, 
Down sun with fright a red 
Round globe hot burning deep 
Deep down into the Abyss: 
Panting: Conglobing, Trembling 
Shooting out ten thousand branches 
Around his solid bones. 
… 
His nervous brain shot branches  
Round the branches of his heart. 
(Erdman 75-6: 1-7, 11-2) 
 
A subsequent plate will continue to add the last parts to Urizen’s body, such as his ears, 
nostrils, stomach, throat, and tongue (76: 21, 1, 6-8).67 However, the lines above are the 
epitome of Blake’s understanding of the Hunterian body. Therefore, I will devote the rest of 
this section to the parallel between Blake’s anatomical language and Blood’s examples. 
Object 11 from Urizen, copy A (visit www.blakearchive.org) depicts a figure hunching over 
a red circle. Blake connects the figure to the red circle by depicting veins from the base of 
the figure’s spine to the circle below. This circle most likely illustrates: “From the caverns 
of his jointed Spine, / Down dun with fright a red / Round globe hot burning deep,” which 
also captures the effect of “Shooting out ten thousand branches / Around his solid bones” 
(75-6: 1-3, 6-7). We know that the “globe” represents blood for it is named as such by Blake 
later in the poem—“a round globe of blood” (77: 58). The specificity of the vessels’ exit 
from the body reflects John’s comment that “the cavity of the veins…pass off from the 
body…and at last terminate in the common trunk” (Blood 181), that is, in the torso of the 
body.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  The order of these body parts, too, follow the same order that John discusses them in his part two of Blood 
chapter “Union by the First Intention” (255-85).  
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 This suggests that, in one plate, Blake visually captures the fundamentals of John’s 
concept of blood as it pertains to the development of a body. The globe of blood attracts a 
good deal of the viewer’s attention just as John’s attention to blood spans nearly half of 
Blood’s 634-page text. The body above the globe and the vessels connecting to the body 
show Blake’s understanding of blood as the first primeval anatomical substance by placing 
it at the bottom. As viewers work their way up the illustration, they will witness the 
increasing complexity of blood’s development as it corresponds to key passages in Blood. 
Interestingly, Blake goes so far as to capture John’s uncertainty about why blood is a living 
fluid: “It is probably impossible to say where the living principle first begins in the blood” 
(91).  
 Furthermore, Blake clarifies his intentions on this plate to reflect Hunterian thought 
well after completing the first copy of Urizen in 1794. In copies C, D, and F (1794), the 
effects of Blake’s emphasis on making the vessels from the body more reddish to avoid 
confusion with the figure’s hair are easily discernible. Copy B (1795) depicts the same 
globe of blood; however, it differs from the other copies mentioned in that the globe is now 
covered in bluish veins, which more closely resemble John’s illustrations of his experiment 
with a chick embryo.68 In a separate work altogether, Blake revisits John’s concept in the 
same plate illustration in his color prints for The Large Book of Designs and The Small Book 
of Designs (SBD) (1796). I believe Blake’s modification on this illustration served to render 
more distinctively his Hunterian allusions. In SBD, the plate contains more intricately 
painted vessels, contrasting with the blackness inside of the globe. This causes an intense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Please visit www.blakearchive.org to see The [First] Book of Urizen, copy B, object 19 for a clear visual of 
the changes of the globe of blood. And then compare aforementioned Blake plate to John’s illustration of his 
chick embryos (Figure 4).   
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three-dimensional rendition of the globe as compared to the eight copies of Urizen. The 
complex three-dimensional effect enhances the notion that Blake’s use of blood is not 
metaphorical but ought to be read more corporeally than previously acknowledged in past 
Blake scholarship. Even more remarkably, a recent issue of Blake/An Illustrated Quarterly 
(Fall 2008) published images of an additional copy of SBD made available to the public for 
the first time. The illustration in discussion now contains a textual caption: “Vegetating in 
fibres of Blood” (Butlin 68). The caption along with the intensification of vessels in the 
globe of blood that Blake creates two years after he completed Urizen, Copy A, allows us to 
read the elapsed time as Blake’s attempt to reinforce his original Hunterian allusion that 
traces back to Blood.  
 The corporeal Urizen inherited from Blake’s illuminated work is not an isolated 
product of Blake’s poetic genius, but rather intertwines with the rich field of eighteenth-
century anatomy. Urizen’s transformation from formlessness into a corporeal body is an 
affirmation of Blake’s anatomical knowledge, rather than mere poetical fancies. Thus, we 
should revisit his other works that use anatomically precise terminology to recast Blake, a 
poet and illustrator, as an artist who uses anatomy not only to render a degree of realism but 
also to comment upon prevailing ideas about the origins of the material self. It is not a 
coincidence that he engages an anatomical treatise to fabricate Urizen’s corporeal origin. 
Instead, Blake is using his anatomical knowledge to vividly create a work that does not just 
simply emphasize the commonality between our bodies and Urizen’s, but also highlights our 
perceptions of our bodies as they are—incomplete.  
III. Vala, or The Four Zoas: Building a Communal Anatomical Body  
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   For Blake, the body is so impassioned and imprisoned that it needs a complete 
transformation in order to reveal a body that is more suitable to Blake’s own concepts of 
freedom and imagination. What this means is that the body at its best is neither allegorical 
nor anatomical. What emerges over the course of Four Zoas (c. 1796) is that Blake’s anger at 
his own complicated relationships with local patrons and artists overwhelm any sympathy he 
might have for anatomists. This is the work where Blake’s anger propels him from 
embracing the body as good into the realm of a disembodied myth. 	   	  
 The Four Zoas demonstrates man’s internalization of language, while simultaneously 
offering an anatomical body in print; it is not an anti-anatomical language, but he does 
attempt to create an anatomy based on the redemption of the Zoas and the emanations. To 
ignore his anatomical language, we ignore Blake’s desire to truly produce an anatomical 
body that his readers could feel and understand, for he sought to produce a different language 
that intends to rehabilitate a human embodiment and drive contemporary anatomical 
language away from reductionism. Blake’s alternative approach to anatomy provides a refuge 
for conceptualizing the human body and its anatomical parts as a collective identity 
inherently formed out of nonlinear complexities, ultimately dependent upon a communal 
organization. Even here, though, Blake’s refusal to create a hierarchy of organs resembles 
John’s approach to organs. For William Hunter each major organ was classified into a 
hierarchal order according to its mechanical value in respect to the body; and the heart was 
“The Centre of the System,” especially due to the heart’s location in the “middle of the whole 
Mass of the Body” (Royal Academy 35). William goes on to list each system in descending 
importance. Since the brain is classified as the second most important system, its influence 
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limited to exerting muscular motion and sensory perceptions, the brain is then a passive 
mechanism.  
Despite evidence that such a perfect body does not exist, William Hunter’s 
anatomical discourse builds a meta-anatomical structure that purports to objectively 
investigate the body on a linear path. The body is conceptualized as a straight line that 
remains uniform and unable to accommodate any outliers. A history of increasing 
technological efficacy reveals a merger between systematic data and bodies, as Burke and 
Ornstein point out: “The ability to reduce people to numbers and graphs…[permitted] ways 
to reduce data on the human body to many more subcategories,” allowing for a taxonomy of 
bodies to appear within anatomical discourse (226, 232). Any descriptive anomaly is 
excluded from the taxonomy as “a modification caused by a wrong arrangement or 
construction of parts, which will produce unnatural action, by which means the natural action 
may be known” (Principles 19). Those monsters in William’s anatomy collection are outliers 
that could never be integrated into his philosophy of the standard body.  
For Blake, William Hunter’s hierarchy of organs would be as repulsive as his social 
elitism. In Blake’s anatomy, as in John Hunter’s, the body is not deduced from linearity but 
communicative. He argues that each organ contributes to its own mechanical role through a 
communal language within the body, which narrates itself in its own environmental 
framework. The linear body is conceived as a mammoth machine fueled by smaller 
machines, which are in turn operating on minuscule machines and so on. In that perspective 
of the body, there is a loss of independent agency on the behalf of organs and the body; 
oddly, William does not locate a starting point for these machines. But Blake’s theory of the 
body “subsists in its activity and its motion” without attempting to structure body forms into 
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a linear hierarchy (Frosch 143). Any compositional bodies that create outliers are not seen as 
defunct but rather as an individuation of the body’s communal language. For Blake the 
body’s valuation shifts from mechanical to communicative.  
The introduction of a collective identity to the body in Blake’s anatomy relies heavily 
on the notion of interdependent communication within a single body. For Blake the living 
body is always communicative. This site of communication between the body and other 
organs lies in the brain: “Tho in the Brain of Man we live, & in his circling Nerves / Tho’ 
this bright world of all our joy is in the Human Brain” (Erdman, FZ 11: 15-6). The body 
begins with the brain since it mediates sequential events both inside and outside of it. In other 
words, the body is a continual, interactive system. The invocation of the brain as the site of 
imaginative will appears in the beginning of Blake’s Milton, psychosomatically capturing the 
interaction that takes place within his body as he begins to engrave: 
Come into my hand  
By your mild power; descending down the Nerves of my right arm 
From out the Portals of my Brain, where by your ministry 
The Eternal Great Humanity Divine. (2:5-8; emphasis added) 
 
The interaction not only occurs in the brain but traverses the body to an outward form, 
writing. Language is not a by-product of humanity; rather, it is a necessity for the body to 
exist. Language bespeaks us, and for the body to function, it must achieve nothing short of 
perfect communication among its parts. If the body exists, after our use of language, then 
anatomical discourse is manufactured after dissecting the body. 
What angers Blake so much is that the language of anatomy in William’s works as 
well as several of his prominent students tends towards a body described in a confined order. 
This type of structure in anatomical discourse understands the body without Blake’s vision of 
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mutability. Blake realizes that anatomists produce massive norms on a minuscule scale of 
actual dissections: “In ignorance to view a small portion & think that All, / And call it a 
Demonstration: blind to all the simple rules of life” (Jerusalem, 65: 27-8). Without the 
precision of calculations, anatomical discourse cannot master any form of language between 
organs. Instead, they are limited to predicting possible outcomes. For Blake, the body’s 
communal language is a democracy among the organs in which there are no hierarchies, each 
fulfilling its own distinct role that no other organs could duplicate. The precise linguistic 
components of the body’s communal language are unintelligible to anatomists because they 
describe only what they see. Blake labors to restructure our minds to perceive the body’s 
communal language. Whereas the anatomist’s subjective model of a healthy organ becomes a 
universal standard, Blake perceives organs as individual agencies communicating with other 
distinctive organs within their bodily community; any discrepancies among the organs result 
in diseases or degenerative modes of bodily functions. Organs demonstrate their lingual 
dexterity by adapting to the constant changes within the collective body, for health or 
sickness: “Let the Human Organs be kept in their perfect Integrity / At will Contracting into 
Worms, or Expanding into Gods” (55: 36-7). Organs have the freedom either to decide their 
own agenda within the body as productive and cohesive members or to resort to anarchy. 
Blake’s anatomical theories waged a war in opposition.   
If Blake is angered in part by the kind of restrictive body that William’s anatomy 
tends to produce, he is also perturbed by the kind of uncertainty that John tends to confess 
regarding organ responsiveness. For Blake John has asked the right questions but provides no 
answers when he cryptically confesses: “An organ is a peculiar conformation of matter, (let 
that matter be what it may) to answer some purpose, the operation of which is mechanical; 
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but, mere organization can do nothing, even in mechanics, it must still have something 
corresponding to a living principle; namely, some power” (Treatise 72). John knew organs 
were co-dependent on each other but fails to explain what creates that coherence in the body. 
The body remains a collective identity without regards to the hierarchy espoused in 
William’s anatomical treatises. Anatomical discourse cannot dictate what the organs say and 
do within the body. For Blake, the supposedly powerless organs described by these very 
anatomists have the potential to destroy the body and other organs by failing or refraining to 
communicate to one another. If an organ encounters a harmful pathogen and fails to 
collaborate with other organs to overcome the invasion, this is because the organ has failed to 
communicate. The failings of communal language within the body are the causes of Albion’s 
countless deaths and seemingly timeless reposes within Four Zoas. Blake turns towards the 
body and its faculties as a site for where a “world made into words” constructs its own 
anatomical narrative (Adams 217). Even the location of divinity has its place in the distortion 
of bodily power, which changes each body into mystical scenes found in traditional 
perceptions of divinity. Anatomists purport that they cannot see a soul in dissection; 
therefore, it has to be either mystical or fictitious. In Blake’s anatomy, the human body is the 
soul. A double dissection occurs—the body and soul—hence Blake’s outrage at the 
anatomists’ blindness and deafness to the body’s communal language. The greater part of the 
medical community has mutilated the vast world contained in body. Their malpractice 
provokes Blake to deconstruct the contemporary anatomical discourse in order to reveal the 
collective body of humanity, which is Albion. And through Albion, Blake revolutionizes 
anatomy lessons and starts with the concept of “soul” to reconstruct that anatomical 
discourse abandons through dissection.   
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 In the history of Blake’s engravings and drawings, there are spectacular scenes where 
Blake demonstrates his ardor for the body. Let us turn to Blake’s The Grave. We can see in 
one illustration that the focus is upon the body leaving the soul. For Blake, the body is the 
site of divinity. Divinity has an organic residue originating in the body, and therefore it ends 
accordingly. These designs fuse the gap between soul and body, liberating death from the 
tradition of the soul as a shapeless mystical cloud. Often the soul is depicted as an ascending 
aura. But the iconoclastic Blake makes it undeniably physical. By drawing a bodily form for 
the aura, he refuses any clear distinction between body and soul maintained by anatomists. 
Conversely, Blake designed an etching where a soul welcomes its departure with an 
obliterated imagination. In both etchings, the dying body breeds a dying soul.  
 The autonomy of Blake’s visions elicited various apprehensive remarks, most notably 
from the Antijacobin Review, which described it as an “outrage done to nature and 
probability” (Blake Records 439). His design prompted this elusive commentary from Robert 
Southey: “Among Blake’s strange designs for Blair’s poem of the Grave, is one representing 
the reunion of the body and the soul; the highest genius alone could have conceived it, and 
only madness have dared to attempt the execution” (439). Even his peers were reluctant to 
entertain Blake’s shift in the body’s ownership of soul. The same concept he illustrated in 
The Grave is also reflected in the Four Zoas, in which Blake captures the soul’s fear to be 
without a body: “Spirit Separating / Their Spirit from their body. Terrified at Non Existence / 
For such they deem the death of the body” (Erdman, FZ 116: 3-5). While he was renovating 
anatomical discourse, he was challenging the framework that was a patron to its success—
empiricism.  
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The establishment of Newtonian science in London did little to facilitate Blake’s 
anatomy theories. As empiricism permeated the culture, Blake increasingly associated it with 
an attempt to make the human nonhuman. In Milton, he describes empiricists as those “Who 
creeps into State Government like a catterpiller to destroy” (41: 11). Blake implores 
empiricists to leave the body alone: “To cast off Bacon, Locke & Newton from Albions 
covering” (41: 4). As precisely as possible, he pins their damage to the physical body, not the 
abstract mind. Albion is the representative body of humanity, but empiricism adversely 
affects human fulfillment for Blake, as Johnson and Wilkie describe: “Newton could have 
seen his apple as uniquely beautiful being of reds…but he chose to reduce it to the 
controllables of mass” (228). In another poetic expression, Night I of Four Zoas, Urizen—the 
epitome of a jealous god—encases man in an ironclad hand of empirical discourse by 
denying the individuality of each body and mind. For Blake, anatomy can be restrictive and 
empirical, or dynamic and imaginative. Without unbridled human intellect and emotion, 
Urizen could not have been born in the mind. Out of the abstract mind, the concepts of 
religion and all of its ramifications threaded themselves into the language of humanity and its 
practices. From then on, each distant generation viewed their bodies as a by-product of 
divinity, instead of its source. While Albion lingers in repose, Urizen finds himself, “as he 
stood in the Human Brain” (FZ 23: 12), at a loss. What body can Urizen control, if the body 
he controls (Albion’s) has fallen into a mystifying formlessness abyss?  
For Blake, the imagination is a crucial part of anatomy, and its denial in anatomy 
books implies an incomplete framework: “The Eternal Body of Man is The IMAGINATION 
/ … / All that we See is VISION from Generated Organs gone as soon as they come / 
Permanent in The Imagination; considered as Nothing by the NATURAL MAN” (Erdman, 
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Laocoön, 273)	  . Imagination is adaptation, and it works through communal language. In other 
words, a bodily imagination creates the forms a body can possess throughout its existence. 
By contrast the empirical language of the dominant anatomical discourse has no way of 
explaining why the body can change forms, as in the case of circumstantial disabilities.  
Initially Albion suffers from this empirical language and replicates the master/slave 
dualism, a relationship that we see when the four Zoas become Albion’s slaves. In Night I of 
the Four Zoas, Luvah, who resides in “porches of the brain” (21: 29), knows that the 
language dictates the public outcome of a body’s standing in society: “my Word shall be 
their law” (21: 35). Luvah aims to dominate the only body he has ever known: his own. 
Albion is caught in limbo between these chasms—empirical discourse versus the bodily 
imagination—in which each signifies a separate use of language to explain a unique body 
and its status among the population of other bodies. While the Zoas bicker, the real 
opportunity for advancement in bodily freedom withers away as they all clamor for a faux 
body of perfection. Bodily imagination crumbles, and what is lost in the retrospective process 
is the understanding that humans—the articulators of language—create their own 
confinement in anatomical discourse. The body dies an untimely death at the hands of 
mechanical impulses, while the brain’s importance increases as the organs become 
diminutive. Blake sees what the empirical anatomists do not see: “Without the body of Man 
an Exudation from his sickning limbs” (18: 10).  
The empirically inclined anatomical discourse results in various systems of 
classification, often translated loosely into hierarchies founded upon a linguistic basis. 
General descriptions become normative or deviant by arbitrary means. Moreover, these 
generalities become principles that are guidelines in relation to the truths about bodies. 
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Although it is not entirely fair, Blake would have seen someone like Dr. William Hunter as 
flourishing with his use of a purely observational technique, presenting the body as it laid on 
a dissecting table apart from its marks of individuality. Blake, too, examines the body in the 
beginning of Four Zoas—“The Mans exteriors are become indefinite opend to pain” (20: 
40)—in order to demonstrate the fragile state the body remains in until the Poetic Genius is 
reassembled and awakened. 
In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake pinpoints the traditional dichotomy of 
Heaven and Hell as a persistent metaphor that keeps the body in prolonged conflict. The 
canonical conception of Heaven as a reward only perpetuates the grandiose illusion, that of a 
sinful body that duels with its soul, as if they were still wholly separate:  
But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul, is to be 
expunged: this I shall do, by printing in the infernal method, by 
corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent 
surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which is hid.  
  
If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to 
man as it is: infinite. 
 
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ narrow 
chinks of his cavern. (39)	   
 
 Blake’s cavern is the epidermis shell over the body’s organs. The vital organs are 
prerequisite in the maintenance of the body, and each organ contains within itself an essence 
of life. For Blake, the “chinks” of the cavern, the body’s neural pathways are a starting point 
for understanding the body’s interior construction. Each organ serves a twofold purpose—
unique from other organs—to foster both their own and a collective identity of the body. If 
any organ refuses these purposes, the body morphs into a battle ground: “The Human Nature 
shall no more remain nor Human acts / Form the rebellious Spirits of Heaven. but War & 
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Princedom & Victory & Blood” (FZ 11: 23-4). In the Four Zoas, the Emanations enlist 
themselves in a war that begins by closing the organ of speech: “The daughters of Beulah 
terrified have closd the Gate of the Tongue / Luvah & Urizen contend in war around the holy 
tent” (21: 11-2).  
The lines begin to blur from intellectual engagement with anatomical discourse to 
outright hostility in the Four Zoas, in which Blake struggles to situate the interconnectedness 
of the body’s own language, rather than dualistically dividing language away from the body. 
This excision of language conceptualizes the body as an inarticulate object in a perpetual 
state of waiting. The denial of the body’s communal language also denies the dynamic 
interaction of the brain and the organs: “Man cannot naturally Perceive. but through his 
natural or bodily organs” (2). The empirical study of anatomy is the disruptive drive to 
control bodies through a self-contained language, which harnesses the bodily imagination 
and drives it into submission.  
 Blake’s anatomy argues that “bodily organs” are able to perceive other organs: “Mans 
perceptions are not bounded by organs of perception. he perceives more than sense (tho’ ever 
so acute) can discover” (2). In the Four Zoas, Blake’s anatomical rhetoric subverts the gist of 
empirical discourse. Each emanation attempts to move up the ladder of hierarchal statuses, 
causing Albion’s body to increasingly lose functionality. The effect of such discord causes 
Albion’s deep, perennial repose. When the body slumbers, it remains alive but suspended in 
stagnation: “And Luvah strove to gain dominion over the mighty Albion / They strove 
together above the Body where Vala was inclos’d / And the dark Body of Albion left 
prostrate upon the crystal pavement” (FZ 41: 13-5). Since Blake believes body hierarchy is a 
function of language, which causes the body to wither under the pressures of empiricism 
	   123	  
Albion’s body succumbs to a fraying identity as his organs rage for sole domination. This 
competition among the organs accounts for the fragmentation in the Four Zoas. Blake 
attempts to reconstruct Albion’s collective body, but it must have the capacity to interact 
with external stimuli, which requires a unity of the interior body: “These Spectres have no 
[Counter(parts)] therefore they ravin / With the food of life Let us Create them 
Coun[terparts] / For without a Created body the Spectre is Eternal Death” (87: 36-8). In other 
words, by Night VII, the vast majority of the Emanation’s epiphanies attest that if the body 
acts in opposition to a collective identity, it will cease to exist; and shortly thereafter, they 
will too. Without collectivity among the organs Albion necessarily dies. Or alternatively, 
emanations are subjected to the dying body; inversely, they also need the body to persist. The 
aim of Blake’s engagement with contemporary anatomy is “To bind the Body of Man to 
heaven from falling in to the Abyss” (33: 17). A collective body becomes an individualized 
site of divinity, rather than a common product of empirical science: “In Eden; in the 
Auricular Nerves of Human life / Which is the Earth of Eden, he his Emanations propagated” 
(4: 12-3). The adjective “Auricular” suggests heard language as it is actualized in Albion’s 
nerves. Albion hears with his nerves, which run throughout the body. In the Four Zoas, 
Blake defines the nerves as the matrix of communal language within Albion’s body. The 
Zoas, impervious to the others, at first cannot comprehend that their individual falls are 
invariably linked to the falls of the other three Zoas. The opportunity for salvation comes 
through an unbinding of their subjective-objective relationship with one another by their 
intercommunication.  
 In the Four Zoas, we notice that Blake confines his whole mythology to the interior 
of Albion’s body, despite its unpredictable states of consciousness: “The Fallen Man 
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(Albion) takes his repose: Urizen sleeps in the porch / Luvah and Vala woke & flew up from 
the Human Heart / Into the Brain; from thence upon the pillow Vala slumber’d.” (10: 11-2; 
emphasis added). If we see the Four Zoas as restrictive to Albion’s physiology, we can see 
how Blake reinforces his conception of a psychosomatic communal language. In the end, 
Albion’s body regains equilibrium through a communal feast with the Zoas. The equal 
participation of consuming subsistence in turn nurtures the body: “The feast was spread in 
the bright South & the Eternal Man / Sat at the feast rejoicing” (9: 2-3).  
Milton, a Poem (c. 1804-1811) 
    In the introduction of a facsimile Milton, a Poem (1993), the editors argue that it is 
an allegorical poem that “lacks the stability of one-to-one relationship we find in its medieval 
forebears” (9).69 Yes, but a strictly allegorical reading of Blake’s Milton ignores his creative 
use of contemporary anatomy. By contrast, I explore the poem’s intricacies by examining 
how Blake views the eighteenth-century discourse of anatomy as profoundly inadequate. In 
fact Blake is dismayed how shortsighted this discourse is. On top of the undoing of 
Antiquity’s grip on anatomical knowledge, in Milton and Four Zoas Blake expands the 
metaphysics of the interactions between the human mind and body without losing sight of his 
anatomical theories. In doing so, Blake engages with the conversation of what being human 
means in order to redress the battle wounds of empiricism and to rejuvenate the human body. 
His contrary views are not quite as idiosyncratic as the editors of The Blake Trust series tend 
to depict them: “Blake’s critique of selfhood goes to the heart of Western metaphysics… that 
posits a unitary self as the basis of existence. It is an existence Blake wished to overcome and 
replace with a more fluid and open concept of being where the gulf between self and other is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 It is worth noted that Blake incorporates significant parts from The Four Zoas four years after he completes 
its manuscript into Milton (usually without major revisions).   
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bridged—indeed, annihilated” (12). To some degree this is true as Blake seeks to proclaim a 
new philosophy about the selfhood, its corporeal body, and its natural, communal interior 
language. But clearly Milton is a poem that is deeply indebted to historical sources, not just 
to the poetry of Milton, but also to the anatomical legacies of the Hunters. In other words 
Blake is not as angry as he is in the Four Zoas.  
  In the preface to Milton, Blake exhorts the younger generation to join in his cause of 
ushering in a new model of knowledge pertaining to the body and the mind: “Rouze up O 
Young Men of the New Age! […] For we have Hirelings in the Camp, the Court, & the 
University. who would if they could, for ever depress Mental & Corporeal War” (Erdman 
95). As Blake calls upon his Muse, Milton, he invites him to enter his body and circulate 
inspiration: “Come into my hand / By your mild power; descending down the Nerves of my 
right arm / From out the Portals of my Brain, where by your ministry / The Eternal Great 
Humanity Divine” (96). Blake asks Milton to incite his imagination by soaking in Blake’s 
brain, and then directs Milton to descend upon his right hand—his etching hand—to create 
the plates of Milton both visually and rhetorically. Imagination, inspiration, and creative 
production can only exist if there is a human body to produce the effects. Blake is acutely 
aware that without a healthy, relatively functional body, he could not create his art, 
philosophies, nor share his visions. By focusing on the anatomical philosophies, Blake makes 
the human body’s act as centrifugal to his mythopoetical project.   
 Nearly ten years after Urizen (1794), which responds to John’s theory of the body’s 
order of composition, Blake still maintains the same order in Milton: eyes and eye sockets, 
ears, nostrils, digestive system, arms, and feet (97). By repeating Urizen’s corporeal 
manifestation, Blake reminds his readers that all bodies originate from  “a red Round 
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Globe,” something akin to John’s “living principle”. And then again, we are reminded that 
Los weeps over the existence of the red globe not because Urizen’s body and ours have been 
created, but because they have been created and maintained under a false ideology of its 
creation. In other words, the body is not as fixed and certain as Urizen’s rationalistic “net of 
religion”. The flaw lies not in the corporeal construction, but rather, in how Blake’s 
contemporaries explain the functionality of the body insofar as it perpetuates its limited use: 
Ah weak & wide astray! Ah shut in narrow doleful form 
Creeping in reptile flesh upon the bosom of the ground  
The Eye of Man a little narrow orb closd up & dark 
Scarcely beholding the great light conversing with the Void 
The Ear, a little shell in small volutions shutting out 
All melodies & comprehending only Discord and Harmony 
The Tongue, a little mostiure fills, a little food it cloys 
A little sound it utters & its cries are faintly heard 
[…] 
 
Can such an Eye judge of the stars? & looking thro its tubes 
Measure the sunny rays that point their spears on Udanadan 
Can such an Ear filld with the vapours of the yawning pit. 
Judge of the pure melodious harp struck by a hand divine? 
Can such a closed Nostrils feel a joy? or tell of autumn fruits 
When grapes & figs burst their covering to the joyful air 
Can such a Tongue boast of the living waters? or take in  
Ought but the Vegetable Ration & loathe the faint delight 
Can such gross Lips perceive? alas! folded within themselves 
They touch not ought but pallid turn & tremble at every wind 
[…] 
 
And Mathematic Proportion was subdued by Living Proportion[.] (99) 
 
If the body’s construction and its capacity are wrongly understood, Blake says, then inferring 
and utilizing whatever one perceives from that initial and misunderstood premise means that 
all conclusions are conditionally wrong, too. Hence in the last line, he resorts to a prophecy 
that mathematics loses its powerful grip, and he prizes individualism as the source of 
authenticity. Blake’s phrase “living proportion” cues us towards the body and its experiences 
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within the living, natural world. Blake is wondering how we can understand the photons of 
light waves or gravity if we still do not understand the very body we inhabit.70 If we achieve 
complete anatomical and metaphysical knowledge of the body, then we will understand the 
environment we inhabit. When we achieve such aims, then Albion—Ancient Britain and a 
grand version of ourselves—will reign as freely as Blake desires.  
 Until the “Spectre of Albion” shatters, the current creation of society begins with 
Los’ hammer and on Enitharmon’s looms. Her looms combine the vibration theories of 
David Hartley’s Observations of Man (1749) along with the ancient myth of the Sisters of 
Fate and their independent and yet necessary role in weaving every mortal’s fate from their 
beginning to end. This role includes the snipping of each thread of life they spin according 
to their own inexplicable creed. In Blake those three Sisters of Fate are concentrated into 
one emanation, Enitharmon, who like most of Blake’s emanations play several roles, such as 
being Los’ female twin and yet a separate entity that brings forth poetic beauty and 
inspiration by representing Space:   
[…] vibrate with soft affections, weaving the Web of Life  
Out from the ashes of the Dead; Los lifts his iron Ladles  
With molton ore […] 
Here the Three Classes of Mortal Men take their fixd destinations  
And hence they overspread the Nations of the whole Earth & hence  
The Web of Life is wove: & the tender sinews of Life created  
And the Three Classes of Men regulated by Los’s hammer.  
The first, The Elect from before the foundation of the World:  
The second, The Redeem’d. The Third, The Reprobate & form’d  
To destruction from the mothers womb: follow with me my plow! (100)  
Contemporary culture is stratified by those three categories. The ‘Reprobate’ class is 
history’s repetitious mistake: each time creating the next generation. Through Milton and 
Jerusalem, Blake believes we will climb higher into the second class, redemption, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In the next section, I explain how Samuel Taylor Coleridge speculates on a similar Newtonian dilemma.  
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springing from that stratum we will achieve a quasi-nirvana that brings us to the beginning 
of a clean slate of humanity. The second return to that very slate does not allow for the 
possibility of another postlapsarian era because Blake believes the memory of Urizenic 
control will ensure that the second epoch of humanity retains its rightful knowledge of self-
creativity by living through its corporeality freed from the Enlightenment’s limitations. 
Until the first class of mortals returns to the shores of Albion, Enitharmon is left weeping at 
Los’ inability to free the third class, and his creation of Urizen. In other words, Los’ good 
intentions have brought an immense amount of corruption into the universe, and in turn, 
affected the trajectory of humanity. In Los’ attempt to curb the corruption stemming from 
his blacksmithing of bodies, he stuns his horrid creations by putting them in a state of 
perpetual sleep or alternatively, a reposeful death, until he fixes his errors. As we, the errors, 
pile up themselves we create a labyrinth of mistakes and contrived solutions that backfire, 
thereby leading to only one solution, that, is an apocalyptic annihilation that will return us to 
the beginnings without being bounded by a faulty legacy:  
Then Los & Enitharmon knew Satan is urizen 
Drawn down by Orc & the Shadowy Female into Generation 
Oft Enitharmon enterd weeping into the Space, there appearing 
An aged Woman raving along the Streets (the Space is named 
Canaan) then she returnd to Los wear frighted as from dreams 
 
The nature of a Female Space is this: it shrinks the Organs 
Of Life till they become Finite & Itself seems Infinite.  
 
And Satan vibrated in the immensity of the Space! Limited 
To those without but Infinite to those within  
[…] 
 
Every thing in Eternity shines by its own Internal light: but thou 
Darkenest every Internal light with the arrows of they quiver 
Bound up in the horns of Jealousy to a deadly fading Moon 
And Ocalythron binds the Sun into a Jealous Globe 
That every thing is fixd Opake without Internal light 
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So Los lamented over Satan, who triumphant divided the Nations[.] (104) 
 
In providing a corporeal form to Satan-viz-Urizen, Los has darkened the “Internal light” 
within each mortal that was woven by Enitharmon. The “Internal light” binds humanity and 
permits Blake to link the diverse representation of bodies as a single entity, until we 
recognize and use that “Internal light” to free us from unknowingly self-imposed restraints. 
Meanwhile, Satan has declared war on Albion’s body: “The Spectre of Satan. he furious 
refuses to repose in sleep / […] / Glorying to involve Albions Body in fires of eternal War” 
(106). Blake believes that the shackle of corporeality is maintained by incomplete anatomical 
knowledge of our bodies, so that human beings continue to deny their capacity for far greater 
freedom in perceptions and experiential sensations. 
IV. Corporeal Multiplicity: A Blakean Mode in Milton  
 In assessing Blake’s debts to the language of anatomy, we must finally reconsider 
the question of why Blake fills his works with the cycles of birth and dying. In Milton, 
Blake curiously reveals an osmosis between bodies, and one that is not necessarily akin to 
his spiritual invasion of historical persons such as Paracelsus and Voltaire. This Blakean 
phenomenon, which I am terming “corporeal multiplicity,” explains how Blake’s concept of 
death and histories is cyclic and unresponsive to time as he engages in this peculiar 
osmosis.71 This concept of corporeal multiplicity extends Blake’s commitment to the idea 
that human bodies are engaged in a larger communal network. Communality is not just for 
the organs within a body, but also for connecting humanity as a single community.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 This concept is different from Barbara Maria Stafford’s observation of Blake’s similarities with George 
Berkeley’s (1685-1753) Siris insofar that Blake agrees with the idea of a “whole world of visible objects 
bec[o]me transmuted into phatasmagoria hovering in the camera obsura brain” (381).  
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 Milton stands before his own shadow as he faces “eternal death,” where he sees “A 
mournful form double; hermaphroditic: male & female” and then “In one wonderful body 
[…] he enterd into it” (108). Milton still retains his own proper identity but adds an 
additional facet to a single body. This is the first instance of corporeal multiplicity in Milton, 
and Blake immediately provides us with two theories of the body: in one persons retains 
their original identity as they traverse through bodies, then in the second theory they lose 
their original identity as they enter said new bodies. The dreamscape adds limitless 
possibilities to Blake’s conception of bodily layering, and provides the best context for him 
to explain to us the shifting perception of truth and illusion that is not rooted in empiricism. 
Dreaming gives men opportunities to see and realize their mortal body, but this is only one 
version and the waking body offers another version: 
As when a man dreams, he reflects not that his body sleeps, 
Else he would wake; so seem’d he entering his Shadow: but 
With him the Spirits of the Seven Angels of the Presence 
Entering; they gave him still perceptions of his Sleeping body; 
Which now arose and walk’d with them in Eden, as an Eighth 
Image Divine tho’ darken’d; and tho walking as one walks 
In sleep; and the Seven comforted and supported him. 
 
Like as a Polypus that vegetates beneath the deep! 
They saw his Shadow vegetated underneath the Couch 
Of death: for when he entered into his Shadow: Himself: 
His real and immortal Self: was as appeard to those 
Who dwell in immortality, as One sleeping on a couch 
Of gold; an those in immortality gave forth their Emanations 
Like Females of sweet beauty, to guard round him & to feed 
His lips with food of Eden in his cold and dim repose!  
But to himself he seemd a wanderer lost in dreary night.  
 
[…] 
 
The nature of infinity is this: That every thing has its 
Own Vortex; and when once a traveler thro Eternity. 
Has passd that Vortex, he perceives it roll backward behind 
His path, into a globe of itself infolding; like a sun: 
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Or like a moon, or like a universe of starry majesty, 
While he keeps onwards in his wondrous journey on the earth 
Or like a human form, a friend with whom he livd benevolent. 
As the eye of man views both the east & west encompassing 
Its vortex […] 
Thus is the earth one infinite plane, and not as apparent 
To the weak traveler confin’d beneath the moony shade. 
Thus is the heaven a vortex passd already, and the arth  
A vortex not yet pass’d by the traveler thro’ Eternity. (109)  
 
By erasing the confines of time, Blake shows the travelers’ innate capacity to traverse forms 
and places are effortless Blake asserts as long as humans are not paralyzed by belief of 
corporeal limitations. Blake considers that each spatial or time shift we experience—
whether tactile or through various stages of consciousness—is but one vortex that we passes 
through in a string of alternative vortexes. By claiming an infinity of vortexes, Blake makes 
Earth into a transitory stage. All these vortexes are separated by Blake’s concept of a “Sea 
of Time & Space,” which is a state of suspended death. This place represents the 
equilibrium between life and death, where we float throughout indistinguishable Time and 
Space until we are swayed to either state. In Milton, we find Albion and Urizen floating in 
the same sea, while the Miltonic protagonist navigates the “vegetated Earth” to set in motion 
the cleansing apocalypse so vital to the second slate of humanity.  
 Throughout Milton, corporeal multiplicity supports Blake’s permeable rhetoric of  
“I” with several figures that render his experiential philosophies. Through corporeal 
multiplicity, Blake is able to travel through all these vortex-entities and absorb their 
memories, knowledge, and emotions. The “Human Form” is Blake’s negative reaction to his 
contemporaries’ erroneous understanding of anatomy, while advancing his own anatomical 
theories that add his corrections while allowing for a greater acceptance of corporeal 
multiplicity as a natural extension of the human body.  
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 Bodies in the Blakean worldview are entirely malleable and subject to reinvention, 
which is akin to Blake’s creation of illuminated books. For instance, in Milton’s retribution 
to Urizen pouring icy liquid on his brain, he uses clay to give Urizen a new human body: 
But Milton took of the red clay of Succoth, moulding it with care 
Between his palms: and filling up the furrows of many years 
Beginning at the feet of Urizen, and on the bones 
Creating new flesh on the Demon cold, and building him, 
As with new clay a Human form in the Valley of Beth Peor. (112) 
 
As Milton creates a new human body for Urizen, whose origins into corporeality follow 
John’s theories of blood as well as his living principle, he is also following the method of 
creating anatomical models. What if Blake is blurring the distinction between anatomist and 
artist by advancing an argument that both professions are capable of modifying the fleshy 
body according to their own perspectives? If so, then Blake is anatomically proving his 
premise in Marriage of Heaven and Hell and There is No Natural Religion from almost 
twenty years prior to Milton. In the following example we see not only corporeal 
multiplicity, but also another reinvention of body-creation: “She ties the knot of nervous 
fibres, into a white brain! / She ties the knot of bloody veins, into a red hot heart! / Within 
her bosom Albion lies embalmd, never to awake” (113). Blake’s belief in these osmotic 
abilities of bodies and environment helps explain the continual inversions of protagonists 
throughout Milton. Even Milton is subject to these bodily shifts: “Thus Milton fell thro 
Albions heart, travelling outside of Humanity / Beyond the stars in Chaos in Caverns of the 
Mundane Shell” (114). This is how Milton can enter Blake/Los’ foot, enabling him to see 
“the nether / Regions of the Imagination”; but Blake did not know it was Milton per se “for 
man cannot know / What passes in his members till periods of Space & Time / Reveal the 
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secrets of Eternity: for more extensive / Than any other earthly things, are Mans earthly 
lineaments” (115).  
 These various demonstrations of the flexibility in the flesh as well as the adoption of 
current anatomical language throughout Milton help clarify the conceptual struggles within 
Four Zoas. We need to keep in mind that there is hardly a coherent, straightforward 
narrative line linking these two works. And because of that, I treat these works as evidence 
of a dynamic mind that engaged various types of subjects: art, philosophy, medicine, 
science, and literature. Thus we see the tenacity of Blake’s mind, especially as he tells us he 
is becoming Los because Los has entered his body: “And I became One Man with him [Los] 
arising in my strength: / Twas too late now to recede. Lose had enterd into my soul: / His 
terrors now posses’d me whole!” (117). Because of corporeal multiplicity, Blake’s body not 
only becomes Los’ simultaneously, but shares his emotional responses along with his 
histories. This type of bridging between two lives is neither allegorical nor metaphorical. 
This is the method that enables Blake to claim that his knowledge of humanity is more 
comprehensive than what his experiences would suggest: “The generations of men run on in 
the tide of Time / But leave their destind lineaments permanent for ever & ever” (117). The 
beginnings, in-betweens, and ends of lives prior to Blake’s provide him with information 
and experiences to continue the battle to free humanity from its own invisible grips of 
limitations, just as Blake convinces us that “very Generated Body in its inward form, / Is a 
garden of delight & a building of magnificence” (123).  
 Another of Milton’s aims is to rouse the sleepy imagination, whose rudimentary 
steps Blake sees in his contemporary intellectual culture’s explosion of curiosity: “… Every 
scatterd Atom / Of Human Intellect now is flocking to the sound of the Trumpet / All the 
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Wisdom which was hidden in caves & dens, from ancient / Time; is now sought out from 
Animal & Vegetable & Mineral” (121). The hunger to know is what drives Blake’s 
insistence that the eighteenth century is the dawn of a revolutionary framework of humanity, 
which is the shift into Eternity. For there Blake explains how all of the fields of knowledge 
converge and exist in a wonderful symbiosis of discovery: 
But in Eternity the Four Arts: Poetry, Painting, Music 
And Architecture which is Science: are the Four Faces of Man. 
Not so in Time & Space: there Three are shut out, only 
Science remains thro Mercy: & by means of Science, the Three 
Become apparent in Time & Space, in the Three Professions 
 
Poetry in Religion: Music, Law: Painting, in Physic & Surgery: 
That Man may live upon Earth till the time of his awaking, 
And from these Three, Science derives every Occupation of Men. (125) 
 
If Blake is right, then Eternity will reveal to us that our quest for empiricism is a step 
forward to something far greater; however, we must not fall into the trappings of narrow 
thought and fragmented study of parts that ignore the whole. Blake cautions that so much 
work remains to achieve the bodies we are capable of inhabiting, and time is measured 
according to that body: “Every Time less than a pulsation of the artery / Is equal in its period 
& value to Six Thousand Years” (127). The epicenter of perception is intimately tied to the 
human body. By counting six thousand years to the pulse of our artery, Blake heavily 
emphasizes the possibility of the infinity as non-metaphorical.  
 If so much time exists within a pulse, then what of the blood content? To see blood, 
according to Blake, is to witness the power of living creation. A blood cell becomes an 
anatomical vehicle for Blake’s belief that it matters not where, individually, we come from, 
but that we are all involved in the process of returning home: “We are not Individuals but 
States: Combinations of Individuals” (131). However, this process is neither geographical 
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nor exclusively spiritual. Through our neuro-anatomical philosophies, Blake hopes we will 
see the authentic body as a portal to an infinite string of universes. The wonders of scientific 
instruments prove, as Blake purports, the limitations of our collective knowledge: 
As to that false appearance which appears to the reasoner, 
[…] 
The Microscope knows not of this nor the Telescope. they alter 
The ratio of the Spectators Organs but leave Objects untouchd 
For every Space larger than a red Globule of Mans blood. opens  
Into Eternity of which this vegetable Earth is but a shadow[.] (127)  
 
If objects can morph their shape through the microscope, then the uncertainty of our 
perceptions should assure us that our multifaceted Earth is hardly singular. Blake struggles 
to understand how his contemporaries are enthralled with these instruments and are 
delighted with new views, but fail to apply the same methodology to anatomy. Our own 
visual ability to shift perceptions proves Blake’s philosophy of corporeal multiplicity. 
Indeterminate sights fuel Blake’s conviction that our bodies are just as indeterminate, 
thereby enabling a recreation of the human body. A historical example of how Blakean 
contraries abet advancement, “Without Contraries is no progression,” explains his 
highlighting of the conflict between ocular uncertainty and anatomical certainty (34).  
 What I have endeavored to demonstrate in this section is that when Blake removes 
John Hunter’s last name in Island, changing “John Hunter” to “Jack Tearguts”, he was 
conceding that the recent surge of anatomical discoveries could not simply be rejected. But 
in fact John had taken a role similar to Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), namely as a 
worthy opponent that incited some of Blake’s most profound philosophies of human 
identity. In the final section we will see that when Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) 
turns to the metaphysics of life in the second decade of the nineteenth century his 
engagement with John’s legacy is both elaborate and reverential.  
 
 
 
 
 
PART III: ‘LIFE ITSELF IS NOT A THING’: SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE 
 
 
 
All this knowledge, all our knowledge, has been built up communally: there would be no 
astrophysics, there would be no history, there would not even be language, if man were a 
solitary animal.  
 
   -J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values  
 
To know and feel all this and not have the words to express it makes a human a grave of his 
own thoughts.  
 
   -John Donne, Eclogue 
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 In my dissertation we have seen how the metaphysics of the Hunter brothers shaped a 
conservation that dealt with questions of life and death prompted by anatomical exploration. 
Proceeding from the Hunters, we saw how Blake’s time at the Royal Academy of Arts as 
well as his attendance in Dr. William Hunter’s lectures influenced his complex relationship 
with anatomy in his Four Zoas. Blake also engages with John Hunter’s Blood in Urizen and 
Milton as he advances his own philosophies on what it means to be human. In Blake’s 
responses to the Hunter Circle, the social dynamics of local artists and anatomists prove to be 
hardly hierarchic, but rather, collaborative and explorative as they articulated their theoretical 
underpinnings in elucidating how the interior body functions as well as negotiates its external 
reality. There is yet another Romantic poet that speculated on the intricacies of life. In what 
follows we will see how Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s (1772-1834) theories on life reveal the 
depth of his response to the medical culture of eighteenth-century London, but also, the 
intensity of his interest in answering questions pertaining to the human body between 1815-
1820s. From early on, Coleridge showed interest in the philosophies pertaining to life, 
especially in his poems “What is Life?” (1829) and “The Eolian Harp” (1796). Coleridge 
wrote a letter to Poole in 1801 centralizing the active mind in his anatomical theories: “I 
believe the Souls of 500 Sir Isaac Newtons would go to the making up of a Shakespeare or a 
Milton…. Newton was a mere materialist—Mind in his system is always passive—a lazy 
Looker-on on an external World…there is ground for suspicion, that any system built on the 
passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system” (Griggs, 2: 709). But it was really in his 
metaphysical writings era in 1816, prior to his intensely Christian writings, that we are able 
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to see how the concept of life and death became a fascination for Coleridge. As it turns out, 
this coincided with his profound admiration for the life work of John Hunter.  
 If we accept J. H. Haeger’s estimated date range for the Hints towards a more 
Comprehensive Theory of Life’s (1848) composition at the end of 1816 to as late as 1820, 
then we are able to trace how Coleridge’s metaphysical works played a part in developing 
his understanding of the anatomical body.72 It is crucial that we understand that Coleridge 
does not conceive of himself as exclusively a philosopher or a poet. By encompassing both 
anatomical specificity and metaphysical paradigms in his works, Coleridge confirms his 
resistance to such labels. For example in his lecture on Shakespeare’s works, he writes:  
The form is mechanic when on any given material we impress a pre-
determined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material: 
as when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we wish it to retain 
when hardened. The organic form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes, as it 
develops itself from within, and the fullness of its development is one and the 
same with the perfection of its outward form. Such as the life is, such is the 
form…—each exterior is the physiognomy of the being within,—its true 
image reflected and thrown out from the concave mirror. (Essays 46-7) 
 
The concentric circle imagery underpins Coleridge’s negotiations between interiority and 
the externality of bodies. As these concentric mirrors develop, what we really see is 
Coleridge’s image of a sustainable world that is pulsating, thinking, and throbbing in 
constant change throughout time and space. All movement of life that takes place within 
each circle could potentially and freely affect others, much like the ripple effect from a 
pebble tossed in a pond. Whereas Blake saw our bodies as macrocosms and the natural 
world as microcosms engineered by our fears and absolute domination, Coleridge saw our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See J. H. Haeger. “Coleridge’s ‘Bye Blow’: The Composition and Date of ‘Theory of Life’”. Modern 
Philology. V.74.1 (August 1976). Pg. 20-41 for more on the editorial history of “Life”.  
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mind as the microcosm of God’s metaphysical mind and our flesh as the microcosm of the 
natural world that was God’s creative art.  
 In “The Eolian Harp” Coleridge explains that the mind’s propensity for creative 
production as the very breeze playing softly throughout its physical embodiments: 
O! the one Life within us and abroad,  
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,  
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,  
[ …]  
 
Full many a thought uncall’d and undetain’d, 
And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain 
[…] 
 
 And what if all animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely fram’d, 
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze 
(Perkins 399-400) 
 
In the confines of “The Aeolian Harp,” then, Coleridge suggests that the physical body, 
without the instrumental mind, cannot give rise to an active brain. In the last stanza I quoted, 
Coleridge’s questioning of the “intellectual breeze” as one that transpires through all living 
beings and geological extensions of nature also reflects the beginnings of what becomes a 
long-held Coleridgean belief of unity through the many. Or as Eric G. Wilson aptly explains 
Coleridge’s initial fervor for Davy’s scientific philosophies that brought together seemingly 
disparate objects through one subjective force: “Davy had substantiated the dreams of the 
alchemists—those visions of a cosmos ruled by a pervasive and intelligent spirit, a universe 
in which everything manifests the ‘one Life within us and abroad’” (643).  
 In the poem “What is Life?” (1805), Coleridge asks the very question he will set out 
to answer physiologically and metaphysically nearly a decade later in his Theory of Life 
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(1848). But at the point of composing “What is Life?” at the age of thirty-three, Coleridge is 
still searching for absolute answers to the question of what defines life: 
   Resembles life what once was deem’d of light, 
   Too ample in itself for human sight? 
An absolute self—an element ungrounded— 
All that we see, all colours of all shade 
 By encroach of darkness made?— 
Is very life by consciousness unbounded? 
And all the thoughts, pains, joys of mortal breath, 
A war-embrace of wrestling life and death? 
(Perkins 436) 
 
Here life is being questioned through the scope of Newtonian optics, but without the 
emphatic declaration that reduces the universe to minuscule material objects: photons, ether, 
continuous motion of indivisible particles prompting a mechanistic world. Extraordinarily 
similar to Blake’s anti-Newton stance, Coleridge rejected “Newton as a speculative thinker 
whose immense prestige as a physician had vain impetus to a metaphysical world-view, the 
‘Corpuscular and mechanic Philosophy’, that had reigned for the preceding century” 
(Abrams 117). Thus the importance of initially answering his question of “what is life” 
through Opticks’ terminology is in part a cue to his reader of the Newtonian debate as well as 
a declaration of his own proficiency in sciences. However, Coleridge imbues Newton’s 
theory of light with psychological traits of the human body, in the process using terms such 
as “consciousness” and “thoughts, pains” as signifiers of the balancing weights between life 
and death. By uniting the psychological with the physiological, Coleridge brings the same 
charges against Newton that Blake did; to ignore the uncertainty of humanity’s psychological 
depths is to render an incomplete projection of ourselves.  
 We see this accusation best exemplified in his poem, “Kubla Khan” (c. 1796). The 
give-and-take relationship between the mind and its natural environment seen in Blake’s 
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visionary world is also seen in Coleridge’s poem, especially when we consider how he 
negotiates his uneasy acknowledgment of opium’s capacity to create new worlds that takes 
on a quasi-divine power to create. In the preface, he clearly describes to his reader the 
physiological state of his body as this particular opium dream commenced: “The Author 
continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the external senses, during 
which time he has the most vivid confidence, that he could not have composed less than from 
two to three hundred lines; if that indeed can be called composition in which all the images 
rose up before him as things, with a parallel production of the correspondent expressions 
without any sensation or consciousness of effort” (Perkins 430-1). By way of digestion, 
opium initially interacts with his physical body as it dissolves into his bloodstreams, then it 
affects his consciousness by producing a hallucinogenic dreamscape. In this regard, “Kubla 
Kahn” anticipates the more pronounced claim Coleridge makes in Theory of Life that living 
is a throbbing, interdynamic engagement between a series of organic forces. In “Kubla 
Kahn,” those forces are: Coleridge’s body, opium, compositional skills, and his metaphysical 
toolbox cultivated from his literary background. But it is the wobbly, uncertain structure 
within “Kubla Kahn” that respects the mysteries of creativity’s origins, but also brings to the 
forefront the pressing question of Coleridge’s metaphysics: why does life seemingly appear 
to ascend—concentrically—towards progress, but contemporaneous living appears to reveal 
itself as a precarious play of forces? During a pivotal phase in his intellectual development 
Coleridge turned passionately, but complexly to John Hunter for answers. 
 Scholars such as Wilson, Trevor H. Levere, James Allard and others have noted 
Coleridge’s scientific interests, especially during his time in Germany (1802-5). In more 
recent scholarship we see a collective effort to trace his biographical roots in London’s elite 
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medical culture. In turn, I reread Coleridge as an individual who was not only addicted to the 
“free-agency annihilating poison,” but also lived a life that teeter-tottered between 
dissolution and ascents of creative production. Crucially Coleridge was as a polyglot thinker 
that pulled incessantly from various fields in an attempt to answer a crucial question of why 
the human mind and body had come to exist despite our persistent unfamiliarity with what 
the mind is (Griggs, Collected Letters, 3: 495). As M. H. Abrams noted in Coleridge’s 
chronology of literary projects, “The years 1815-19 are for Coleridge as metaphysician and 
critic what the years 1796-98—the time of The Ancient Mariner, Christabel, and Kubla 
Khan, as well as his hardly less innovative ‘conversation poems’—are for Coleridge as a 
bard” (Abrams 115). In portraying the full scope of Coleridge’s projects and their significant 
reception in posterity, Abrams elaborates, “the range and quality of his achievement in these 
latter years would for any man be remarkable; for Coleridge, give the circumstances of his 
life, it must count as a feat of massive spiritual heroism” (115). It was in his metaphysical 
writings of these years that Coleridge concentrated his efforts in engaging with medicine in 
general and with John Hunter in particular. I will begin by delineating the main themes in 
Coleridge’s Theory of Life. In doing so I will argue that his accelerated production of 
writings in 1815-19 reflects an optimism that medical discourse might provide answers to his 
questions about human life that had haunted his earlier poetry. One implication of my 
argument is that in his writing career up through Theory of Life one sees a crescendo in his 
poetical and medical investigations of life. It is only after the mid-1820s that Coleridge 
writes exclusively in Christian framework that creates such a chasm in his corpus.   
 In a more straightforward manner than his earlier poetry, Coleridge as a medical 
metaphysician attempts to craft a theoretical framework that responds to the many impressive 
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discoveries of the long eighteenth century. In this regard, Coleridge’s awareness of his 
lifetime within the span of human history prior to his works shares the same historical 
awareness expressed by Dr. William Hunter in his Lectures. But what is peculiarly 
Coleridgean is his attempt to universalize the definition of life through a neurohumanities 
scope that is deeply indebted to William’s brother, John Hunter. We will see how the 
anatomical brain versus the multi-conscious mind proves to be an uneasy tension that 
Coleridge struggles to reconcile. In turn this dilemma leads to another set of questions that 
sustain Coleridge’s pursuit in answering what is “human”: what qualifies as real living, and 
what is the nature of the soul in the anatomical framework?  
 In 1816 Coleridge moved in with Dr. James Gillman in Highgate where he would live 
out his remaining years. There he wrote “An Essay on Scrofula” in collaboration with Dr. 
Gillman.73 The opportunities afforded by Coleridge’s living arrangements provided him with 
access to a medical library as well as conversations with both physicians and Dr. Gillman’s 
visiting patients. This intellectual environment provided Coleridge with both the physical and 
literary material to create his own conceptions of life and death. In the essay Coleridge raises 
the need for defining life:  
…the necessity of a distinct conception of life itself, or, as it has been the 
fashion of late years to name it, of the living principle … I anticipate that the 
investigation of this question likewise, nay, even the mere reference to it as a 
problem, the solution of which remains not the less desirable on account of its 
difficulty, will be conceived by many as visionary & seducing us beyond the 
bounds of clear conceptions. (11: 238) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 It has been argued by several scholars that Coleridge wrote a large majority of “Scrofula,” and Dr. Gillman 
only provided anatomical specificity while lending his credibility as a physician. Notwithstanding those 
possibilities, it is necessary to give Coleridge the benefit of the doubt that he was genuinely interested in 
medicine, both factually and philosophically.  
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He lays down the origin of his exploration of life as a way to address its manifestations in 
humanity in several varieties: psychological, metaphysical, and crucially, physiological. In 
doing so, Coleridge is attempting to articulate a philosophy of life that can expand and 
contract to accommodate all expressions of life (mammals, insects, humans, and geological 
formations), which adapts the conceptual and rhetorical apparatus of John Hunter’s corpus. 
In the latter part of the passage quoted above, Coleridge is definitely setting up boundaries to 
his philosophy of life as one that must provide evidence rooted in experience. This reveals 
his demand for an absolute answer that is not too emphatically metaphysical. As we see in 
the continuation of the same passage:  
And truly if by clear conceptions we must mean only distinct images, & that 
the mind can conceive nothing but what the fancy can make pictures of, they 
are in the right, & their censures well-grounded. … for all rational thinking—
an expurgation which would make their [materialists] vocabulary collapse into 
a very slender & starveling form… But nothing short of absolute 
demonstration would convince (me) that the problem is a chimera worth of a 
place (among) the subtile [sic] questions proposed by the laughter-stirring 
Rabelais, the solution of which was regarded of such importance by the 
greatest benefactors of our Art, & the soberest as well as deepest thinkers of 
our profession, from Harvey to Haller & from Haller to John Hunter… 
(11: 478-9)74 
 
Within this passage, Coleridge is announcing his desires for an absolutely true framework 
pertaining to what defines life and death. If the thinkers cannot demonstrate absolute proof, 
then he is ready and willing to treat their theories as nonsense by satirizing their words. Thus 
Coleridge reveals his dissatisfactions with contemporary discourses regarding the meaning of 
what a life is within a human being and its existence within the expansive natural world. 
However, his dissatisfaction does contain elements of reverential respect for the innovative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Parenthetical words belong to the editors of The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge  
(16 vols.) as they speculated on words in the manuscripts that were illegible.  
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ideologies prior to his Theory of Life. In comparing John Hunter to Albrecht von Haller 
(1708-1777), Coleridge is downplaying John’s lack of formal education while associating his 
broad interests with Haller’s reputation as a man of both botany and anatomy excellence, but 
also Haller’s lifelong preoccupation with his personal poetical compositions.  
 By selecting Haller as John’s predecessor, one well versed in science and fine arts, 
Coleridge is staking his admiration on the ideal scientific thinker that also has a deep sense of 
the metaphysical side of his anatomical interests. In the same process, Coleridge is implicitly 
arguing for the same benevolent admiration of himself. For he is a well-known poet at the 
point of his Theory of Life composition, and believes his mutual interests shared with Haller 
and John allow his work to join to their ranks. Furthermore, by cultivating a sense of awe for 
anatomists that are proficient in the delicates of the metaphysics of human life, he advances 
the intimate relationship between anatomy and fine arts in the fashion that Dr. William 
Hunter treated both fields of knowledge at the Royal Academy of Arts. However, 
Coleridge’s admiration proves to be short-lived; he ultimately becomes disillusioned and 
adopts an exclusively Christian context for the rest of his life after the 1820s.  
 In this densely packed argument for the need to carefully outline a conceptual 
framework defining life, Coleridge lends credibility to what he will come to call the 
psychosomatic legacy of John Hunter, all the while positioning himself among the leading 
anatomists. He explains that in order to properly conceive of a definition regarding life, it 
must not be purely metaphysical or materialist. Any overwhelming tendency towards a 
specific branch of knowledge as the foundation for defending and proving what life is will 
necessarily fail because of its lack of a panoramic view of reality. But he also insists on an 
absolute demonstration of its rightness. With no room for error, it must be as an absolute as 
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his God. In this sense, Coleridge exemplifies the Latinate notion of “convince” as to “cause 
(a person) to admit, as established to his satisfaction, that which is advanced in argument; to 
bring to acknowledge the truth of” (OED). It is crucial for us to be clear here that unlike in 
his Christian phase in the 1820s, Coleridge is not seeking to find the solution to death in 
achieving spiritual immortality. He desires to stand at the fracture of life and death and to 
articulate a universal definition of reality that is limited to no single strain of thought. In his 
methodology, he attempts to erase dichotomies between the growing specialized fields of 
knowledge in the early nineteenth century. This is because he realizes that defining life will 
require a synthesis in yielding a theory that can, truthfully, account for universal life and 
what sustains it, yet be flexible to accommodate the outliers of the natural world such as 
monstrosities.  
 In his poem “Human Life, on the Denial of Immortality” (c. 1815) Coleridge gives us 
his version of Hamlet’s soliloquy on death that meditates on the brevity of life and the 
certainty of death. If we are right in dating this poem around 1815, then we see that 
Coleridge is struggling to pin down his understanding of life and death at the very moment he 
begins to praise and rely on John Hunter. By describing our deaths as a facet of nature’s 
finicky climate, Coleridge offers a panoramic view of human history and its births and deaths 
as mere moments within the span of earth’s geological age: “If dead, we cease to be; if total 
gloom / Swallow up life’s brief flash for aye, we fare / As summer-gusts, of sudden birth and 
doom, / Whose sound and motion not alone declare, / But are their whole being!” (Perkins 
438). The transitory hum of life and death in a human being prompts Coleridge to 
conceptualize death as simply an end. He offers no further explanation or even speculation, 
which he is usually prone to do, as to why death exists. By treating death as merely a 
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nihilistic ending, Coleridge turns his energies in “Human Life” towards convincing his 
readers that they should “Be Life itself, and not its task and tent” for “even a soul like 
Milton’s can know death” (438). If one chooses to live mechanistically, and without a life of 
the mind, one lives as a “vessel purposeless, unmeant,” when in fact the mind is the “drone-
hive strange of phantom purposes! / Surplus of Nature’s dread activity” (438). The current of 
dreams and nightmares through the slumbering consciousness is the mark of the living mind 
ceaselessly trying to break from its chains to incite imagination and thereby usher in creative 
progress. Nature crafts the content of humanity’s subconsciousness artistically, but Coleridge 
finds its lack of purpose causing him to rethink his Galenic commitment to teleology: “she 
gazed on some nigh-finished vase, / Retreating slow, with meditative pause, / She formed 
with restless hands unconsciously. / Blank accident! nothing's an anomaly!” (438). Coleridge 
does not say that accidents are Nature’s error, but rather he pauses and realizes that “nothing” 
is actually a time-and-space anomaly. Coleridge’s earlier premise in the poem that death is 
nothing, and his subsequent discovery that nothing is an anomaly fuse the two views of death 
to offer the elusive meaning within “Human Life”; death is an anomaly of nature. In all 
likelihood, this is the context in which Coleridge looks to John Hunter not for anatomical 
knowledge on its own but for a metaphysics of life to assuage his own insecurities about 
death. 
 Just as the Hunter brothers and Blake did, Coleridge wonders how death relates to 
living functions, especially in the mind. Death, for Coleridge, is “sudden or otherwise, but 
having no demonstrable Action or Consequence than that of removing or incapacitation the 
means and existing conditions of the manifestation of Life and Mind; and of course, 
therefore, suspending the manifestation itself” (11: 423). Hinging “Life and Mind” together, 
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he argues that the separation of the two because of death would suggest that despite a 
corporeal death, the mind could persist in living. In order to sustain a living distinction 
between the body and mind, Coleridge says that one would have to admit to feelings and 
thoughts imperceptible to the body as well as sensations of the body as unaffecting the mind. 
Not surprisingly, Coleridge deems the separation an impossibility that would allow for the 
existence of a body separate from the mind, thus creating a human that would “have no more 
responsibility, or fitness to be loved and esteemed, than a Looking Glass!” (11: 425). From 
thence, language would succumb to an endless chaotic meaninglessness, “without it Esteem, 
Love, Responsibly, would be words without a meaning—nay, even Pain, Pleasure, Happiness 
would be all nothing to me” (11: 425). By “it,” he means the sympathy between body and 
mind that constantly responds to and causes the emotions and actions of a human. By 
situating the body and mind in a union that is equally subjected to the cycle of life and death, 
Coleridge argues this union is “to cause the Idea, Self, Consciousnesses, or the I to rise as a 
product and as a necessary part of the same series with Body, Organization” (11: 425). 
Without a symbiotic relationship between body and mind, Coleridge argues that the selfhood 
cannot exist or function. The self’s capacity to experience various pains and to think, along 
with the body’s capability to exert action and receive tactile information, confirms one’s 
existence. In turn, he modifies Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” into “I think, and I act; 
therefore I exist as I am,” or as he clarifies in Biographia Literaria (1817), “I am, because I 
affirm myself to be; I affirm myself to be, because I am” (Chapter 12). The human being’s 
affirmation of self-consciousness —a metaphysical gesture—proves the existence of 
corporeality.   
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 Although Coleridge often depicts a harmonious fusion between man and nature, he 
does not maintain a decisive stance on death’s relation to life. In “Human Life” death is 
nature’s anomaly, but then in another work he positions life and death not as antithetical, or 
as parasitic to one another, but instead as a means to recognize and enhance living powers of 
the meditative mind. This strand of thought is best exemplified in his own epitaph that he 
penned:  
Beneath this sod 
A poet lies, or that which once seem’d he. 
O, life one thought in prayer for S.T.C.; 
That he who many a year with toil of breath 
Found death in life, may here find life in death! (1834) 
(PW v.1: 491-2)  
 
The flipped perspective is partly an idealized striving towards his freedom from his opium 
addiction as well as his angst from his lost love, but it also reveals his commitment to his 
Theory of Life insofar as that death and life are not polarities, nor are they orbiting stages; 
instead, he finds life and death as an osmosis within a being, which in turn reenacts the same 
process within the grander scale of the natural environment. Coleridge remains committed to 
the task that he delegated to himself in 1803 when he wrote in his notebook, “seem to have 
made up my mind to write my metaphysical works, as my Life, & in my Life—intermixed 
with all the other events/or history of the mind & fortunes of S.T. Coleridge” (CN 1: 1515). 
Just before he turns fully to Christianity, he views his mind as a parallel to his conception of 
life as an oscillating, highly responsive entity of energies. 
I. The Living Energies as Life’s Essence  
 Keep in mind that even before Coleridge reached adulthood, he seriously considered 
the prospect of becoming a physician. As a young schoolboy he spent his Saturdays 
following his older brother, Luke Coleridge, a young surgeon at the London Hospital. In 
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preparation for his medical studies, he attended Dr. Thomas Beddoes’ lectures. Allard 
reminds us how Beddoes “claimed that the works of John Hunter […] ‘may be regarded as 
the foundation of a new science, not less generally interesting than any of the preceding’” 
(31).75 This could be another source in explaining how Coleridge came into contact with 
Hunter’s theories. Coleridge also attended Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s biology lectures 
at the University of Göttingen.76 In fact, Linde Katritzky describes Coleridge’s arrival at 
Göttingen as that of an individual who was “steeped in progressive scientific notions, and 
fresh from communication with enthusiastic scientists, many of whom had interacted with 
Lichtenberg and Blumenbach for years” (267).77  
 A good way to see what was at stake in Theory of Life is to consider Seth B. Watson’s 
critique of this work. As the nineteenth-century editor of this book, Watson may be the son of 
Mr. Watson who worked with John Hunter when John departed from Dr. William Hunter’s 
Great Windmill anatomy school. In editing the book, Watson describes its definition of life 
as one that “disclaims the division of all that surrounds us into things with life, and things 
without life; and contends, that the term Life is no less applicable to the irreducible bases of 
chemistry, such as sodium, potassium, &c., or to the various forms of crystals, or the 
geological strata which compose the crust of our globe, than it is to the human body itself, 
the acme and perfection of animal organization” (Watson 8). But Watson raises his own 
personal contentions with Coleridge’s blanket application of the word “life” and argues that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Quoted from Beddoes Observations 1: 1xxxiii. Also, Dr. Beddoes translated Dr. John Brown’s Elements of 
Medicine (1795), in which there is an illustration of Dr. Brown by William Blake. Additionally, Louis I. 
Bredvold notes that Coleridge “attended lectures by Dr. [Thomas] Beddoes … and when he was at the 
University of Göttingen, he had the opportunity of hearing Blumenbach’s lectures in biology. Upon his return to 
England, he frequently observed experiments of Humphrey Davy” (393).   
 
76 Interestingly, one of Blumenbach’s sponsors for being elected to the Royal Society was John Hunter.  
 
77 Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London. Vol. 49, no. 2 (1995) 
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he wishes Coleridge had restricted the term to mankind. Watson disagrees with Coleridge’s 
belief that “rocks and mountains, nay, ‘the great globe itself’ share[s] with mankind the gift 
of life” (9), further objecting to Coleridge’s use of “Nature” that it is “extremely apt to make 
a false impression on young or thoughtless minds” (9). Watson explains that nature “is not a 
person; it is not active; it neither creates nor performs actions more or less energetically, nor 
learns, nor forgets, no reexerts [sic] itself, nor recruits its vigour” (10). Watson attempts to 
exert corrections upon readers by noting that “Nature in any intelligible sense, means nothing 
but that method and order by which the Almighty regulates the common course of things” 
(10). To emphasize his condemnation of Coleridge’s intertwining of poetry with science, 
Watson states that “figurative language is very much misplaced in strict philosophical 
investigations; and these particular figures, which might be quite consistent with the 
atheistical philosophy of Lucretius, sound ill in the mouth of a pious Christian, which Mr. 
Coleridge undoubtedly was” (10-1). Given the severity of Watson’s displeasure in his 
introduction to Coleridge’s Theory of Life, we must acknowledge the pressure Watson puts 
on the readers prior to their reading the first line of chapter one. It is the reverse, but equally 
powerful editorial pressure constraining John’s nineteenth-century publications. Both John’s 
and Coleridge’s works were fundamentally altered by the dismissive editors who often 
undervalued their complex approaches to subjects that are not typical within their respective 
fields of inquiry.78 Generally speaking, these editors overtly shared the attitude that a poet 
should not be discussing anatomy and an anatomist should refrain from delving into 
metaphysics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 At this point, we do not have a full understanding of Dr. Watson’s editorial principles, or an explanation of 
how he came to possess a manuscript of Coleridge’s Theory of Life.   
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 In his introduction, Coleridge immediately identifies John as the premier voice 
leading an open dialogue about the metaphysics of life. Coleridge may have known about 
John in part as a result from the William Lawrence (1783-1867)-John Abernethy (1764-
1831) debates from 1799 onwards. Lawrence was a former student of Abernethy who 
became his adversary by promoting an overtly materialistic approach to the origin of life. On 
the other hand, Abernethy, a former student of John Hunter, was a major proponent of 
advancing vitalism through an exclusively metaphysical scope that was explicitly indebted to 
John. These debates caught Coleridge’s interest insofar as they demonstrated a deadlock 
between two schools of thought pertaining to the philosophies of life, but also caused 
Coleridge to desire an absolute philosophy to avoid the stalemate by incorporating parts from 
both Lawrence’s and Abernethy’s works. The fulcrum between the two thinkers, for 
Coleridge, was John Hunter.  
 In the years around 1816-20, just after his first admiring reference to John, Coleridge 
announces that John’s work on the definition of life has acquired a virtually divine 
significance to him. Coleridge clarifies his perception of John’s profundity, first by stating 
his familiarity with John’s published works, and then by sharing his experience of revelation 
in visiting John’s anatomy museum at the Royal College of Surgeons in Lincoln’s Inn Fields. 
Inside the museum, which Coleridge compares to an Augustan temple with John Hunter 
himself as its priest, he seizes upon the fusion between the metaphysical and scientific strains 
in John’s work on themes life and death. He writes: 
When we stand before the bust of John Hunter, or as we enter the magnificent 
museum furnished by his labours, and pass slowly, with meditative 
observation, through this august temple, which the genius of one great man 
has raised and dedicated to the wisdom and uniform working of the Creator, 
we perceive at every step the guidance, we had almost said, the inspiration, of 
those profound ideas concerning Life, which dawn upon us, indeed, through 
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his written works, but which he has here presented to us in a more perfect 
language than that of words—the language of God himself, as uttered by 
Nature. (17) 
 
John, for Coleridge, was not simply an anatomist preoccupied with experimental and 
empirical data, but he was also a genius who searchingly labored over questions about our 
bodies’ longevity and their propensity towards death. By identifying John as a genius, 
Coleridge models the Romantics’ conception of genius as a bard for humanity, and thus John 
is promoted as a divinely sanctioned bard-anatomist. And as Coleridge reads the anatomical 
specimens in John’s collection he treats the museum as a book that left no body unexamined 
while revealing God’s secrets. Coleridge is praising the museum for offering what he wanted, 
“absolute demonstration” not in the language of man but in the language of anatomy. He 
gives John credit for exhaustive insight in positioning all living bodies (humans, animals, and 
plants) on a single spectrum. In doing so, Coleridge recognizes that John’s search for the 
original spark of life was also an attempt to construct a universal account of this 
phenomenon. Coleridge concludes his celebration of John by exclaiming that “the true idea 
of Life existed in the mind of John Hunter I do not entertain the least doubt” (17). John’s 
museum is the perfect teleological proof of the true idea of life. Coleridge expresses absolute 
confidence that John’s works virtually embody the divine mind’s idea of life. If the written 
works are the dawn of revelation, then the anatomy museum is high noon. 
 Coleridge recognizes that John’s rogue personality may not have been sensible like 
his older brother’s, but Coleridge asks us not to let this fact hamper the brilliance of his 
works in that John was the first to seriously advance the project of defining life as a separate 
inquiry from embryological studies. In that manner, Coleridge partly recognizes the 
ingenuity of John in defying the formal education of anatomists, but he readily accepts and 
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propels the novelty of John’s metaphysics. Nonetheless Coleridge’s own assessment of 
John’s limited education prompts Coleridge to envision a way, in which as a poet, he might 
contribute to John’s project:   
…it may, perhaps, be doubted whether his incessant occupation, and his 
stupendous industry in the service, both of his contemporaries and of 
posterity, added to his comparatively slight acquaintance with the arts and aids 
of logical arrangement, permitted him fully to unfold and arrange it in distinct, 
clear, and communicable conceptions. …in his writings the light which 
occasionally flashes upon us seems at other times, and more frequently, to 
struggle through an unfriendly medium, and even sometimes to suffer a 
temporary occultation. …To this effect we must, as it were, climb up on his 
shoulders, and look at the same objects in a distincter form, because seen from 
the more commanding point of view furnished by himself. (18)     
 
This analysis stems from Coleridge’s keen observation in recognizing John’s struggles with 
the English language. The medical metaphysicians’ struggle with language takes on two 
forms. For one thing John simply lacks his brother’s formal education and culture. For 
another, by referring to the works in an “unfriendly medium,” Coleridge also expresses his 
fear that the English language itself lacks words for meditative speculations pertaining to 
anatomical unknowns. Here again Coleridge wants an absolute demonstration of a linguistic 
character. In acknowledging John’s novelty as well as his linguistic battles, Coleridge argues 
that it is precisely because of such intellectual frictions between language and the anatomy 
specimens that it is necessary for someone like Coleridge to produce additional perspectives 
to the study of defining life. Given Coleridge’s educational background in medicine, he feels 
that coupled with his literary skills, he has something to offer to the complex—unfinished—
metaphysical project of John’s.   
 And thus Coleridge begins Theory of Life by quoting Bichat’s definition of life, “Life 
is the sum of all the functions by which death is resisted,” then by raising his major 
contention with Bichat’s definition in that it neglects to offer “the law of the thing” (22, 25). 
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In his disappointment with Bichat’s definition, Coleridge argues that scientific study is 
supposed “to be causative, but by introduction of imaginary somewhats, natural or 
supernatural, under the name of causes, but by announcing the law of action in the particular 
case, in subordination to the common law of what all the phenomena are modifications or 
results” (25). By structuring the nature of inquiries as one that actively seeks to explore and 
explain ambiguity, Coleridge contributes to John’s project by accommodating John’s 
foundational speculations, but Coleridge wants to add the study of the conscious human mind 
as a crucial topic within the philosophies of life and death.   
 From a historical perspective, Coleridge claims that the birth of science precipitates 
humanity’s interest in defining life, precisely because it demonstrates the unfolding 
awareness of our desire to understand the philosophical differences between life and death: 
“the 13th century the first science which roused the intellects of men from the torpor of 
barbarism” (28). In this sense of history, Coleridge shares a similarity with William in that 
both utilize a historical narrative to highlight progress as well as to ensure humility among 
contemporary thinkers. But they differ in that William framed historical topics in his Two 
Lectures as a moral and ethical framework, whereas Coleridge’s treatment of history was 
overtly Hegelian. He believes the initial impetus for humanity’s desire to define life began 
when humanity “wonder[ed] if truths, that appeared to reveal the secret depths of our own 
souls, should take possession of the whole mind, and all truths appears trivial which could 
not either be evolved out of similar principles, by the same process, or at least brought under 
the same forms of thought, by perceived or imagined analogies?” (28). The capacity for a 
human mind to examine its subjectivity and to search for a rationale of its existence within 
the natural environment marks civilization’s progress. Coleridge believes our inability to 
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define that rationale of life gave rise to religious metaphysics; even still, the very core of 
metaphysics pertaining to ourselves remains a perpetual question with an elusive answer: 
what drives and retains life within its corporeal manifestations, or as Coleridge calls it, “the 
sacred adyta of organic life,” suggesting that somewhere within our bodies there is an 
interiority sustaining and protecting life akin to an especially secret sanctuary inside an 
ancient Greek temple (32). The language and recapitulation of a priest-and-temple 
relationship suggest that Coleridge has greater confidence in religion’s capacity to define life 
than we see in the Lyrical Ballads. The Romantic Prophet proves to be problematic in that 
this figure often takes on an isolated voice, and the medical philosopher is also problematic 
because it tends towards either a strictly mechanistic or a divine framework, and therefore 
Coleridge firmly roots himself in Christian dogma in his remaining years. This final shift 
indicates that medicine, for Coleridge, is a pivotal transition phase from revolutionary poetry 
to exclusively Christian philosophizing.  
 A major motivation for Coleridge is his desire to escape his reputation for 
supernaturalism that developed from The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798). Accordingly 
he cautions all readers of Theory of Life that he “disclaim[s] all intention of explaining life 
into an occult quality” (33). In other words he does not want his readers to think his analogies 
between John’s anatomy museum and an Augustan temple to be supernatural. He intends his 
comparison of the two to be of a fundamentally different source from his earlier poetry, that 
is, psychosomatic rather than supernatural. In sharing with John the struggles with how to 
define life, Coleridge is clearly worried about his own legacy post-Theory of Life.  
 In his troubles in explaining the phenomena of life, living, and their relationship to 
putrefaction, Coleridge finds his definition of life: “I define life as the principle of 
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individuation, or the power which unites a given all into a whole that is presupposed by all its 
parts. The link that combines the two, and acts throughout both, will, of course, be defined by 
the tendency to individuation” (42). This definition addresses John’s attempt to produce a 
philosophy of life that included amputated bodies and yet recalled a pre-amputated life. For 
example, an arm by itself is not alive. The arm can only express a recognizable sign of life 
when it is attached to the human body. No one would claim a human being dead because of 
an amputation, and the reverse proves true; an arm separated from its body could not be said 
to be alive.79 For Coleridge, the sum of all individual parts to create a whole, thereby 
becoming recognizable as an object to us, is a requisite in defining life.  
 Coleridge sees that the activity of individuation also reveals a body’s property of 
gravitational union, or in other words, the property by which individual parts remain 
connected to the whole. He argues that what keeps our internal organs within our bodies and 
from freely floating around depends on gravity’s inclination to maintain wholeness amongst 
parts. Coleridge attributes that union to “the opposite tendency to connect, even as the 
centrifugal power supposes the centripetal, or as the two opposite poles constitute each other, 
and are the constituent acts of one and the same power in the magnet” (50). Borrowing from 
John’s ideas on sympathetic union, Coleridge makes similar claims as Blake does in 
Jerusalem and Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “They take the Two Contraries which are calld 
Qualities, with which / Every Substance is clothd, they name them Good & Evil” and 
“Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love 
and Hate, are necessary to Human Existence” (Erdman 152, 34). Yet Coleridge is more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 This also captures William Blake’s interest in regeneration; especially noted by his fascination with polyps. 
See Stefani Englestein’s Anxious Anatomy (2009) for further details on Blake and polyps.  
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teleological than Blake, for the aggregated whole and its ability to maintain that objective 
whole drive Coleridge’s Theory of Life.  
  Astutely aware that he is treading a fine line between empirical sciences and highly 
abstract philosophies as a self-proclaimed “medical philosopher,” Coleridge argues that an 
interplay between the two extremes is necessary to guarantee a comprehensive examination 
of life: 
Life, then, we consider as the copula, or the unity of thesis and antithesis, 
position and counterposition,—Life itself being the positive of both; as, on the 
other hand, the two counterpoints are necessary conditions of the 
manifestations of Life. These, by the same necessity, unite in a synthesis; 
which again, by the law of dualism, essential to all actual existence, expands, 
or produces itself, from the point into the line, in order again to converge, as 
the initiation of the same productive process in some intenser [sic] form of 
reality. (51)  
 
Quietly he points out that a definition of life must not be reducible to a single action or 
principle, or even a single cause; but rather it must be able to explain the contentions that a 
body endures to preserve life among differentiated parts. Coleridge notes that “the identity 
of the two counter-powers, Life subsists; in their strife it consists: and in their reconciliation 
it at once dies and is born again into a new form, either falling back into the life of the 
whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation” (52). The fight to survive is an 
attempt simultaneously to live and to continually recreate. Coleridge is trying to explain that 
the perpetual struggle for every living body is also a process of creativity. Or alternatively, 
the propensity towards an interactive adaptation to one’s environment reflects a body’s 
innate creativity to persist in living.  
 But what exactly is that propensity or “strife”? Coleridge argues that it is not 
locatable in, or determined by a specific organ. A flawed physiologist can only think in 
terms of anatomy, but Coleridge expands his definition to argue that the “universal law of 
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life” is found in Time and Space (53). The necessary relationship between time and space, 
or “the oneness” of the two concepts strikes Coleridge as the “predicate of all real being” 
(53). He argues that one concept cannot be determined without the other. In other words, we 
cannot distinguish time without space, and vice-a-versa: “if we exclude space by an abstract 
assumption, the time remains as a spaceless point, and represents the concentered power of 
unity and active negation, i.e. retraction, determination, and limit, ab intra. But if we 
assume the time as excluded, the line vanishes, and we leave space dimensionless, an 
indistinguishable ALL, and therefore the representative of absolute weakness and 
formlessness” (54). It is the “interpeneration and co-inherence” of time and space that 
makes these concepts perceptible to our minds, but also “the condition and meaning of a—
thing” (57). As noted by C. U. M. Smith, the Romantics’ use of “… space, time, substance, 
causality, and so on, are not observables but the very conditions which make meaningful 
observations possible. They are ordering relations imposed on our “sense data” by ourselves 
so that we can make sense of our observations” (Smith 223). Thus Coleridge exemplifies the 
need for space and time to articulate his own philosophies of life and death. There are 
echoes of the Cartesian “I think, therefore I am” in Coleridge’s explanation of life, but only 
insofar as he uses time and space to claim how we use the activity of thinking to recognize 
living from the unthinking dead. Thus life is indefinable solely in terms of physiology, 
theology, or philosophy. Life cannot be found in a single, unique substance. For Coleridge 
explains “Life itself is not a thing—a self-subsistent hypostasis—but an act and process” 
(Watson 94). Hence space and time necessarily exist to explain the capacity of self-
recognition in our thinking as well as to mark the minute differences of life as a tangled 
process that intercedes within all bodies, vegetable and animal. And metaphysically 
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speaking, notions of space and time serve as concepts marking powers that express what 
Coleridge claims as “the power to suffer, as well as the power to act” (93). The histories of 
the human mind demonstrate, all too harrowingly, our capacity to express both powers.       
 Dead material, both plant and animal, is the product of a disintegrated relationship 
between counteractive forces. As Coleridge explains: “decomposition, in short, the relations 
of unproductive particles to each other; so that in every instance the result is the exact sum 
of the components qualities, as in arithmetical addition. This is the philosophy of Death, and 
only of a dead nature can it hold good. In Life, and in the view of vital philosophy, the two 
component counter-powers actually interpenetrate each other” (63). When the integration of 
polar forces ceases to negotiate the peculiarities of their attraction and repulsion, then the 
singularity of somatic particles is now both distinguishable and decaying. The inability to 
determine a single object for what constitutes life (i.e. blood, ether, etc.), Coleridge claims, 
is the definition of living because it is not a single entity that yields life, but rather, life is a 
result of a conglomeration of energies.  
 And yet, at the height of his Christian works in the 1820s, Aids to Reflection, he 
divides death into two types, physical and spiritual: “… besides that dissolution of our 
earthly tabernacle which we call death, there is another death, not the mere negation of life, 
but its positive opposite. And as there is a mystery of life, and an assimilation to the principle 
of life, even to him who is the Life; so is there a mystery of death, and an assimilation to the 
principle of evil; a fructifying of the corrupt seed, of which death is the germination” (Aids 
251). Interestingly, he assigns the concept of death the same philosophical genealogy as 
John’s “principle of life”. Coleridge may cloak death in mysteries, but he explicitly identifies 
death as an extension of evil. Despite his convictions in Theory of Life that our fallacies tend 
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to originate from our narrow perception as a human being, he assigns death a human moral 
value, but for no other stage of a human’s life does he offer a moral explication.  
 Death is the end of nature’s creativity, too. Nature’s response to the inherent conflict 
within a body begets evolution, for “the great fundamental truth that all things spring from, 
and subsist in, the endless strife between indifference and difference. The whole history of 
Nature is comprised in the specification of the transitional states from the one to the other” 
(68). Metamorphosis is the creative clash between polarities yielding to the universal array 
of natural diversity. In general terms, this is precisely what Coleridge sees when viewing the 
entirety of John’s “Book of Life” in his anatomy museum. He visualizes the transitional 
phases of nature in comparable terms to how William Blake sees vortexes as the dimensions 
of universes: “the progress of Nature…and that she expands as by concentric circles” (70). 
The boundary of each outwardly radiating concentric circle represents the “endless strife” 
and the ultimate and subsequent rise of the next phase of transition. Coleridge elaborates, 
“the whole actual life of Nature originates in the existence, and consists in the perpetual 
reconciliation, and as a perpetual resurgency of the primary contradiction, of which 
universal polarity is the result and the exponent” (70). The human body “ascend[s] from the 
laws of attraction and repulsion, as united in gravity, to magnetism, electricity, and 
constructive power, till we arrive at the point of representative of a new and far higher 
intensity” (71). Whereas Blake sees a series of interlinked vortexes as the explanation for 
the infinite numbers of human, animal, and plant bodies, Coleridge views all of nature by 
looking downward in one instance to visualize not individually linked vortexes, but only one 
set of concentric circles that emanates until it arrives at what he views at the “last and most 
consummate of her [Nature] combined energies,” which represents the human brain (73). 
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Our bodies, containing the human brain, an organ that his describes as being “disguised in 
the subtlety and multiplicity of its evolution,” reflect his uncertainty of whether human 
beings are the final circle or will transition into another phase (73). By placing the human 
brain at the very center of the last concentric circle, Coleridge signifies our varied states of 
consciousness. C. U. M Smith is right to point out the link between Coleridge and Galen’s 
“idea of an indwelling power working from within outwards” (Smith 42). Coleridge 
attributed this power to divine origins, but he looked for anatomical proof. Our human mind, 
says Coleridge, is the “whole force of organic power” that has “attained an inward and 
centripetal direction” (85). The fleshy body that expresses the mind “has the whole world in 
counterpoint to him, but he contains an entire world within himself. Now, for the first time 
at the apex of the living pyramid, it is Man and Nature, but Man himself is a syllepsis, a 
compendium of Nature—the Microcosm! ... he is a revelation of Nature” (85-6). Nature has 
created man through eons of polar confrontations. 
 As the concentric circles narrow towards the center—the apex—Coleridge suggests 
the last great battle of polarity will take place between Nature and Man—Maker and Prodigy, 
or Master and Slave—leading towards an apocalyptic battle. Until that final struggle occurs, 
he keeps his focus on the forces within a human body. When he writes that “the difference of 
magnetism and electricity, and the powers illustrated by them, is an essential part of my 
system, but that the animal Life of man is the identity of all three,” he is positioning man as 
the synthesis of energetic engagements (87). Man does not proceed a priori to magnetism or 
electricity, nor is man endowed with a particular substance: “I hold the organized body itself, 
in all its marvellous contexture, to be the produce and representant of the power… the 
unceasing polarity of life, as the form of its process, and its tendency to progressive 
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individuation as the law of its direction” (66-7). Man, to Coleridge, is the result of 
intermingling forces constantly negotiating polarities; it is from these battles that man 
achieves his dominance. Without opposites, life ceases, and decomposition begins. Coleridge 
understands that the process of decomposition of a body is actually a slow dissolution of the 
body’s conglomeration of individual parts into singular, indivisible parts as tangible proof 
that death is definable as the absence of energies’ dualities. 
II. Reframing Theory of Life in relation to Coleridge’s Philosophy of Consciousness   
 We must look at several works prior to Theory of Life to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of Coleridge’s concept of interiority and its polarities, both subjectively and 
objectively. In his essay fragment, “On the Concept of ‘Depth’” he sets up the premise that 
“the idea of Depth is one and the same with that of inward, or the inside” (CL 11.1: 452). If 
one does not account for interior substance, depth, then one will only conceive of length 
(11.1: 452). Coleridge argues for the necessity of depth because “Space has relation only to 
the outside. Depth therefore must be that by not with which Space is filled” (11.1: 453). If 
depth is not a perceptible, tangible characterization of bodies then, exactly, what is it? He 
writes of this depth that “it must be a Power, the essence of which is inwardness, 
outwardness being its effect and mode of manifesting itself” (11.1: 453). By synthesizing 
depth with the animation of bodies, Coleridge creates a union between the corporeal and 
metaphysical. Then the body, he claims, “cannot be essentially material—but that Depth—
i.e. a power, manifesting itself in Space, and contemplated in its phœnomena, Length and 
Breadth, is what we mean by BODY” (11.1: 453). Depth is the expression of a distinct 
object from space and time. If our bodies create depth, and we can perceive depth in 
separate bodies from ourselves, then we arrive at the metaphysical power of feeling. He 
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defines “feeling” as self-confirmation: “in all languages—deep feeling, profound thought: 
substantial Truth … But feeling is a Self-Finding” (11.1: 454). If we feel “depth,” then we 
confirm its separateness from our bodies, thereby recognizing life. Feeling is an action that 
happens because one is alive. For Coleridge, one cannot have a feeling without a mind, and 
therefore the mind needs to be posited at the crux of a universal definition of life; hence the 
human brain is the very center of the concentric depiction of all living bodies.  
 Even as much as Coleridge likened us to God in his metaphysical writings, he still 
maintained that thoroughly knowing the universe was not in perfect harmony with human 
ambition or understanding; Coleridge emphasizes the value of admitting uncertainty. He 
admires thinkers’ ability to admit the limitations of their knowledge, and wishes to conceive 
this admittance as a confirmation of integrity as well as demonstrating the necessity of 
pursuing uneasy questions concerning ourselves. To some degree then Coleridge recognizes 
that his desire for absolute demonstration is impractical. In his fragment, “On the Existence 
of Evil and the Uncertainty of Progress” (1816), he writes that “the Physician is worth of no 
thanks, who determines the true name and nature of the Malady and refers it to its right seat 
and source, even tho’ he should confess himself unable to prescribe for it…If he draws off 
those, who have been losing themselves on the wrong scent, if he guard the Patient against 
unprincipled Empirics and Remedies worse than the Disease, I do not see why those, who in 
all other things so highly extol the division of Labor, can consistently deny him the credit of 
having paid in to the Public” (11.1: 421). Coleridge is attempting to ensure validity in the 
practice of speculating on life and death despite the evasiveness of absolute answers. 
Humanity’s irreconcilable desire to justify its mental speculations is reflected in a short note 
of Coleridge’s, “On the Mind” (c. 1814): “Beauty—Mind in the form of Life.—Then, 
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definition of Mind as from basis—& Life—what is this?—” (11.1: 348). The uncertainty of 
his note assures Coleridge of his own integrity as a thinker in discussing life and death. The 
very fact that many of these text are left in manuscript or in fragmentary states underscores 
Coleridge’s appreciation of provisional knowledge, especially given the fact that he is still 
thinking about issues that have intrigued him his whole adult life.  
 Nevertheless, Coleridge does not hesitate to participate in his own anatomical 
explorations like the Hunter brothers. For example, in “Fragmentary Advice” (c. 1816), he 
examines the anatomical marvel of our eyes’ capacity to focus on single objects despite our 
panoramic sight. He asks how our eyes are able to take “converging rays of Light or Warmth 
in the Air” and translate those photons into a focused picture, which in turn “our sight and 
feeling acts precisely as if a solid flesh & blood reality were there” (11.1: 423). How is it that 
our eyes impress form upon the rays of light to create objects of recognition? Then he 
inquires further and attempts to describes how “focal entities, we are all more or less in the 
habit of creating for ourselves in the world of Thought…Thought after Thought, Feeling after 
Feeling, and at length the sensations of Touch…Infinitesimals that make up our sense of 
existing…The focal word has acquired a feeling of reality—it heats, & burns, makes itself be 
felt. If we do not grasp it, it seems to grasp us, as with a hand of flesh & blood, and 
completely counterfeits an immediate presence, an intuitive knowledge” (11.1: 423). The 
original anatomical aim shifts as he asks whether our anatomy or our consciousness 
determines the objects of our shared reality. His question from an anatomical inquiry into the 
human eye shapes Coleridge’s attempt to legitimize both our sensorial and psychological 
apprehension of the world to describe processes, external and internal, to the human body.  
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 In his manuscript essay “Consciousness and Self-Consciousness” (c. 1816), we see 
how Coleridge works out similar concepts of the human mind and identity prior to the 
publication of Biographia Literaria in 1817. Take for instance its Thesis VI: “the SUM or I 
AM; which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by the words spirit, self, and self-
consciousness. In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowing, are identical, 
each involving and supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a 
subject by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which never is an object 
except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act it becomes a subject. It may be 
described therefore as a perpetual self-duplication of one and the same power into object and 
subject”. Here Coleridge is working out a metaphysical question he raises in 
“Consciousness” that meditates on how the soul knows itself, corporeally and 
metaphysically. In “Consciousness” he answers that the soul can only be said to know itself 
from “the Soul’s distinguishing it [any object or subject from itself] from her Self, as a 
modification of the ground from the ground—and then comparing herself thus modified with 
her Self as the ground of other pervious or co-existent modification…she is not only the 
ground as receptive Being but a cause as a will, or a productive energy, as a spontaneous 
Life” (11.1: 427). If the soul can actively distinguish concepts, then there is proof of a living 
aspect. He argues it is necessary for the soul to be identified as our self-consciousness in 
order to account for our internal monologues, which act as a filtered separator between the 
internal and the external reality. Coleridge considers the soul as the glue that binds the human 
body and mind: “We must attribute to the Soul, as a self-conscious personal Being, not only a 
unity that cannot be divided; but this unity must contain distinctnesses [sic] that cannot be 
confounded. The Soul must not only be distinct & therefore distinguishable, from other Souls 
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& other Objects, but she must be capable of actually distinguishing herself” (11.1: 427-8). 
The soul is our divine pathway to realizing the existence of God, but this conclusion leads to 
another disorienting question for Coleridge.  
 If he is correct that there are multiple layers of consciousness, then do those layers 
cause multiple competing perceptions? In an annotation regarding “On David Hartley 
Observations on Man” (1800), however entirely stricken out, Coleridge wrote, “is not 
Perception a habit? Upon the whole perhaps it is better to consider Perception as painful & 
pleasurable only by the association with bodily + present feelings” (11.1: 107). He seems to 
be suggesting that consciousness influences our perceptions because we are able to discern 
what we perceive by checking its reception against the body’s sensorial memory bank, a 
point that he elaborates in Biographia: “all the organs of sense are framed for a 
corresponding world of sense; and we have it. All the organs of spirit are framed for a 
correspondent world of spirit: though the latter organs are not developed in all alike. But they 
exist in all, and their first appearance discloses itself in the moral being” (Chapter 12). Here 
Coleridge is arguing that the soul is a spiritual umbilical cord to the divine spiritual body that 
ensures the existence of morality in our fleshy anatomy.80 The soul and human mind both act 
as mediums between the worlds of the tactile and spiritual within a human being.  
 If we look at another fragment, “On the Four Convictions Natural to Man” (1816), we 
see how Coleridge identifies four key concepts that position the body between the 
metaphysical and the tactile world. These four concepts constitute the basis for what he 
qualifies as knowledge in understanding the human body’s negotiations of interiority and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See Coleridge’s fragment “The Soul and the Universe” for the origins of this quote: “As no one every 
doubted, that all the visible & tangible part of the Universe bore some analogy to his Body, tho’ it were but as 
an oyster shell to an eye: so it always seemed to me strange, and wilful [sic] and almost wicked not to believe 
equally that what cannot be seen touched, or heard, bore an equal analogy to his soul” (Essays, 154).  
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reality throughout its life span: “First, those derived from the senses by aid of the 
Understanding. Second, those derived from the Understanding by reflection on its own acts 
and processes. Third: those derived from the pure Reason. Fourth: those derived from the 
Conscience. The first Class comprises all matters of Fact, the sum of man’s sensible 
Experience” (11.1: 412). Without sensorial impressions, bodies cannot understand or make 
use of themselves in a natural environment without collaborating with their consciousness. 
From within the consciousness, facts are determined about ourselves, objectively and 
subjectively. The body, for Coleridge, is always the liminal space between the thinking and 
acting. 
 In his “Suggestions for J.H. Green’s Lectures on Anatomy and Surgery” (c. 1824), 
Coleridge outlines the position of our neurological bodies through an anatomical framework. 
Experience, as defined by Coleridge, involves “seeing intellectually,” which he further 
describes in his claim that “Seeing can supply any ground for judging and determining” 
(11.2: 1088). He turns to a twofold model in explaining how experience operates in exploring 
our anatomical selves: if “we learn all by experience; but not all from experience,” this 
permits alternative sources of knowledge to exist within the human capacity, but unites 
humanity though a universal truism that to live is to experience (11.2: 1089). However, 
Coleridge complicates this seemingly straightforward notion by introducing his “idea of life” 
as a “power which acquires its form by evolution and its mass by assimilation” (11.2: 1090). 
Here Coleridge is extrapolating his definition of life from a human perspective and 
attempting to define all living things, which is akin to John Hunter’s museum being 
conceived as a visual representation of the “Book of Life”. But Coleridge differs from John 
in that his “Idea of Life” is supposed to act as an eternal concept that ties to an ascension 
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philosophy, whereas John discarded the notion of The Great Chain of Being. However, 
Coleridge explains that “there is yet another mode of conveying a just philosophical notion of 
Life (by considering it in the relation of a Subject to an Object)…Except the single instance 
of Self-consciousness, a Subject can never be an Object; and in no instance can it become an 
Object to another, thro’ the medium of the Senses” (11.2: 1092). Because for Coleridge the 
self-conscious is a gateway, the body of senses serves as a medium between the metaphysical 
and the physiological. The mind is a threshold that experiences, reflects, and creates: “that as 
MIND may be defined a Subject is its own Object; so may LIFE be defined, a Subject that 
tends to produce an Object for itself—the Object thus produced being its Organismus, or 
Body considered as a complexus of Organs, or Instruments” (11.2: 1092).  
 The mind is the subject of its physiological embodiment, which seems to have 
prompted Coleridge’s creation of the word “psychosomatic”—the interactive process 
between mind and body. The result from a psychosomatic relationship is manifested in the 
activity of creation. If the creation process stems from a psychosomatic polarity, then the 
thinking consciousness is the site of the creative genius in explaining how humans rationalize 
their existence within nature. In Lecture 11 (8 March 1819), Coleridge writes:  
At once the most complex and the most individual of creatures, man, taken in 
the ideal of humanity, has not been inaptly called the microcosm of the world 
in compendium, as the point to which all the lines converge from the 
circumference of nature. This applies to his sum of being, to his powers 
collectively; but we find him gifted, as it were, with a threefold mind: the one 
belonging to him specifically…and by this he beholds all things perceptively 
from his relative position as man; the second, in which those views are again 
modified, too often disturbed and falsified by his particular constitution…By 
this third and highest power he places himself on the same point as nature and 
contemplates all objects, himself included, in their permanent and universal 
beings and relations. (8.8: 461) 
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A threefold mind offers an anatomical model of consciousness. After the initial self-
affirmation that one exists as distinct from external reality, then a process of experience 
follows in shaping the individual’s understanding of itself within the natural world, and 
then—and only if—properly thinking human beings develop as they attempt to make sense 
of themselves within a universal paradigm to account for why humanity exist. When 
Coleridge writes, “Nature excludes nothing. She takes up all, still subjecting the higher to the 
less so, and ultimately subjecting all to the lower thus taken up,” he is returning to the 
Galenic notion from De usu partium corporis humani that the contemplation of nature’s 
vastness is the mark of a cultivated human mind (8.1: 461). By hitching his conception of the 
human mind to Antiquity’s notion that nature does not produce anything without reason and 
its design is always perfectly executed, his view of the mind as a focus in Theory of Life as a 
means to understand humanity’s and nature’s tendency to create is also his identification of a 
living action that takes on a quasi-divine role. 
 By focusing on the mind—conscious and subconscious—as the pinnacle of human 
life that mirrors and illuminates nature, Coleridge argues that “there is in Genius itself an 
unconscious activity—nay, that is the genius in the man of Genius” (5.2: 222). The close 
proximity of the human mind to nature yields “living and life-producing Ideas, which contain 
their own evidence and in that evidence the certainty that they are essentially one with the 
germinal causes in Nature, his Consciousness being the focus and mirror of both—for this 
does he for a time abandon the external real, in order to return to it with a fully sympathy 
with its internal & actual” (5.2: 222). As the mind wanders towards its subconscious state 
and momentarily ceases to engage with the external, it is gestures towards the understanding 
of life. It is the ebb and flow of the subconscious travelling that allows one to confirm the 
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existence of separateness from one’s mind: “each thing, that lives, has its moment of self-
exposition, and each period of each thing” (5.2: 223). When Louis I. Bredvold writes, 
“Coleridge warned against attempting to solve the mystery of life itself and especially 
stressed the danger of the encroachment of science on alien territory,” he may not have 
realized Coleridge was much more consistently interested in answering why and how the 
living force sustained presence (Brinkley 394). For Coleridge, that meant he was acutely 
observing and intellectually philosophizing about the powers of living bodies, and thus his 
“opinion is this—that deep Thinking is attainable only by a man of deep Feeling, and that all 
Truth is a species of Revelation” (400). By maintaining an organic framework between 
feeling and thinking throughout his scientific works, Coleridge is able to seamlessly weave in 
his metaphysical philosophies in the process of championing organic practices without 
hesitation. By doing so, Coleridge denies the false schism between anatomy and the fine arts 
because the human body is the linchpin that binds both fields together in their mutual study 
of the human. In addressing the human without bounded categories, Coleridge’s intellectual 
pursuits at this point in his career highlight the intricate complexities of the human and the 
dangers of studying only one facet of the human. Such neglect is a Coleridgean nightmare.  
 In bridging over the false separation between anatomy and fine arts just as the Hunter 
brothers and Blake did, Coleridge conceives the two fields interacting as powers do in a 
body, as a “series of surges and relapses, creation and quiescence, and constancy of 
productive tendency coupled with variety of productions” (Levere 167). The indefinite, or 
indeterminate, boundaries are proof of the fields’ and bodies’ proclivity towards 
experimental progress. As he explained in Theory of Life, “nothing real does or can exist 
corresponding to either pole exclusively,” but instead the real is “the synthesis of opposing 
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energies. That a thing is, is owing to a co-inherence therein of any two powers” (Watson 69). 
In other words, the greyish ambiguous areas between medicine and fine arts is the area that 
most intrigues Coleridge. It is precisely because of that ambiguity that Coleridge sustains his 
belief in a philosophy of life defined by interactive energies that are constantly participating 
in a series of transformations. In a crucial passage below, Coleridge positions himself as a 
human being aware of both his distant relation to simpler forms of life but also his 
physiological advancement as historical evidence of nature’s continual attempt to weave a 
more perfect existence of life: 
I seem to myself to behold in the quiet objects, on which I am gazing, more 
than an arbitrary illustration, more than a mere simile, the work of my own 
fancy. I feel an awe, as if there were before my eyes the same power as that of 
the reason—the same power in a lower dignity, and therefore a symbol 
established in the truth of things. I feel it alike, whether I contemplate a single 
tree or flower, or meditate on vegetation throughout the world, as one of the 
greatest organs of the life of nature. Lo!81—with the rising sun it commences 
its outward life and enters into open communication with all the elements, at 
once assimilating them to itself and to each other. At the same moment it 
strikes its roots and unfolds its leaves, absorbs and respires, steams forth its 
cooling vapour and finer fragrance, and breathes a repairing spirit, at once the 
food and tone of the atmosphere, into the atmosphere that feeds it. Lo!—at the 
touch of light how it returns an air akin to light, and yet with the same pulse 
effectuates its own secret growth, still contracting to fix what expanding it had 
refined. Lo!—how upholding the ceaseless plastic motion of the parts in the 
profoundest rest of the whole it becomes the visible ogranismus of the entire 
silent or elementary life of nature, and therefore, in incorporating the one 
extreme becomes the symbol of the other; the natural symbol of that higher 
life of reason, in which the whole series (known to us in our present state of 
being) is perfected, in which, therefore, all the subordinate gradations recur, 
and are reordained in more abundant honour. We had seen each in its own 
cast, and we now recognise them all as co-existing in the unity of a higher 
form, the crown and completion of the earthly, and the mediator of a new and 
heavenly series. Thus finally, the vegetable creation, in the simplicity and 
uniformity of its internal structure symbolising the unity of nature, while it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Coleridge’s own footnote in the 1822 edition: “… without reference to any theological dogma, or any 
religious obligation to receive it as a revealed truth, but traced to the law of the dependence of the particular on 
the universal, the first being the organ of the second, as lungs in relation to the atmosphere, the eye to the light, 
crystal to fluid, figure to space, and the like” (77).  
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represents the omniformity [sic] of her delegated functions in its external 
variety and manifoldness, becomes the record and chronicle of her ministerial 
acts, and inchases the vast unfolded volume of the earth with the 
hieroglyphics of her history. (Aids 76-9)   
 
One can recognize the history of the Great Chain of Being structuring his thoughts as he 
insists upon an internal similarity throughout all living beings. In doing so, he is able to 
maintain his conviction—shared with the organizational principle of John Hunter’s anatomy 
museum—that living is the relatable, tangible thread uniting vegetation, animals, and 
humanity. Without this thread, we miss our real history by losing the ability to read the “vast 
unfolded volume of earth” which contains the “hieroglyphics of her history,” thus 
disenfranchising the human from the natural world. Coleridge feared what the violence of 
such a separation would imply in future generations. He must have seen the rudimentary 
fractures and attempted to address these growing contentions within his own philosophies of 
life and death as a result of seeing the foreboding signs of London’s role as an epicenter of a 
great divide between science and humanities in the late nineteenth century. He realized that 
such a rift could occur because anatomists and fine artists would insist on a narrow scope to 
define life through their specialties. We can only wonder whether, if Coleridge had not 
radically confined himself to Christian writings in the two remaining decades of his life, he 
would have accounted for the next concentric level of higher reason and life beyond the 
eighteenth-century human being.  
 Coleridge concludes his Theory of Life by positioning the human body as nature’s 
model of perfection. That the structure of a human body is in tandem with nature’s secrets 
provides fertile grounds for Coleridge’s remaining years as he attempts to recover from the 
failures resulting from various disillusionments stemming from his Lyrical Ballads project 
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with William Wordsworth, a failed love, a crushing opium addiction, and finally 
psychosomatic medicine’s inability to offer a satisfactory answer to what a human being is 
and to why humans exist in the way they do. As he places human bodies as nature’s 
inexplicable form of perfection, Coleridge describes the human body as crowning jewel of 
nature:  
Man possesses the most perfect osseous structure, the least and most 
insignificant covering. The whole force of organic power has attained an 
inward and centripetal direction. He has the whole world counterpoint to him, 
but he contains an entire world within himself. Now, for the first time at the 
apex of the living pyramid, it is Man and Nature, but Man himself is a 
syllepsis, a compendium of Nature—the Microcosm! Naked and helpless 
cometh man into the world. Such has been the complaint from the eldest time; 
but we complain of our chief privilege, or ornament, and the connate mark of 
our sovereignty. Porphyrigeniti sumus! In Man the centripetal and 
individualizing tendency of all Nature is itself concentrated and 
individualized—he is a revelation of Nature! Henceforward, he is referred to 
himself, delivered up to his own charge- and he who stands the most on 
himself, an stands the firmest, is the truest, because of the most individual, 
Man. (Watson 77) 
 
Here we see a radical departure from the premise with which Coleridge opens the Theory of 
Life. Before this quotation, he adamantly declares that he will contribute to John’s 
speculations by enhancing John’s major points that were eroding under the pressure of 
former students as vitalism started to fade from the conceptual and rhetorical toolbox of 
anatomists and philosophers. Now Coleridge argues that man is a perfect artwork of nature, 
in making this claim he is starting to lay the foundations for his Christian works that position 
man in a direct relationship with God. However, he restrains himself in the praise of man; 
while the body is a perfect work of nature the metaphysical will of the human being is 
secondary to divine powers. As he explains: 
In social and political life this acme is inter-dependence; in moral life it is is 
independence; in intellectual life it is genius. Nor does the form of polarity, 
which has accompanied the law of individuation up its whole ascent, desert it 
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here. As the height, so the depth. The intensities must be at once opposite and 
equal. As the liberty, so must be the reverence for law. As the independence, 
so must be the service and the submission to the Supreme Will! As the ideal 
genius and the originality, in the same proportion must be the resignation to 
the real world, the sympathy and the inter-communion with Nature. In the 
conciliation mid-point, or equator, does the Man live, and only by its equal 
presence in both its poles can that life be manifested! (85-6)  
 
Nature and divinity form the polarity man finds himself within. While he seems to permit the 
human body an opportunity to be equal in strength to nature, he clearly submits the powers of 
the human mind beneath the divine will. Perhaps this awkward polarity is indicative of the 
historical fact that Coleridge is merely a few years away from confining himself to a 
Christian context after Theory of Life. Coleridge’s trajectory started with a young man asking 
the weightiest of questions pertaining to human life, tormenting himself with their elusive 
answers, and one that ended with his finding solace only in regulating the indefinites of life 
and death as a confirmation of God’s existence. Midway between the start and finish, 
Coleridge sought out John Hunter’s medical metaphysics for his answers. The resigned 
Coleridge may not have accomplished his initial goals as set forth in the beginning of Theory 
of Life, but he seems to never have lost his inclination to explore the condition that animates 
our body—life—and those conditions that bring about the finality of the human mind—
death—for he conceived these questions as being pertinent to discover the absolute truth 
about our humanness.  
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FIGURES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Drawing. “The life school at the Royal Academy of Arts, London with William 
Hunter” attributed to Elias Martin (c. 1770). Dr. Hunter is standing far left of the drawing. 
[Accessed January 2014; courtesy of Wellcome Images.] 
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Figure 2. Dr. John Brown’s “Table of Excitement and Excitability” from his Elements of 
Medicine (1795) (1: 163). 
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Figure 3. Dr. John Brown’s frontispiece in his Elements of Medicine (volume 1). 
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Figure 4. John’s illustration of consecutive developmental stages of a chick’s embryo from 
his posthumous publication, Treatise on the Blood, Inflammation and Gunshot Wounds 
(1794) (566).  
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